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In my dissertation I explore the connection between intentional action and practical normativity from the 
perspective of motivation.  I assume that an adequate theory of action motivation should embrace the 
normative commitment that to explain intentional action is to reveal it to be subject to practical norms.  In 
the first chapter I argue that these are not the norms of so-called instrumental rationality.   Against most 
theories of practical reason I argue that there is no irreducible, action-guiding requirement of practical 
rationality to take the means to one‘s ends.  The normativity of means-end thought is not a type of 
practical rationality that guides action, but is internal to the elementary structure of intentional action 
itself.  In the second chapter I argue against monolithic theories on which the relevant norms are the 
norms of non-instrumental practical rationality which are constituted as such by a single requirement:  the 
requirement to approximate or satisfy an agent-general desire, to act in accordance with one‘s judgment 
about one‘s reasons, or to engage in a single type of practical reasoning.  To allow for the possibility of 
primary motivational conflict, conflict between contrary motivations towards one and the same action at 
the same time, we have to assume a multi-dimensional theory which posits incommensurable practical 
requirements at the source of practical norms.  In the final chapter I argue that we should explain choice 
in the face of conflict between these incommensurable requirements in terms of these very requirements 
alone.  Against contemporary versions of Humeanism, Scholasticism and Kantianism I argue that we 
should not appeal to the existence of a separate purely executive or a more rational capacity for choice to 
explain how incommensurable practical requirements issue in unified intentional action.  Instead, I 
propose, we should accept that these incommensurable requirements issue in unified intentional action 
because they constitute potential determinations of practical knowledge: knowledge of oneself as 
determined in one‘s reasoning about what to do by the right requirement for the circumstances.  
Intentional action is what meets the requirements of practical rationality, I show, as long as we take these 
requirements to be both incommensurable and cognitive. 
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Preface 
 
It follows that the standard of reasonable conduct that the philosophy of the 
practical derives from lived experience must attend to each value in its separateness 
and irreducibility to others.  It must specify more and more closely what claims 
(including moral claims) each value makes on thought, feeling, and appetition.   
The philosopher of practice must render it as un-mysterious as he can how the 
knowledge of such a standard is not exhausted by the verbalized generalizations or 
precepts of either agent or theorist.  (D. Wiggins, Incommensurability: Four 
Proposals, p. 65) 
 
I came to Pittsburgh to work on Wittgenstein.  But once I actually made it here I got mesmerized by the 
philosophy of action.  I started working on this dissertation hoping that I would be able to follow David 
Wiggins‘ admonition about what the philosopher of practice should do.   In the process I felt the need to 
first understand how one reaches the conclusion ―that the standard of reasonable conduct that the 
philosophy of the practical derives from lived experience must attend to each value in its separateness and 
irreducibility to others.‖   
What I hope to have done in this dissertation is explain what I now understand about the premises of this 
conclusion.  I say ―what I now understand‖ because I have had the great luck to be guided in this wild 
endeavor by a true Wittgensteinian, who mercilessly but kindly over the years kept showing to me that I 
merely thought I understood, where I thought I understood: Kieran Setiya; without whom not.   
I know that dissertations have been written and are now being written without his help, but I do not think 
I will ever understand how. 
But I also hope that in this dissertation I managed to say ―nothing new.‖  For, I have also had the 
unbelievable luck to have been taught by John McDowell, who patiently and uncompromisingly over the 
years kept pointing out to me that what I was arguing against I was also infested with.  Without him I 
would have forgotten that it is the appearances we are here to save and not the reputations. 
This notwithstanding, what I hope to have done in this dissertation is to ―speak my mind‖.  For I have 
also had the great fortune to have been taught by Anil Gupta, who critically but encouragingly over the 
years kept pointing out to me that I cannot say a little bit of this and a little bit of that for fear of saying 
one false thing.  Without him I would not have minded to mind my words. 
Last, but not least, what I hope to have done in this dissertation is put my own spices in the mix.   For I 
have also had the unbelievable luck to have been taught by Jessica Moss, who ironically but always 
warmly urged me to speak my heart‘s mind and not some constructed edifice of philosophical correctness, 
even if my spices were sometimes too hot.  Without her I would have forgotten that we do not love X-
style wisdom, but just wisdom. 
 vii 
I would have known less of myself without the guidance of these four people.  And yet it was this very 
enterprise which would have been truly unbearable without the presence of my good friends.  In a sense, 
finishing this dissertation is my excuse for writing this thank you note to the friends who have shown me 
so much over these long and painful years:  First and foremost I want to thank James Pearson, who taught 
me that brilliance doesn‘t always shine, and who, with a fine sense of humor, reminded me in my darkest 
hours that ―I‘m a good philosopher even though most people think I‘m a woman;‖ Hille Paakkunainen, 
who never failed to talk me out of my philosophical fanaticism with love and patience; Jamsheed Siyar 
who never let me forget that we do philosophy to do politics; Sasha Newton, who always kept me on the 
track of self-consciousness; Markos Valaris whose sharp and painful criticism always cleansed my 
thinking; Jesse O‘Brien, whom I‘m still trying to forgive for leaving Pittsburgh, for in doing so he took 
away from me an invaluable interlocutor; Kim Frost, who reminded me that philosophy doesn‘t need to 
be life-less even though some of the best philosophers are dead, and who generously added a bit of 
Australian English to my idiomatic Greek-American mix; Kyle Stevens, who relentlessly challenged my 
carelessness with words; Matthew Boyle, who could make me touch the softest note in me without ever 
sounding off; Lissa Meritt, who could actually explain Kant to me; Jochen Bojanowsky, who spent 
endless hours explaining to me American political philosophy; Ian Blecher whose work has been an 
exemplar of the delicacy of written philosophy; Greg Strom, whose good action theory gave me strength 
when I doubted all theory; and last but not least Karl Schafer whose philosophical acuteness and courage 
inspired my last years in Pittsburgh.   
I wouldn‘t have made anything without the constant presence in my life of Elena Mamoulaki, Giouli 
Papadaki, Niki Maragkaki and Antonis Bikakis who have been my lifelong companions.  Without them 
I‘m not a whole person.  Each has supported me and encouraged me in ways that defy enumeration.   
Last, but not least, I want to thank Dora Makri, Evaggelia Peraki, Kaiti Papari and Kostas Loukos.  
Without their support and friendship I would not have managed these last painful years of ―finishing.‖  I 
owe to them more than I can say.  
I don‘t know how any-one manages this sort of life without such good friends. 
Nevertheless I need to admit that all of my 1% of potential originality is stolen.  In Steven Engstrom‘s 
lectures it was impressed upon me with great care that nothing bad can ever happen to reason itself.  (This 
in effect is the inspiration of the fourth chapter.)  Sometimes, after Michael Thompson‘s seminars I could 
literally feel my mind blowing up; thinking along with Michael about kinesis always felt like a kinesis of 
my understanding.  (None of the first chapter would obviously have been possible without the guidance of 
Michael‘s thought.)  In Sebastian Rodl‘s classes I could see it all hang together beautifully.  Time and 
self-consciousness and I knew that I could never build something as attractive as what he did.  I did try 
though.  In my dream-like discussions with Jonathan Lear, I was taught that there is room even in the 
philosophy which looks to the ideal for the experience of loss and pain.  I would never have the courage 
to schematize anything like the philosophical possibility of conflict, had it not been for his guidance and 
empathy.  He could understand what it is like to come near a point where ―nothing happens,‖ and I had to 
start from there.  And in my conversations with Aristeides Baltas, my teacher in Athens, I could always 
feel that doing intellectual work is a matter of taking a political stance and not simply occupying an 
armchair. 
 viii 
The very best moments of this dissertation would, if only per impossibile, be blessed if they had managed 
to steal something from the ethos of Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics, Plato‘s Republic, Kant‘s Religion 
within the Limits of Reason Alone, and Anscombe‘s Intention.  
I dreamed of this dissertation one night last summer while I was sitting in the ancient open-air theatre of 
Dionysus, below the Akropolis of Athens in Greece, and under the stars, listening to the symphony, 
looking over the lights of the city.  I could see myself sitting there, struggling to understand why I kept 
failing to ―be‖ in harmony, to ―be‖ in balance, and I knew it, right there, right then, that that experienced 
―struggling‖ and not the wishful ―being‖ was the point; that I had to read Plato more than I had read 
Aristotle, and think about partition more than I had thought about the good.  I knew that I could not just 
―be‖ anything, either through luck or design.  I could not just parachute myself in the land of the free.  
Each time I had to make a kinesis, from conflict to unity.  Here it is my first such attempt. 
To my family. 
* 
 
Portions of this dissertation were written while I held an American Association of University Women 
Fellowship.  I am very grateful for the funding.  I‘m also grateful for comments of audiences at the Center 
of Humanities of the University of Johns Hopkins and the Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society and 
the Mind Association, and in particular Anthony Duff, Mark Pavlopoulos and Sandi Berkovsky, as well 
as my teachers in Athens, Vasso Kindi and Stelios Virvidakis.  Last, I want to thank Kristen Inglis for her 
comments for my second chapter and Kevin Smith for showing me the way to courage. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In my dissertation I explore the connection between intentional action and practical normativity 
from the perspective of motivation.
1
  The main assumption of this work is the truth of what I shall 
be calling the normativist commitment: that to explain action motivation as such is to reveal it to 
conform or fail to conform to, or conform by approximation to, representations of practical 
norms; for short, to reveal it to be subject to representations of practical norms.
2
  I argue that (1) 
practical norms are the norms of non-instrumental practical rationality, (2) that these norms 
ultimately trace back to incommensurable requirements of practical rationality, (3) that the form 
of action motivation (the way action motivation is determined by these incommensurable 
requirements) is the form of practical reasoning (the way practical reasoning is determined by 
these incommensurable requirements), and (4) that the form of practical reasoning and hence of 
action motivation is the form of practical self-consciousness; self-consciousness on the part of the 
agent as determined in her reasoning about what to do by the right practical requirement for the 
circumstances; such that when things go well it constitutes practical knowledge of oneself as 
rightly determining what to do in the circumstances.   
                                                          
1
 By “action motivation” I refer to that activation of the agent’s psychic structures or the agent’s most general 
concerns that makes intentional action intelligible in the way that intentional action is intentional.  The exact 
nature of action motivation will depend on the details of particular theories I will examine in the main body of the 
dissertation. 
2
 From now on I shall be calling theories that accept this commitment “normativist” and theories that reject it 
“anti-normativist.” 
 2 
In the first part of this introduction I will motivate the normativist commitment by presenting 
the phenomenon of akrasia as a philosophical explanandum that anti-normativist accounts of 
action motivation fail to accommodate.  In particular, I will argue, anti-normativist accounts fail 
to explain why akratic motivation incurs a distinctive sort of criticism, when compared to 
immoral motivation in general.  In the second part of this introduction I will present a more 
detailed outline of the argument of this dissertation. 
 
1.1 THE EXPLANATORY AIM OF A THEORY OF MOTIVATION 
Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism criticizes an anti-normativist account of motivation 
on the grounds that it renders intelligible behavior that is not in fact intelligible.
3
  Leaving some 
of the interpretative issues and the details of Nagel‘s argument aside, we may extract from The 
Possibility of Altruism
4
 the following line of thought against anti-normativist accounts of the 
motivation to take the means to one‘s ends.    
1. Pre-theoretically, it makes sense to divide behavior that aims at the realization of an end 
into intelligible and unintelligible behavior.   
2. The aim of a theory of motivation is to explain what makes intelligible behavior 
intelligible and unintelligible behavior unintelligible. 
3. To meet this aim, a theory should explain intelligible behavior as behavior that is subject 
to the normative standards of what counts as aiming at an end.   
4. But, anti-normativist theories of motivation reject the very idea of the connection between 
the intelligibility of action and the appeal to norms. 
                                                          
3
 See Nagel, 1970. 
4
 See especially Nagel, 1970, chapter VI.  
 3 
5. Therefore, non-normativist theories of motivation are bound to fail to satisfy the 
explanatory aim laid out in (2).  
The controversial claim that this reconstruction of Nagel‘s argument involves is the claim of 
premise (3): that if in explaining aim-oriented behavior we are not thereby revealing the agent as 
being subject to standards detailing how she ought to be, our explanations fail to do what they 
were supposed to do, because they fail to properly distinguish between intelligible and 
unintelligible behavior.  But the anti-normativist about motivation will debate this interpretation 
of the general explanatory aim of a theory of motivation proposed in (2).   As Kieran Setiya puts 
it when responding to a particular normativist account of motivation (on which motivation is 
constituted as such by the norms of ideal rationality), ―There is pressure for one's dispositions, 
taken together, to be at least moderately good. But there is no reason to suppose that, in each 
instance, practical thought or the motivation of action must be "made intelligible by being 
revealed to be, or to approximate being, as [it] rationally ought to be" (McDowell 1985, p. 328), 
or that a special kind of explanation is involved.‖5  To use Nagel‘s well known example,6 if an 
agent is disposed to put a dime in a pencil sharpener when she wants to have a drink, and has the 
causally efficacious belief that she is putting the dime in the pencil sharpener because she wants a 
drink, then, Setiya insists, this suffices to explain her act of putting a dime in a pencil sharpener 
as an action qualifying for reasons explanation.   
Exercises of the power of motivation should, on this view, be explained as the activation of 
dispositions to perform certain actions, when certain conditions hold.
7
  If the relevant dispositions 
                                                          
5
 Setiya, 2007a, p. 66. 
6
 See Nagel, 1970, p. 33-34. 
7
 For instance, on Setiya’s account these conditions are conditions of causally efficacious self-knowledge.  See 
especially Setiya, 2007a, p. 39-56.  But the details of his picture don’t matter for my purposes here. 
 4 
are there to be activated and these conditions hold, then even such bizarre actions as putting 
dimes in pencil sharpeners to get cokes may be perfectly intelligible as actions done for reasons.  
Distinguishing the reasonable from the not-so reasonable exercises of the power of motivation is 
the separate task of evaluating the character of these dispositions by standards external to the 
power of motivation itself.  In short, a first stab at getting at the anti-normativist claim is to say 
that there are no standards internal to the power of motivation itself on which to judge that a 
certain behavior counts as an intelligible instance of an action done for reasons. In other words, 
there are no standards inherent to motivation on which to judge that a certain motivation is as it 
ought to be.  This type of ―ought‖ is, on the non-normativist account, nothing but a chimera.  
 
1.2 THE ANTI-NORMATIVIST COMMITMENT 
At this point, it may seem that the choice between a normativist and an anti-normativist account 
of motivation is a matter of sensibility.  Are we prone to think of action explanation as an 
irreducible type of explanation, in which ―we are identifying the phenomena to be explained and 
the phenomena that do the explaining, as directly answering to our own norms?‖8   Or do we tend 
to conceive of action explanation as part of our comprehensive theory of the world which 
purports to explain things by ―subsuming particular cases under what generally tends to 
happen‖?9   
But this is not merely a matter of sensibility; at least not entirely.  I believe that there is 
further reason to resist a theory of motivation on which the criteria of intelligibility do not 
                                                          
8
 See Davidson, 2004, p. 115.     
9
 McDowell, 1998, p. 331. 
 5 
identify the explanandum by reference to whether it is subject to distinctive norms; by reference, 
that is, to internal normative standards.  We should resist anti-normativist accounts of motivation 
at the start because they revise our pre-theoretic understanding of what the explananda of a theory 
of motivation are.  This comes out in the way such accounts deal with a distinctive kind of 
motivational conflict: instances of akratic motivation.   
As I already said, on a view like Setiya‘s, action explanation is adequate if it can reveal 
action as the activation of non-normatively understood dispositions; if it can reveal action to be a 
case of the general pattern of what tends to happen.  Now, this pattern may be criticized on 
external grounds.  It may turn out that some such pattern fails to meet the external standards of 
what counts as a good motivational pattern.  The action, which is revealed as falling under that 
specific pattern, can in turn be criticized as not meeting the standards of good motivational 
patterns.  On Setiya‘s view, these external standards are the standards of virtue, the standards of 
ethically excellent motivational patterns.
10
  Good motivational patterns, then, are determined as 
such on the basis of what counts as virtuous motivational patterns.  At least in principle, there is 
no restriction on the origin of the standards by which to judge the quality of these dispositions.  It 
might turn out that motivational patterns count as good if they tend to make the agent happy; or 
most agents happy, etc.   
But I want to suggest now that no external criterion of goodness will properly differentiate 
between two ways in which our motivational patterns might (pre-theoretically at least) incur 
criticism.  I will call them the way of the akratic agent and the way of the vicious agent for short, 
although by the latter I will basically refer to any case of non-akratic moral or rational failing.  
                                                          
10
 See Setiya, 2007a, part two. 
 6 
The rough difference, I shall urge, is that akratic moral failing is further criticizable from a 
perspective internal to action motivation.
11
  Anti-normativist accounts, I will argue, deny the 
possibility of any distinctively motivational failing or defect, and hence of akratic motivation.   
Denying the possibility of any distinctively motivational failing or defect should not be 
conflated with the weaker suggestion that no one specific type of motivation is necessarily 
defective by a single standard.  As Nomy Arpaly quite attractively argues, acting against one‘s 
best judgment is not sufficient to guarantee that one thereby acts defectively in this sense.
12
   If 
we are convinced by Arpaly, it follows that motivation which goes against one‘s best judgment is 
not inherently defective.  For there are cases in which by acting against one‘s best judgment, one 
does the thing one has most reason to do, as when one drops a secure but draining career in law 
school to follow one‘s dream to become a singer.  Dreamy motivation is not inherently defective 
even if it may at times go against our best judgments; in fact, sometimes at least, not even when it 
goes against our best judgments.  For sometimes our best judgment is inculcated with guilt, 
repression of feelings, etc, which may actually render an agent‘s choices in accordance with it 
unreasonable.   
This much may be true.  But it does not follow from this that the conflict between being 
motivated against one‘s best judgment and being motivated in accordance with one‘s best 
                                                          
11
 For my purposes here I shall suppose that akratic failing is always a moral failing, which is controversial, but I 
don’t think that much rests on this assumption.  The claim I am interested in is the claim that there is at least one 
perspective from which akratic motivation is criticizable and vicious motivation isn’t.  And this is a meaningful claim 
independently of whether we also assume that there is a common perspective from which both failings are 
criticizable. (For a view on which weakness of will is mere irresoluteness in the pursuit of any end, and so is not 
necessarily criticizable from a moral perspective, see Holton, 1999.)  In what follows, I will understand by “vicious 
motivation” the motivation which goes against the externally determined standards of good practical thought (e.g. 
virtue in Setiya’s case) and I will claim that akratic motivation incurs a further type of criticism.  Whether or not it 
also involves a common criticism is not important for my purposes. 
12
 See Arpaly, 2000. 
 7 
judgment cannot be an instance of a distinctively motivational defect, or failing.  And even if this 
is granted, it still does not follow that the idea of a distinctively motivational defect or failing is 
incoherent.  In other words, even if we dispel the attraction of the thought that there is only one 
standard of motivational success (such as following one‘s best judgment for instance) such that 
any one motivation which does not meet this standard counts as inherently defective, we do not 
thereby show that no case of motivational conflict should be characterized as motivationally 
defective.   
We are now in a position to say that the radical anti-normativist commitment is that no type 
of distinctively motivational defect or failing is possible.  In other words, no motivational 
situation (e.g. conflict) can count as defective from a perspective internal to the power of 
motivation itself.  If this is true, there will be no way to distinguish between akratic motivation 
and morally defective motivation (in general). 
The argument I propose can be put in the following way: 
1. All intelligible behavior can be divided into behavior that incurs criticism and behavior 
that does not. 
2. There is a pre-theoretic distinction between two different ways in which intelligible 
behavior may incur criticism: the way of the akratic motivation and the way of the immoral 
motivation (in general). 
3. Anti-normativist theories fail to explain the distinction in (2). 
4. We ought to reject non-normativist theories in favor of normativist theories. 
 
 
 8 
 
1.3 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AKRATIC AND VICIOUS MOTIVATION  
Premise (2) above is supported by the pre-theoretic intuition that while vicious and akratic 
motivation both issue in action against the good (and, hence, must be the result of motivation 
against the good, assuming the agents are free), the agents in each case do not count as acting 
against the good in the same way.  Intuitively, the reason is that the good is not available for both 
in the same way.  For the motivation of the vicious agent the good is available only as that which 
is to be avoided (whether in a direct or oblique cognition), whereas for the motivation of the 
akratic agent, the good is available as that which is both to be pursued and avoided (where the 
cognition of the good as to be pursued is not oblique). 
Consider some typical examples of akrasia, and think about how we describe the motivation 
of an akratic agent.  One is both thinking that the Surgeon General warns that smoking kills, and 
dying to enjoy smoking, as one takes the cigarette out of the packet, lights it up and exhales the 
smoke.  One is both thinking that betraying a friend is really a terrible thing to do, and dying to 
enjoy intense sexual intercourse, as one takes off one‘s clothes, walks towards the bed and starts 
kissing a friend‘s beloved partner.  One is both thinking that having a heavy meal right before 
going to bed is bad for one‘s health, and dying to enjoy the taste of melted cheese on bacon, as 
one gets out of bed, goes to the fridge and puts the bacon in the microwave.    
Now consider how we would describe these same actions if we thought they issued from 
vicious motivation.  We might very well say the following: that as the agent takes the cigarette 
out of the packet, lights it up and exhales the smoke, she does not care about her own life; that as 
she takes off her clothes, walks towards the bed and starts kissing her friend‘s beloved partner, 
 9 
she does not care about her friend; and finally, that as she gets out of bed, goes to the fridge and 
puts the bacon in the microwave, she does not care about her health.  In contrast, we say of the 
akratic agent that she cares for her life but does not keep herself from smoking; that she cares for 
her friend but does not keep herself from having sex with her friend‘s beloved partner; that she 
cares for her health but does not keep herself from having a heavy meal right before bed.   
Intuitively, even though both cases incur a common criticism, the akratic motivation seems 
to incur a further criticism.  The common criticism might be expressed interrogatively as follows: 
―Why did you want to smoke this cigarette?,‖ ―Why did you want to have sex with your friend‘s 
beloved partner?,‖ ―Why did you want to eat this heavy meal right before going to bed?‖  The 
further criticism that the akratic motivation incurs might be expressed interrogatively in the 
questions ―Why did you want to smoke a cigarette/have sex with your friend‘s beloved 
partner/eat this heavy meal right before going to bed, if you care about your life/friends/health?‖  
It seems, then, that at least pre-theoretically we think that there is a distinctive criticism that 
akratic motivation incurs.  Intuitively, what we find fault with is not just the appeal of the bad, or 
not caring for the good, but the appeal of the bad given that one cares for the good. 
But if we agree with the anti-normativist that the only standards by which intelligible 
behavior can be criticized are external to what constitutes it as intelligible behavior, we will not 
be in a position to distinguish between these two sorts of criticism to which action motivation 
may be subject.   
The anti-normativist might attempt to make this distinction in the following way.  She may 
suggest that both akratic and vicious motivations fail to meet the following criterion of what 
counts as a bad disposition of practical thought: not being moved towards A, when A is good.  
 10 
Moreover, akratic motivation fails to satisfy the further, distinctive criterion of what counts as 
bad practical thought: not being moved towards A, when A is good and one believes that A is 
good.  But this is not sufficient to mark the distinctive motivational defect of akrasia.  For it 
needn‘t be the case that believing that A is good must have a motivational effect on the agent.13  
Therefore the agent need not be in a motivational opposition of the akratic sort (where the good 
is available to one‘s motivation as both to be pursued and to be avoided), even though she may 
indeed believe that A is good while she is not being moved towards A. 
But suppose the objector further refines the definition of akratic disposition as the 
disposition to not do A when both of the following conditions hold: one believes that A is good 
and one is disposed to do A when one believes that A is good.  Now it may seem that akrasia 
would be a distinctively problematic disposition indeed, one that would dispose us to do not A 
when we are, inter alia, disposed to do A.  On this picture, to not be disposed towards A, when A 
is good and one believes that A is good and one has the general disposition to do A when one 
believes that A is good, would be a distinctively bad (i.e. akratically bad) disposition of practical 
thought.  In contrast, the vicious agent would appear to be an agent who acts in agreement with 
her dispositions, and thus her motivation would not be criticizable in this further, special sense.     
But the sheer conflict of dispositions cannot be what is involved in akratic motivation pre-
theoretically understood.  For it is conceivable that conflict of dispositions might be in perfect 
agreement with an agent‘s beliefs, plans, desires, etc.  Imagine the case of a determined self-hater 
(perhaps a woman who is from an early age inculcated with great guilt) who is committed to not 
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 Of course there are theories on which this claim is false.  But, no matter whether these theories are right or 
wrong, I believe that they are initially at least counter-intuitive.  On any given occasion I may entertain the belief 
that dancing is good without actually being moved to do so, without anything being wrong with me. 
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acting on her own self-regarding dispositions.  This person may have slowly, over the years and 
with a lot of practice, developed the disposition to not do A when she is disposed to do A, where 
A is any self-protecting act.  Granted, her disposition may be distinctively criticizable from a 
perspective that is external to motivation as such. (It may, for instance, be one of the platitudes of 
our current ethical theory that good practical thought should involve self-protection when self-
protection is not outweighed by other ethical considerations.)  The fact is though that the 
disposition of the determined self-hater to act against her own dispositions is in perfect agreement 
with her plan to punish herself, or her belief that she ought to act against the self she hates, or 
even just the desire to express her self-hatred.  Thus being in conflict with one‘s dispositions may 
itself be in perfect agreement with one‘s dispositions.   
But if an anti-normativist account of motivation cannot appeal to the difference between 
conflicted and unconflicted dispositions to explain the distinction between akratic and vicious 
motivation, it will have to present both akratic and vicious motivation as merely criticizable from 
an external perspective.  If for instance, this is the perspective of virtue, it may seem that akrasia 
is a distinctive moral failing, say a failing by the standards of the moral virtue of resoluteness. 
But this would not constitute a distinction between vicious and akratic motivation.  In the best 
possible case, it would merely explain akrasia as a distinctive form of vicious motivation: 
motivation against the standards of the distinctive moral virtue of resoluteness in pursuit of an 
aim, in our case.  But this would be to revise our pre-theoretic understanding of akrasia as a form 
of failing distinct from typical moral failing; and not distinct merely as a case of typical moral 
failing. 
 12 
To sum up: by the lights of an anti-normativist conception of motivation, akratic motivation 
is perfectly non-problematic as an instance of action motivation; at most it incurs criticism only 
from an external perspective.  If it incurs criticism only from an external perspective, it will 
merely constitute a species of vicious motivation.  But to distinguish between the two kinds of 
criticism to which motivation might be subject we have to assume a normativist account of 
motivation.  On such an account to explain action motivation as such is to reveal it to be subject 
to practical norms.  Here is how a normativist account might explain the contrast between the 
criticism to which akratic and vicious motivation are subject.  If in the case of akrasia the 
conflicting motivations are conceived of as subject to two incommensurable forms of practical 
normativity,
14
  then the object of each motivation will be criticizable from the standards which 
constitute the other motivation as such.  It follows that the akratic motivation would count as 
being subject to standards internal to the perspective of action motivation. 
Of course the above line of thought is not conclusive evidence for the truth of a normativist 
account.  For one thing, it is too abstract to even qualify as a proper account.
15
  For another, the 
non-normativist could stubbornly refuse to even attempt to make sense of the distinctive criticism 
to which akratic motivation is subject.  What this line of thought does manage to do, though, is to 
give us sufficient reason to seek an account of motivation which will make good on the following 
commitment:  
Normativist commitment: to explain action motivation as such is to reveal it to 
be subject to standards internal to the perspective of motivation; the standards of 
practical norms.    
                                                          
14
 What exactly the sense of incommensurability is will I hope become clear in the course of the argument. 
15
 I will have to say more about this account in the conclusion of this dissertation. 
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1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE DISSERTATION 
As I said before, in my dissertation I argue (1) that practical norms are the norms of non-
instrumental practical rationality, (2) that these norms ultimately trace back to incommensurable 
requirements of practical rationality, (3) that the form of action motivation (the way action 
motivation is determined by these incommensurable requirements) is the form of practical 
reasoning (the way practical reasoning is determined by these incommensurable requirements), 
and (4) that the form of practical reasoning and hence of action motivation is the form of practical 
self-consciousness; self-consciousness on the part of the agent as determined in her reasoning 
about what to do by the right practical requirement for the circumstances; such that when things 
go well it constitutes practical knowledge of oneself as correctly determining what to do in the 
circumstances.   
To reach this conclusion I argue against three popular interpretations of the normativist 
commitment.  On the instrumentalist interpretation, which is the topic of the first chapter, the 
norms to which action motivation is subject are the norms of instrumental rationality.  On this 
interpretation, an action motivation counts as such to the extent that it is subject to the 
irreducible, action-guiding requirement to take the means to one‘s end.  Thus the practical norms 
(which explain motivation) are norms guiding intentional action undertaken as means, and their 
source lies in propositional attitudes (intentions, desires, etc.) for the ends of the actions.   
On the monolithic interpretation of the normativist commitment, which is the topic of the 
second chapter, the norms to which action motivation is subject are the norms of non-
instrumental practical rationality, and they are determined as such by a single commensurable 
 14 
principle of practical rationality.
16
  Depending on the details of each theory, this may either be the 
requirement to be motivated so as to approximate or satisfy an agent-general desire whose 
maximal realization constitutes practical rationality, or to be motivated in conformity with one‘s 
judgments about one‘s reasons, or to just reason soundly about what to do.  So, the practical 
norms in terms of which action motivation is explained are the norms which guide intentional 
action in becoming a perfect instance of its kind; i.e. practically rational.  Their source lies in the 
single, commensurable requirement which constitutes practical rationality.  
On the multi-dimensional interpretation of the normativist commitment, which is the topic of 
the third chapter, the norms to which action motivation is subject are the norms of non-
instrumental practical rationality and they are determined by the incommensurable requirements 
which constitute it.
17
  These requirements nevertheless issue in intentional action that is unified 
across the board and not fragmented depending on the specific guise of action motivation they 
each time determine.
18
 On the multi-dimensional theories that I will examine, the reason is that 
these incommensurable rational requirements constitute more or less genuine approximations of 
the ideal form of practical rationality.  Depending on the details of each multi-dimensional 
theory, this ideal form may be conceived as constituted by: the exercise of an extra capacity 
whose function is to choose among the incommensurable practical reasons or agent-general 
dispositions, or the approximation to the ideal manifestation of one of the forms of practical 
reasoning, or the ideal form of unity of intentional action constituted by the collective exercise of 
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 The exact sense in which it is commensurable will depend on the details of each monolithic theory. 
17
 Again, the exact sense of incommensurability will depend on the details of each theory. 
18
 I will have more to say about the issue of unity of intentional action in the last chapter.  For now let me just note 
that if the requirements to which action motivation is subject are incommensurable, if for instance prudence or 
appetite constitute incommensurable requirements to which action motivation is subject, then it may seem as if 
calling them both intentional is merely a notational device used for our convenience.  
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the proper functions of incommensurable forms of practical reasoning.  The practical 
requirements that determine action motivation are ultimately, on these views, to be explained as 
approximating more or less perfectly to the genuine or ideal requirement of practical rationality.   
In contrast to these interpretations, I argue that the norms to which action motivation is 
subject are the norms of the incommensurable requirements of practical rationality which really 
are incommensurable; i.e. they are no more or less ideally rational.  Practical reasoning 
nevertheless issues in intentional action as unified across the board and not fragmented, because 
it is determined by these requirements in a single way.  In reasoning practically under any of 
these incommensurable requirements the agent is conscious of herself as determined in her 
reasoning by the right requirement for the circumstances.  When things go well, this self-
consciousness may constitute practical knowledge; knowledge of oneself as rightly determining 
what to do in the circumstances.   
Each of my arguments against these interpretations is an attempt on my part to challenge the 
following misguided treatments of motivation in contemporary discussions of related issues.  (1) 
Motivation is sometimes without question taken to be subject to the norms of instrumental 
rationality.
19
  In the first chapter of this dissertation I argue that there is no instrumental 
rationality to begin with, if we take the requirements of rationality to be action-guiding.   (2)  
Motivation is usually without question taken to be the arbitrator in discussions of practical 
rationality, since it is commonly accepted as a premise that practical reasons should be able to 
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 So for instance, a great number of accounts of practical rationality assume that motivation is unproblematically 
subject to the norms of instrumental rationality and proceed to investigate whether it may also be subject to non-
instrumental, categorical norms.  Christine Korsgaard challenged this assumption in her seminal paper on the 
normativity of instrumental reason (Korsgaard, 1997), thus opening the road for non-instrumentalist approaches 
to practical rationality.   
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motivate.
20
  In the second chapter of this dissertation I argue that considerations of motivation do 
not so much arbitrate between existing conceptions of practical rationality, as demand the 
development of new ones.  (3)  Motivation is usually taken without question to be more or less 
genuine or ideally rational depending on whether the agent‘s capacity to act is determined by 
reason or appetite, and so independently of the circumstances each time.
21
  In the third chapter I 
argue that all incommensurable requirements determining practical reasoning (and so both reason 
and appetite, if they are such requirements) may issue in unified intentional action because, 
depending on the circumstances, each of them potentially constitutes practical knowledge.  
Therefore the ideal rationality or genuineness of each of these requirements depends, other things 
being equal, on the circumstances, and not on some prejudice about their intrinsic genuineness or 
ideality as forms of rationality. 
Since the three arguments aim at addressing fundamental misconceptions of motivation in 
different areas of discourse, my argument in each chapter takes a different form.  In the first 
chapter, my argument against the view that practical norms guide action conceived of as means to 
an end focuses on a more fundamental presupposition of this view.  It thus constitutes an 
argument against the genus to which this view belongs.  In particular, I focus on the idea that 
instrumental rationality is constituted by a distinctive, action-guiding instrumental requirement, 
in the way suggested by philosophers like Mark Schroeder, John Broome, etc.  I argue, in 
something like the spirit of Joseph Raz and Niko Kolodny, but against their proposed 
alternatives, that there is no distinctive, action-guiding principle of instrumental rationality at all.  
                                                          
20
 For a fine analysis of these discussions see Setiya, forthcoming. 
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 See Tenenbaum, 2007; Korsgaard, 1997; Parfit, 1997; etc. 
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The conception of the practical norms which explain action motivation as issuing from intentions 
for ends is criticized as subscribing to a misguided conception of instrumental normativity.   
In the second chapter, I argue against the view that the practical norms which guide action 
motivation are internal to a single commensurable desire, or type of judgment, or (individual) 
determination of reasoning, which alone constitutes practical rationality, by focusing on what I 
take to be a platitude about our motivational life.  I argue that the monolithic conception of action 
motivation, on which it is determined by a single commensurable requirement of practical 
rationality, fails to accommodate this platitude.  In particular, following the Platonic argument in 
book iv of the Republic,
22
 I argue that the possibility of primary motivational conflict, i.e. the 
possibility of being motivated in opposed ways towards one and the same action at the same time 
and in the same respect, shows that practical rationality should be conceived of as multi-
dimensional.  In other words, that practical rationality should, contra the assumption of David 
Velleman, Thomas Scanlon, Thomas Nagel, etc., be conceived of as either issuing in judgments 
about incommensurable aspects of practical reason-hood, or determined by incommensurable 
requirements of practical reasoning.  Thus the views on which the norms of motivation are 
internal to a single commensurable desire, or type of judgment, or (individual) determination of 
reasoning, which alone constitutes practical rationality are criticized as being built on inadequate 
conceptions of practical rationality. 
In the third chapter I argue against the view that the practical norms which guide intentional 
action are internal to a separate, purely practical or ideally rational capacity which provides the 
unity of the multiple guises (i.e. (individual) determinations by incommensurable practical 
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requirements) of practical rationality.  First I argue against the postulation of the will by Joseph 
Raz, Thomas Pink, Jay Wallace, etc. as the extra executive capacity whose function is to choose 
among the incommensurable aspects of practical worth-whileness.  Then I argue against Sergio 
Tenenbaum‘s postulation of an ideal form of practical reasoning as what incommensurable forms 
of rationality ought to approximate, and finally I argue against Christine Korsgaard‘s postulation 
of the collective exercise of the functions of incommensurable forms of practical reasoning as the 
ideal form of unity of intentional action.  In this case, the views on which the norms of action 
motivation are traced to a single (purely practical or ideally rational) capacity which provides the 
unity of intentional action are criticized as illegitimately promoting one requirement of practical 
rationality as more practical or more rational than another.   
Instead, I propose, all the normative sources of action motivation are equally practical and 
rational, depending on the circumstances.   Therefore the explanation of the unity of intentional 
action cannot be a matter of postulating a separate capacity as the most practical or the most 
genuine unifying capacity, of which all other practical rational capacities fall short. On the 
contrary, the explanation of the unity of intentional action must be a matter of identifying what in 
each plausible guise of practical reasoning (i.e. (individual) determination by incommensurable 
principle) enables it to issue in equally practical and rational intentional action or simply in 
choice, depending on the circumstances.  The crucial enabling feature, I argue at the end, is the 
form of practical reasoning: the way in which it is determined by the incommensurable practical 
requirements.  This way is the self-consciousness of the agent as being determined in her 
reasoning by the right requirement; which may constitute practical knowledge depending on the 
circumstances, and not on some prejudice about what practical requirement is really the most 
genuine or the ideally rational. 
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Even though the arguments of the three chapters take three different forms depending on the 
areas of discussion in which they each time intervene, they are not at all unrelated.  In fact, each 
builds on material and insight gained from the previous argument.  In chapter two I can argue 
from facts about motivation to demands on the theory of practical rationality, because in the first 
chapter it transpires that instrumental rationality (rationality constituted by a distinctive, action-
guiding instrumental principle) is no part of practical rationality, but (contra Kolodny and Raz 
and following Michael Thompson) that it nevertheless constitutes an altogether distinctive form 
of normativity.  The sort of normativity it constitutes is internal to the elementary structure of 
intentional action as such, and not to the character of specific (i.e. more or less rational) types of 
intentional actions.  In particular, in the second chapter I can assume that primary motivational 
opposition is the opposition of means-end syntheses and not entities within that order (i.e. actions 
treated as means only), because it transpires at the end of the first chapter that intentional action 
is not an entity within an instrumental order but the very synthesis of an instrumental order.   
The same is true of the transition from the second to the third chapter.  In the third chapter I 
can argue that we should not postulate a purely practical capacity which is not necessarily 
rational or a practical rational capacity which is ideally rational in order to explain choice in the 
face of conflict between incommensurable requirements of practical rationality, because in the 
second chapter it transpires that if we posit distinct forms of practical rationality to explain 
primary motivational conflict, we must take them to be incommensurable.  Both a purely 
practical and an ideally rational practical capacity would have to be informed by one of these 
incommensurable forms of practical rationality, and so the remaining forms of practical 
rationality would have to be a priori understood either as less practical or as less rational; thus 
turning their purported incommensurability into a mere word play. 
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If it works, the progression of my thought in this dissertation shows (1) that platitudes about 
motivation play an important role in determining our conception of practical rationality, provided 
that we have the right conception of the elementary structure of intentional action; i.e. provided 
that we understand the elementary structure of intentional action as the structure of a form of 
event or process and not a propositional attitude, and (2) that the issue of explaining intentional 
action as unified across the board and not fragmented depending on the guise of practical 
reasoning it issues from plays an important role in determining our conception of practical 
reasoning, provided that we understand that the requirements of practical rationality are 
incommensurable.
23
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 The question of unity of intentional action is usually treated as the issue of explaining practical reasoning or 
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believe that the problem of unity in this sense is not a real question.  For no sane theory of practical reasoning 
should suggest that there are no borderline cases of intentionality anyway. 
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1. INSTRUMENTALIST NORMATIVIST THEORIES:  DESIRE BASED THEORIES OF 
MOTIVATION AND THE SCOPE OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the introduction I motivated the assumption of the truth of the normativist commitment.  On 
this commitment, to explain action motivation as such is to reveal it to conform or fail to 
conform to, or conform by approximation to, representations of practical norms; i.e. to reveal it 
to be subject to representations of practical norms.  Think of the following two cases: I am 
moved to open the door because I‘m under hypnosis and I am moved to open the door because I 
want to get ice-cream.  On the normativist commitment, whose truth I will assume in the 
remainder of this dissertation, the second explanation explains my being moved to open the door 
as the motivation to perform an intentional action, and it works by way of revealing the 
explanandum (being moved to open the door) as being subject to distinctive representations of 
norms which make the ensuing action intentional.
24
   
On the instrumental interpretation of the normativist commitment, these norms are the norms 
of instrumental rationality.  On the standard formulation of the constitutive principle of 
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 In the first case too, one could claim the explanation works by showing the explanandum to be subject to norms, 
but these are not the kinds of norms that make an action intentional.  In general, normative explanations explain 
by revealing the explananda to be subject to norms.  This is possible because being subject to norms has a 
distinctive explanatory power; distinct from that of falling under patterns of happenings.  For this characterization 
of the distinction between types of explanatory power see Davidson, 2004, p. 115 and McDowell, 1998, p. 331. 
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instrumental rationality, if one intends to do E and believes that M is the means to E then one 
ought to intend or do M.  On the narrow scope interpretation of this requirement, the proposition 
that one ought to do M is detachable from the conditional by modus ponens.  So, from the fact 
that if one intends to do E and believes that M is the means to E, then it follows that one ought to 
intend or do M.  The most popular version of this reading, what I shall be calling 
‗instrumentalism‘, is the view on which the narrow scope demand that one ought to take the 
means to one‘s end is generated by the intention for that end.   On a weaker version of 
instrumentalism, if one intends to do E, and believes that M is the means to E then one has 
adequate subjective reason to intend or do M.
25
 
On the most popular version of instrumentalism, what I shall be calling Desire Based 
Theories, action motivation is subject to the constitutive principle of instrumental rationality and 
the source of the normative force of this principle lies in the agent‘s desire(s) for the end.  To say 
that action motivation is subject to the constitutive principle of instrumental rationality is to say 
that an agent counts as being motivated to φ (where φ is an intentional action) to the extent that 
in being moved to φ she is guided by (or subject to) the principle that she ought to take the 
means to her end.   Therefore her motivation issues in intentional action to the extent that her 
action is (suitably) undertaken as the means to an end; and so to the extent that the action itself is 
also subject to the means-end principle.
26
  In what follows I will be calling these theories DBT 
for short.
27
  In the main body of this chapter I will focus on instrumentalist theories as such, and 
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 In what follows I shall sometimes refer to action motivation and intentional action interchangeably as being 
subject to practical norms. 
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 For versions of this view see Hubin, 1996, 2001; Lenman, 1996; Schroeder, 2004, 2007, 2009. 
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I will be using the terminology of intentions to refer interchangeably to intentions, desires, or 
whatever other attitudes towards ends we take to be normative for intentional action as means. 
The claim that distinguishes the DBT from other Desire Based Theories of motivation is that 
desires exert normative control over the motivation to y (e.g. to open the door), qua change-
demanding attitudes towards the end (e.g. getting ice-cream), of the means-act (e.g. opening the 
door), which is the object of motivation.  In other words, on the DBT, desire exerts normative 
control over intentional action as a means to an end.  On this view, to explain a particular 
disposition to y as what issues in intentional action (i.e. as action motivation) is to reveal this 
disposition to be instrumentally rational: i.e. to reveal it to be subject to the principle that one 
ought to take the means to one‘s end.28  In this chapter I will argue on the basis of considerations 
about the requirement of instrumental rationality, and not on the basis of considerations about the 
normative potential of desires as such, that the DBT fail to do justice to the normativist 
commitment.  On my suggestion, the DBT fail because they assume a false interpretation of 
instrumental normativity. 
 A common objection against instrumentalism is what I shall be calling the objection from 
morality: if one intends to do E and the means to one‘s ends are morally unacceptable, then one 
has no reason whatsoever to intend to do M.  In this chapter I will argue that a proper 
appreciation of the objection from morality, which is usually leveled against the narrow scope 
reading alone, illustrates the failure of John Broome‘s wide scope interpretation,29 as well as the 
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 This is sometimes expressed by saying that an intentional action is an action caused in the right way by a desire 
for an end and the belief that the action is the means to the end, or an action guided by a desire for an end and the 
belief that the action is the means to the end, etc.   
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 Broome, 2000. 
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inadequacy of Niko Kolodny‘s error theory of the instrumental principle.30  Yet a proper 
understanding of the objection from morality does not lead to full-blown skepticism about 
instrumental normativity.  Instead, it points the way to an alternative error theory of the 
appearance of a distinctive principle of instrumental rationality: the Structure-of-Intention Error 
Theory. On this alternative theory it merely appears that there is a distinctive, action-guiding 
instrumental principle because the elementary structure of intention is an instrumental order that 
unifies a type of process, rather than the elementary structure of a propositional attitude.   
 In the second section of this chapter I will present the typical objections to the standard form 
of instrumentalism, the objections from bootstrapping and akrasia, and show that a weaker 
version of instrumentalism, of the sort that Mark Schroeder defends,
31
 has the resources to deal 
with these objections.  On this weaker version, if one intends to do E, and believes that M is the 
means to E then one has adequate subjective reason to intend or do M.  In the third section of 
this chapter I will argue that the weaker version of instrumentalism fails to give an adequate 
account of the principle of instrumental rationality.  The common diagnosis of the failure of this 
form of instrumentalism is that like all narrow scope readings it fails to appreciate that the 
instrumental requirement is a requirement of coherence; practical or theoretical.
32
  The rationale 
is simple: if the scope of the instrumental requirement cannot be limited to the intention for the 
means, then it should be widened to include the entire conditional.  In the fourth section I will 
argue against the appearance that the instrumental requirement has a wide scope, which is 
defended by John Broome,
33
 and in the fifth section I will show that the error theory of this 
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misleading appearance, which is suggested by Niko Kolodny and Joseph Raz,
34
 is inadequate.  
We do not have to revert to full-blown skepticism with regard to means-end normativity.  An 
adequate error theory of the principle of instrumental rationality is forthcoming, as I will claim in 
the sixth section.  This is the Structure-of-Intention Error Theory, which is based on Michael 
Thompson‘s conception of intention as the distinctive unity of a process and not as a 
propositional attitude.  This understanding of the structure of intention makes room for an 
alternative version of the Desire Based Theories, against which I will argue in the next chapter. 
In the rest of this introduction I will distinguish my argument against the DBT from the 
standard criticism of such views in the literature.  The common argument against the attempt to 
ground the norms to which action motivation is subject in desire is that desire as such has no 
normative authority at all.  On this common understanding, desires may happen to have 
normative authority, but only as grounded in reason claims.  The reasons for denying that desires 
as such have normative authority vary between different versions of the argument.  In some 
versions, desires themselves lack justificatory power; in some, they cannot be universalized in 
the appropriate way; in some, they do not constitute discriminative responses to experience, etc.
35
  
Whatever the details of the reason for the rejection of the normative potential of desire, the 
common claim is that desire cannot set the normative standards to which action motivation is 
subject because desire cannot set normative standards at all.   
In this chapter I will concur with the conclusion of the common argument that the DBT fail 
to explain the sense in which action motivation is subject to practical norms.  But I will depart 
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from the common argument on the diagnosis of this failure.  The DBT fail, I will argue, because 
they assume a problematic conception of practical rationality in general, on which its 
requirements are directed towards the action as a means and are derived from an attitude 
(intention, desire, etc.) that determines an end.  Desire, I will argue, has no normative authority if 
it is embedded as a ground, or the source of a ground, in this problematic conception of practical 
rationality.  This leaves it open that desire per se may have normative authority. 
If the common argument against the DBT were sound, then these theories would fail to do 
justice to the normativist commitment merely because the particular attitudes, to whose 
normative control motivation would have to be subject, would themselves not be fit to require 
anything at all.   As Dennis Stampe quite plausibly suggests, though, ―The fact that I want 
something, in and of itself, is ordinarily a reason for me to act accordingly.‖36  Desire, as he 
points out, does not move us with mere force, but with a certain right.  If nothing else we are 
beings whose function is to maintain our form in part through the satisfaction of our desires.  
There is a plausible conception of what kind of animals we are, on which our desires have a 
claim to satisfaction just because they are ours; in other words, just because this satisfaction is 
part of what maintains our form.
37
  This claim is, on an intuitive conception, a normative claim.   
But as Anscombe plausibly points out, to say that one merely wants a saucer of mud, without 
any further characterization of what one wants it for, is to leave us in the dark about what it could 
possibly mean for the agent to ―want‖ in this case at all.38  The following question now arises: if 
we find it intuitive that desire per se has normative authority, as Stampe insists, then why should 
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we need to add a further characterization to the mere wanting of the saucer of mud to explain it?  
Are the two claims about desiring really incompatible?  In what follows I will show that they are 
not.   
In fact, it becomes apparent that they are not once we appreciate that the DBT fail because 
they misidentify the scope of desire‘s normative authority.  As I will show at the end of this 
chapter, desire may have normative authority over motivation if the object of motivation is taken 
to be a means-ends synthesis and not what is in reality a means-description of an action.
39
  
Anscombe‘s example is meant to show that wanting can be seen to move us with a certain right, 
as Stampe insists, only when it can be seen to ground the way in which certain means 
descriptions have been represented in connection to certain ends descriptions.  Upon being told 
that one wants a saucer of mud we are left clueless as to what it may mean to ―want‖ it, not 
because desire does not per se legitimize and thereby explain a possible disposition to achieve its 
object, but because in the case of mud it is strikingly difficult to guess to what end the act of 
getting the saucer of mud might be connected, in the specific manner of connection typically 
grounded by desire.  In cases where we merely say we want a piece of chocolate cake or a dream 
job, etc. it is strikingly easy to guess to what end the means of getting the chocolate cake or the 
dream job might be connected in the manner represented by desire.  We usually desire a piece of 
cake to satisfy our hunger or appetite for sweet things and a dream job to make money or fulfill 
our talents.  But when it comes to a saucer of mud is hard to imagine how its connection with an 
end description might be grounded by desire.  I shall return to this at the end of the chapter.  For 
now let me just emphasize what I will try to show is wrong with the DBT: not that desire has no 
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normative power, but that the normative power of desire cannot be embedded in the 
instrumentalist conception of practical norms.  Let me now turn to instrumentalism. 
 
1.2 THE SIMPLE NARROW SCOPE INTERPRETATION OF THE INSTRUMENTAL 
REQUIREMENT  AND THE OBJECTION FROM BOOTSTRAPPING AND REASONS 
The standard objection against the narrow scope reading of the instrumental principle is the 
objection from bootstrapping.
40
  The idea is that if intentions generate requirements, then merely 
intending an action may generate the requirement to perform it.  But this is absurd.  Similarly, if 
intentions for ends generate detachable requirements to take the means, then the mere act of 
intending the end may generate the requirement to perform the means in question, which is also 
absurd.   
 One way to meet this objection is to weaken the strictness of the instrumental requirement 
by suggesting that intending an end gives one a reason and not an obligation to take the means.
41
  
Surely the fact that I now intend to smoke gives me a reason to buy cigarettes even if I had 
absolutely no reason to buy cigarettes before forming the intention.  This response can be 
resisted on two grounds.  The first is that by weakening the strictness of the requirement all we 
have managed to do is to allow the bootstrapping of reasons as opposed to demands.  For now I 
may generate a reason to perform an action just by intending it.  The second is that the 
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 For expressions of this objection see Bratman, 1999; Broome, 2001a; Setiya, 2007b; Wallace, 2001; Raz, 2005; 
etc.  
41
 See Schroeder, 2007.  For an extensive criticism of this version of instrumentalism see Broome, 2001 and 
Brunero, 2007. 
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instrumental requirement is a strict requirement.
42
  An agent who violates it is in a certain sense 
not as she ought to be.  Whereas on the weaker version, to not take the means to one‘s end, when 
one has a reason to do so, says nothing about whether the agent failed to be as she ought to be.  
After all, there may always be stronger or overriding reasons to not take the means one has a pro 
tanto reason to take. 
 But one could ignore the latter form of resistance and meet the former one by suggesting that 
intending unproblematically generates reasons if its essence is to track reasons.  On this 
response, the objection from bootstrapping depends partly on the assumption that intending is 
something that can be done at will.
43
  If it were not in the essence of intention to constitute a 
response to reasons which lies beyond our will‘s manipulative control, then intention could be 
formed at will.  If intention could be formed at will, the objection from bootstrapping would 
stand.  But we do not have to assume such a controversial view of intention even if we want to 
retain a Humean version of the narrow scope reading of instrumental rationality.  If, on the other 
hand, intending an end is essentially responsive to reasons, it starts to make sense to say that 
intending an end gives one reason to take the means.  To begin with, intending an end would be a 
normative attitude and so the reason to take the means, i.e. some normative material, would be 
derived from normative material.  Moreover, on this response, it is more plausible to suppose 
that intending an end does not so much generate a new reason to intend the means, as transmit 
existing reasons for intending the end to the intention for the means.  In other words, on this 
picture, what makes an intention reason giving is nothing other than its reason tracking power.  
The principle of instrumental rationality could be construed as a principle of transmission of 
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reason-hood; so that when one intends to E one thereby has a reason to E only in the inoffensive 
sense that one has thereby tracked the reasons that there are for E-ing. 
 Against the transmission version of the narrow scope reading one may point to cases in 
which the means one envisages are actions which there is absolutely no reason to perform; not 
even a transmitted reason.  On this objection, one may, by the lights of the narrow scope 
reading, have an instrumental reason to form a particular intention to take the means to one‘s 
end, while there may be facts in the world which constitute silencing
44
 – and not merely 
overriding – reasons to not form that intention at all.  Think of the desperate protagonist in 
Gavras‘ brilliant movie, The Ax.45  The hero of this movie intends to get a particular job he 
deserves and is perfect for, but believes that the only way to do so it is to kill all his 
competitors.  On the transmission version of the narrow scope view, that agent has at least some 
reason to kill his competitors.  But this is a conclusion we are not ready to stomach.  Even 
though we may admit that the agent may initially have had some reason for wanting to get that 
particular job, we should readily claim that he has absolutely no reason to kill anyone in order 
to get it.  In other words he has neither an all things considered reason, nor a pro tanto reason to 
do something which is morally unacceptable.  This is the core of the common interpretation of 
the objection from morality. 
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 On silencing reasons see McDowell, 1979; on the role of consideration of silencing reasons in assessing the truth 
in instrumentalism see Setiya, 2005. 
45
 Kostas Gavras, The Ax, aka Le Couperet, 2005. 
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1.3 MARK SCHROEDER‘S ALTERNATIVE: SUBJECTIVE DEMANDS AND  
SUBJECTIVE REASONS 
As Mark Schroeder has recently tried to show, the narrow scope theorist can distinguish 
between subjective and objective demands in a way that blocks these counter-intuitive results.
46
  
On his suggestion, if one intends to do E, one believes that one has reason to do E.   It follows 
that if one‘s belief is true one has an objective reason to do E.47  From the subject‘s point of 
view one‘s own beliefs simply are true.  So, from the subjective perspective the agent has an 
objective reason to do E, and from the objective perspective the agent has a subjective reason to 
do E. So, if one intends to do E, one has a subjective reason to do E.  If one has a subjective 
reason to do E and believes that to do E one must do M then one has a subjective reason to do 
M.
48
  The instrumental principle can now be formulated as follows: if one intends to do E and 
believes that M is the means to E then one has a subjective pro tanto reason to do M.  The 
detachment of reasons should no longer be embarrassing, because the demand they express is 
merely subjective. And there is no bootstrapping either because the demand to take the means is 
not generated out of nowhere, but is transmitted from the subjective reason one has to intend the 
end to the means.   
 This move might appear to deal with the objection from morality, for the fact that one may 
have a subjective reason to do something says nothing about one‘s objective reasons.  At most, 
what it does say is what objective reason one would have if one‘s beliefs were true.  This is 
compatible with the McDowellian reading of moral reasons, on which the fact that some 
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considerations are salient means that competing considerations are not merely overridden, but 
altogether silenced.  On this version of instrumentalism, intending an end and having a belief 
about the necessary means says nothing about one‘s objective reasons to take the means.  This 
need not mean, though, that one cannot have a subjective reason to take the means.  In our job 
candidate example, if one intends to get a job and believes that killing the competitors is the only 
way to get it, then one has subjective reason to kill the competitors, even if one has absolutely no 
objective reason to do so.   
 But the narrow scope reading does not have the resources to block the possibility of the 
following re-description of our job candidate case: as a case in which an agent may truly believe 
that she ought to intend an end E and truly believe that the means to E is M, and yet have 
absolutely no objective reason to (intend to) take the means.  We may for instance claim that the 
Ax hero may truly believe that he ought to get the job because he is trained for it, whereas all of 
his competitors are not, and because he otherwise won‘t be able to make a living.  Also, he may 
truly believe that the only way he can get the job is to kill his competitors, because he lives in an 
utterly corrupt world.  And yet, we want to say, he has absolutely no objective reason to kill his 
competitors.  The obvious way to block this re-description of the case is to claim that the agent‘s 
belief that he ought to get the job in the first place is not true.  For the fact that the only way he 
can achieve the end he intends is morally unacceptable is by itself reason why his belief that he 
ought to intend the end in the first place is not true.  But this response is unavailable to the 
narrow scope reading of the instrumental requirement.  
 The particular character of the means to our hero‘s end cannot make a difference to the truth 
of his belief that he ought to intend the end.  Unless figuring out whether one ought to intend an 
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end somehow depended on figuring out whether one ought to intend the necessary means to 
one‘s end.  But in this case there would not be much point in insisting, as Schroeder does,49 on 
the asymmetry between different ways of satisfying the instrumental requirement that the narrow 
scope interpretation secures, but the wide-scope interpretation doesn‘t.  The point of insisting on 
this asymmetry is to bring forth the intuition that the normative force of the requirement has one 
direction only: it moves from the intention to achieve the end to the intention to take the means.  
This must be true on any narrow scope interpretation; even, that is, on the interpretations which 
may not take the source of this requirement to be the intention for the end but some general fact 
about agency or reason.  
 If we disregard this intuition about the asymmetry of ways of satisfying the requirement, 
Schroeder implies,
50
 we leave the following possibility open: that it may be rational on the part 
of the agent to manipulate her way out of a plausible violation of the instrumental requirement by 
taking steps to alter the conditions that allow for the instrumental predicament in the first place.  
The hero of the Ax could, for instance, convince the firm posting the job to cancel the posting.  
This, as Schroeder points out, would not be a rational thing to do for someone who wants the job.  
But if the agent‘s belief that he ought to get the job depends on his beliefs about whether he 
ought to take the means, it is not clear in what sense the normative force of the requirement 
would still be moving from the intention for the end to the intention for the means.  Positing a 
dependency of beliefs about whether one ought to intend an end on beliefs about whether one 
ought to intend the means cancels out this asymmetry of the ways of satisfying the instrumental 
requirement that Schroeder insists on.  If the asymmetry in the ways of satisfying the 
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requirement is thus not preserved, it is not clear in what sense the requirement to take the means 
is generated from the intention for the end in the way that the narrow scope reading suggests. 
At this point, there are two obvious ways out of the explanatory predicament that the narrow 
scope reading faces.  The first is to attempt an explanation of how it is sometimes possible for 
the normative force of the instrumental requirement to be directed towards intentions for ends.  
The second is to deny that it is possible for thoughts or intentions of means and ends to ever 
come apart in the ways that raise the puzzles of instrumental rationality, by suggesting that to 
intend an end just is to intend the means to it.   
One expression of the latter skeptical response is Finlay‘s definition of intending to perform 
an action, as intending the means to the realization of that state of affairs or the execution of the 
action.
51
  This definition soon needs correction because it is conceivable that one may intend to 
bring about a state of affairs without yet knowing what the means to its realization are.  On a 
slightly corrected version then, A intends that p if and only if A intends that A takes the means A 
knows or expects to know are the means to p.  On this view it is impossible to intend an end 
without thereby intending the means to it.  Figuring out whether one ought to intend an end 
cannot depend on figuring out whether one ought to intend the means because it consists in 
figuring out whether one ought to intend the means. 
But if to intend an end E just is to intend the means M one knows or expects to know are the 
means to E, it does not make any sense to say that one may intend an end without intending the 
means to it.  If it does not make sense to say that one may intend an end without intending the 
means to it, one cannot logically fail to follow the instrumental principle that one ought to take or 
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intend the means to one‘s ends.  If one cannot logically fail to follow the instrumental principle, 
then, surely, it follows that one cannot be subject to it.
52
 This full blown skepticism explains why 
figuring out whether one ought to intend the means to one‘s end must play a role in figuring out 
whether one ought to intend the end; but only at the cost of denying the normative character of 
the connection between the thought of the means and the thought of the end.   
But such a radical denial of the normative character of the connection between thought of 
means and thought of ends leaves us with no plausible error theory to account for the appearance 
that there is a distinctive action guiding requirement of instrumental rationality.  For this 
appearance is not a mere philosopher‘s whim.  It is present when we say things like: ―I don‘t 
understand how you can sit all day and do nothing when you say you intend to find a job,‖ or ―I 
don‘t understand how they still intend to win the war given that they would have to kill the 
civilians to do so.‖  At any rate, to revert to such a full-blown skepticism one would first have to 
show that the following types of theories fail: non-skeptical alternatives to the narrow scope 
reading and more sophisticated skeptical theories (error theories).  The error theories deny the 
existence of irreducible instrumental rational principles but do not altogether deny the normative 
connection between thought of ends and means.  In the following two sections I will argue that 
Broome‘s non-skeptical wide scope alternative and Kolodny‘s sophisticated error theory both 
fail to do full justice to the intuition codified in the objection from morality.  This failure, I will 
argue, does not show that full blown skepticism is in order.  A better error theory is forthcoming; 
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what I shall be calling the Structure-of-Intention error theory.  I will end this chapter by trying to 
lay it out in its essentials and explain how it saves the phenomena. 
 
1.4 THE WIDE-SCOPE RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTION FROM MORALITY 
As I said above, one does not need to deny the normative character of the means-end connection 
to meet the explanatory demand raised by the objection from morality.  One can instead suggest 
that the normative force of the instrumental requirement may on occasions move towards the 
intention for the end, because the instrumental requirement can be interpreted to have a wide 
rather than a narrow scope.  As I will now show, this suggestion has a consequence contrary to 
its intent: it allows the normative force of the instrumental requirement to occasionally move 
towards the intention for the end, without really explaining why figuring out whether to intend 
the means to one‘s end must, at least sometimes, play a role in figuring out whether to intend the 
end.   
Let me explain this.  On the wide scope interpretation, the requirement to take the means is 
not detachable from the conditional that if one intends an end one ought to take the means to 
one‘s end.  The detachment is not permitted because the scope of the instrumental ought is not 
limited to the consequent of the conditional but includes the entire conditional.  On this 
interpretation, the requirement that one ought to take the means to one‘s end is the wide scope 
requirement that one ought to [take the means to an end if one intends the end].  In other words, 
the normative force of the requirement is not necessarily directed towards the intention for the 
means.  Its force may move in the other direction.  For, on the wide scope reading, the 
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requirement is satisfied when the relevant attitudes (intentions or intentions and beliefs) of the 
agent form a coherent whole;
53
 not when the agent takes the means to one‘s end, whatever these 
means happen to be.   
As Broome
54
 readily proposes, and Kolodny
55
 denies, the wide scope requirement is a 
requirement which governs states and not processes.  It requires of the agent that she be in a state 
that does not involve a violation of the instrumental principle of means-end coherence.  It does 
not itself require of an agent that she go through any one particular type of process.  For instance 
it does not require of an agent that she revise her intention for the end or that she revise her belief 
that M is the means to her end or that she intend the means to her end in order to satisfy the 
requirement.   
A popular argument against the wide scope interpretation is that on some occasions it is 
forced to turn into a narrow scope requirement.
56
  That is to say, it is forced to interpret the 
instrumental requirement as demanding that the agent ought to go through a particular process, 
when the balance of reasons may require another.  Say that the Ax hero is required to revise his 
intention to get the job to be coherent.  Now say that it may turn out that he cannot, for some 
reason or other, revise his intention for the end.  Say he is an extremely stubborn person.  In such 
a case, on this objection, the wide scope requirement will be transformed into the narrow scope 
requirement to take the means.    But the truth is that even in these cases the wide scope theorist 
can insist that the scope of the requirement remains wide.  She can claim that the agent is, even 
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in such cases, under the requirement to do what she was under the requirement to do before it 
was suggested that she could not do it.  That one may not be able in some sense to actually revise 
one‘s intention for the end does not turn the requirement to be coherent into the requirement to 
go through a particular process or form a particular attitude.  At least no more than the fact that 
one cannot actually revise a murderous intention (say because one is a sociopath) turns the legal 
requirement to not kill into some other sort of requirement; say a requirement of etiquette.   
The impression that the instrumental requirement ought to be transformed into a different 
type of requirement (one of narrow scope) in case the agent is not able to alter her attitudes is 
misleading.  We get this misleading impression because on the wide scope reading the object of 
the requirement is a conditional, and so it can in principle be satisfied in a variety of ways.  The 
fact that the requirement can in principle be satisfied in a variety of ways does not in itself imply 
that it is such that it always ought to be satisfiable.  To assume this is to assume that the principle 
is not a practical principle; one that an agent may be subject to, even when she may happen to be 
in some sense unable to follow it through.
57
  To assume the contrary would be to assume that an 
agent cannot suffer from weakness of will, apathy, depression, etc.   
More importantly, though, Broome can respond that the objection itself rests on the 
assumption that the agent cannot for some reason or other do what she ought to do (i.e. revise her 
intention for the end).  For on Broome‘s view revising his intention for the end is what the agent 
ought to do in the circumstances.  To say that one cannot do that is to say that the agent cannot 
not do what he ought to do.  This is to assume, and not argue, that Broome‘s wide scope account 
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is wrong.  In this case, Broome might say that to push the objection further is to support the 
inconsistent claim that because one cannot do what one ought to do, one ought to do something 
else, on the basis of the general principle that ―ought‖ implies ―can.‖  The very premise of the 
argument, that ‗one cannot do what one ought to do‘, is, by the lights of this further premise 
stating the general principle that ―ought‖ implies ―can‖, simply inadmissible.  
The fact that the instrumental requirement is such that it could, in circumstances x, be 
satisfied in way x as it ought to, and in circumstances y in way y as it ought to, does not mean 
that when, in circumstances y, it cannot be satisfied in way y as it ought to, then it ought instead 
to be satisfied in way x.  This cannot be the meaning of the practical version of the wide scope 
interpretation.
58
  But this does not have to be the meaning of the practical wide scope 
instrumental ought.  If it so happens that one may not, in some sense, be able to do what one is 
required to do, this does not imply that one ought to do something else instead.  In the same way, 
the fact that the sociopath may be unable to follow the law because he is a sociopath does not 
mean that he ought to do something else instead.  
The drawback of the practical wide scope reading is not that under given circumstances it is 
forced to abandon the symmetry it assumes exists among the different ways of satisfying the 
instrumental requirement.  The fault of this account is that, as Schroeder also suggests,
59
  it 
cannot abandon this symmetry, when it should.  This symmetry is exactly what makes it the case 
that a way of satisfying the requirement which is demanded by circumstances x cannot simply 
replace a way of satisfying it which is required in circumstances y.  For instance, each time the 
wide scope requirement requires that the agent ought to revise her end in order to maintain a 
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coherent set of attitudes, what is required is that the agent ought to perform a particular action 
qua maintaining a coherent set of attitudes.  In other words, the agent is not required to do two 
separate things: revise her intention for the end and maintain a coherent set of attitudes, such that 
when the first fails the agent can always find an alternative way to satisfy the second.  On the 
contrary, what the agent is required to do is a particular action which constitutes the way to 
maintain the coherent set of attitudes. 
In our job candidate example for instance, to say that one ought rationally to revise one‘s 
intention for the end is to say that it is revising one‘s intention to get the job in particular that 
makes one‘s attitudes coherent in the circumstances.  To object that if one cannot revise one‘s 
intention for the end in the circumstances one must be rationally required to take the means to 
one‘s end is to assume that the wide scope requirement simply requires that one ought to [either 
revise one‘s end or take the means to one‘s end].  But there is an alternative interpretation of the 
conditional requirement, on which one ought to [either revise one‘s intention for the end or 
intend the means, depending on the circumstances].  
The symmetry between the different ways or ―processes‖60 through which one may satisfy 
the requirement of coherence is not an expression of the fact that in any particular circumstance, 
all possible processes of getting to that state are perfectly interchangeable.  The asymmetry is an 
expression of the following fact: that the instrumental principle of practical rationality captures 
that aspect of the practical all-out ought of most or conclusive reasons, which concerns the state 
of coherence the agent finds oneself in, after she has done what she ought to do all things 
considered. 
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The problem with the wide scope interpretation is that even if, contra Setiya,
61
 we accept 
that the requirement it specifies concerns one aspect of practical rationality, this requirement has 
little of the explanatory power that our intuitions point to.
62
  The Ax hero example presented a 
problem for the narrow scope reading because the normative force of the instrumental 
requirement seemed to move from the intention for the means to the intention for the end; not 
because it simply required that one ought to revise one‘s intention for the end.   On the wide 
scope interpretation, as I said above, the instrumental requirement captures that aspect of 
practical rationality which essentially concerns the state the agent finds herself in, when she is 
practically rational; not the instrumental process she ought to go through.  If this is right, the 
wide scope interpretation will be equally unable to explain what seems to be involved in the 
instrumental requirement: that figuring out whether to intend the means to one‘s ends ought to 
play some role in figuring out whether one ought to intend one‘s end.  The objection from 
morality codifies the following intuition: when the principle of instrumental rationality demands 
that one ought to intend the end, it does not demand that one ought to intend the end simply, but 
on the basis of consideration of the means.  Similarly, when it demands that one ought to intend 
the means, it does not demand that one ought to intend the means simply, but on the basis of 
consideration of the end.   
On the wide scope reading, though, to say that one ought to intend the end on the basis of 
consideration of the means just is to say that one ought to intend the end on the basis of 
consideration of the requirement of coherence.  For if what I said above is right, on the wide 
scope reading, this claim translates into the following claim: ―one ought to intend the end qua 
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maintaining a coherent set of attitudes, on the basis of considering the end in connection with the 
means (on the de dicto interpretation of ―the means‖), and so, on the basis of considering the 
action as subject to the requirement of coherence.‖  But it can‘t be part of the content of the 
instrumental requirement that one ought to intend something on the basis of this very ought.  The 
wide scope reading cannot capture that part of practical instrumental rationality which seems to 
concern the directed movement of normative force across means-end relations.  As we saw 
above, the narrow scope reading cannot manage to capture this aspect of practical instrumental 
rationality either, for it simply assumes that the relevant normative force can only move in one 
direction.  Do we have to revert to Finlay‘s full blown skepticism? No.  We can, instead, appeal 
to a sophisticated skepticism about the instrumental requirement, which does not altogether deny 
that there is a normative connection between thoughts of ends and thoughts of means.   
 
1.5 NIKO KOLODNY‘S REASONS ERROR THEORY 
On Niko Kolodny‘s account, the ―ought‖ of instrumental rationality is reducible to the ―ought‖ 
of sufficient reasons for forming attitudes, and in particular, intentions.  On his view, we 
commonly assume there is a distinctive action guiding principle of instrumental rationality 
because the agent‘s attitudes will, by and large, be formally coherent in so far as they are 
responsive to reasons.  In Kolodny‘s own words ‗insofar as believers and intenders are sensitive 
to their reasons, their attitudes will, by and large, be formally coherent.  This is what nourishes 
the myth. But this formal coherence among their attitudes will be just a by-product, or 
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epiphenomenon, of their sensitivity to reason. It will not be the result of any tendency to formal 
coherence as such.‘63  
Kolodny‘s account seems to manage to derive the ―ought‖ of instrumental rationality from 
the ―ought‖ of sufficient reasons for intending, as Schroeder seemed forced to do.  And he seems 
to deal with the objection that the force of this ―ought‖ ought to be able to move in more than 
one direction, as Schroeder seemed unable to do.  On Kolodny‘s conception, the instrumental 
requirement is reduced to the disjunction of the following narrow scope requirements of 
sufficient reason: one ought to either not intend the end, when the reasons one believes one has 
for intending the end are not sufficient, or to intend the means, when the reasons one believes 
one has for intending the means are sufficient.  This is possible because all the rational 
requirements ultimately reduce to the following two narrow scope rational requirements: the 
requirement to form the attitudes for which one believes one has sufficient reasons, and the 
requirement to not form the attitudes for which one believes one lacks sufficient reasons.
64
 
But also, contra the wide scope reading, on Kolodny‘s view, there is no special principle of 
coherence of intentions, giving rise to the ―ought‖ of instrumental rationality.  On his 
transparency account, the ―ought‖ of instrumental rationality is nothing more than the expression 
of the ―ought‖ of most or conclusive reason the way this appears from the perspective of the 
agent.
65
  The requirement of instrumental rationality is no longer the requirement to be in a 
certain state, as the wide scope interpretation assumes.  On Kolodny‘s view, it is the requirement 
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to go through a particular process each time: form a new intention or revise an existing one, 
depending on the balance of sufficient reason.  Assume that one is in the state of conflict of 
intending an end and not intending the means, against the background of fixed beliefs about the 
means-end connection.  If one believes one has more reason to intend the end rather than to not 
intend the means, one is ―rationally required‖ to form the intention to take the means.  If one 
believes one has more reason to not intend the means rather than to intend the end, one is 
―rationally required‖ to revise one‘s intention for the end.  If one believes one does not have 
sufficient reason to either form an intention for the end or an intention for the means, one is 
―rationally required‖ to form no intention at all.  This is just to say that the requirement of 
instrumental rationality is reduced to one‘s sensitivity to the patterns of sufficient reason.  In the 
job candidate example, when the means to the agent‘s end are unacceptable, and the agent knows 
it, Kolodny can say that the agent is ―rationally required‖ to revise his intention for the end.  The 
reason is that given that killing his competitors is unacceptable from his perspective, from his 
perspective he has more reason to drop his intention for the end rather than intend the means.   
Thus Kolodny‘s account manages to do two things.  First, it makes room for the possibility 
of allowing thought concerning the means to influence thought about the end, as the objection 
from morality clearly requires.  Second, it explains the possibility of a requirement to go through 
a particular process without yielding counterintuitive results, such as those yielded by the naïve 
narrow scope view.  For the agent is ―rationally required‖ to form an intention for the means only 
if she believes she has sufficient reason to intend the end.  And she is ―rationally required‖ to 
revise her intention for the end only if she believes she has sufficient reason to not intend the 
means.   
 45 
Nevertheless, in discussing the objection from morality I argued that the trouble with the 
wide scope interpretation was not just that it could not explain the possibility of being required to 
go through a particular process as opposed to be in a certain state.  The problem was that it could 
not explain the possibility of being required to go through the particular process of revising one‘s 
intention for the end on the basis of consideration of an action as the means to one‟s end (on a de 
dicto interpretation of „the means to one‟s end‟).  The relevant question there was: why should 
the agent take into consideration the character of the means to one‘s end as such, in determining 
whether or not she ought to intend an end?  On Kolodny‘s sophisticated skepticism, the answer is 
given by a principle of reason (and not rationality) like Raz‘s facilitative principle.66  On this 
principle, ―if there is pro tanto reason for one to E, then there is at least as much pro tanto reason 
for one to take some sufficient means to E.‖67  Loosely stated this is a formulation of the thesis 
that one has reason to bring about whatever is of value, independently of whether it happens to 
be one of the agent‘s ends. Presumably then, if one has sufficient reason to not take some 
sufficient means to E, then given the principle this should signal that one does not have sufficient 
reason to E.  For if there were sufficient reason to E, one would have at least as much pro tanto 
reason to take the means; so one would have sufficient reason to take the means.  What it does 
not signal though is that in determining whether to intend E, the agent ought to think about 
whether there is sufficient reason to intend what one takes to be the means to the end as such.
68
  
As Raz himself suggests,  
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…there is no distinctive set of deliberative standards that are involved in getting 
us to reason correctly from ends we have to means, and that are different from 
those that are involved in reasoning about which ends to have.  Of course, there 
is a difference between facilitative reasons and others.  Facilitative reasons have 
a special kind of dependence on source reasons. But that is a difference in the 
content of our deliberation, not in the standards that should govern the 
deliberative processes. They are the same when we try to determine our will to 
adopt, or maintain, or abandon some ends, as when we try to determine what 
facilitative steps to take in pursuit of goods we take ourselves to be pursuing as 
our ends. (Raz (2005) p. 26) 
At best then, the principle of facilitative reason explains that there are some reasons that are 
facilitative in content in the same way that some tastes are musical.  It explains that there are 
reasons that concern the connection between ends and actions that facilitate the pursuit of these 
ends.  It explains, that is, why part of the reasons for intending an end may concern reasons for 
the means.  What it does not explain is why in trying to figure out whether to intend an end, one 
ought to think about whether the means one takes to be the means to that end are means one 
ought to intend, on the de dicto interpretation of ‗the means to that end‘.  This is not to claim of 
course that there is any principle of rationality requiring an agent to think about the moral 
character of all the possible means to her end before intending that end.  Nor is it to say that an 
agent is under the strict requirement to first confirm whether there are any morally acceptable 
means before intending an end and then intend the end.
69
  It is to say that the awareness of the 
connection between a particular end and particular means to it activates ―something like‖ the 
requirement to think about whether to intend the means in thinking about whether to intend the 
end.  To think about whether it is acceptable to intend an end without thinking about whether it is 
acceptable to intend the necessary means to the end that the agent is aware of as such, is to think 
incorrectly. 
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To explain this let me go back to the hero of the Ax.  In such a case, it would be insufficient 
to merely say that if one thinks one ought to intend the end while believing that the necessary 
means are unacceptable, one‘s belief that one has sufficient reason to intend the end is false.    
For it is possible that in some of these cases one formed one‘s belief that one ought to intend the 
end without thinking about whether the means one was aware of as the only necessary means to 
one‘s end were acceptable or not.  We should be able to say that if one comes to think one ought 
to intend the end while believing that the necessary means are unacceptable, one has formed 
one‘s belief that one ought to intend the end in the wrong way. At the very least, for instance, 
one has failed to meet the standards of how to properly form an intention for a morally 
acceptable end.
70
  One‘s belief that one has sufficient reason to intend the end is formed badly; it 
is formed in abstraction from consideration of the character of the necessary means to the end.  
The mere fact that the insufficiency of reasons for intending means may signal the insufficiency 
of reasons for intending ends does not imply that in trying to determine whether to intend an end 
under the conditions specified above, one ought to consider the character of the means.  The fact 
that the lack of sugar in the coffee may signal the fact that it will be undesirable now that I desire 
something sweet does not imply that in trying to determine whether coffee is desirable or not in 
the future I ought always to think about whether it contains enough sugar.  In fact the facilitative 
principle cannot explain why it appears as if one ought to think of one‘s end in a means-end 
connection, when one is aware of it.  It only explains why there are some reasons that are 
sensitive to this connection. 
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In short, the error theory recommended by Kolodny and Raz – that we should explain away 
the appearance of a special principle of coherence by reference to a principle which explains why 
our attitudes tend to, by and large, be formally coherent
71
 – misses one important point: that the 
appearance to be explained away is not the appearance of a principle of formal coherence of 
attitudes.  As the objection from morality shows, the principle we should explain away is this: 
that when deciding what to do or intend, one ought to think of the actions one is deliberating 
about as figuring in a means-end conenction, provided one is a aware of a relevant means-end 
connection.  In the case of the objection from morality, the appearance is that one ought to think 
about whether one ought to intend the means one takes to be the only necessary means to one‘s 
end in considering whether to intend an end.  The point of the objection from morality is that one 
ought not to determine whether one ought to intend an end in abstraction from the question of 
how the end figures in the means-end connection one is aware of.  Therefore, one cannot say ―I 
don‘t care about the character of the means I take to be necessary for my end at this stage; all I 
know is that I have sufficient reason to intend the end.‖  This, I suggest, is what an ideal error 
theory should explain away: the appearance of a distinctive action guiding requirement to take 
the means to one‘s end as what explains why in intending an end one ought to think of the 
relevant action as figuring in a distinctive means-end connection, of which one is aware. 
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1.6 AN ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTION: THE STRUCTURE-OF-INTENTION 
ERROR THEORY 
I said above that Kolodny‘s error theory cannot explain away the appearance of a special sense 
in which one ought not to intend an end when one has sufficient reason to not intend the means.  
This is the sense in which one ought to think of one‘s action as figuring in the specific means-end 
connections of which one is aware.
72
 To perform this explanatory task, our ideal error theory 
must (1) preserve the distinction between thought of means and thought of ends, in the way that 
full-blown skepticism does not and (2) preserve some conception of the actual (and not just 
apparent from the agent‘s perspective) normative character of the connection between thoughts 
of ends and thoughts of means, in the way that Kolodny‘s error theory does not.   
In this section I will suggest that what explains the appearance of a distinctive action guiding 
instrumental requirement is not the sensitivity of our capacity to form intentions to patterns of 
reason, but the structure of intention itself.  To lay out this error theory I will start with a 
preliminary remark on how we should understand talk of the structure of intention.  Against the 
standard approach on which the genus of intention is a propositional attitude, I will suggest, 
following Michael Thompson,
73
 that the genus of intention is the distinctive form of an event or 
process.  The genus of intention, I shall claim, is determined by the fact that it spans the present 
and reaches out to the future in the way of an event; such that a tree may be falling without yet 
having fallen.  The differentia of intention is that its phases are unified under a rationalizing 
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order of means-end descriptions; such that one may be cutting basil because one is making pesto 
without yet having made pesto.  Put more formally my claim is that: 
The Structure-of-Intention Error Theory:  It appears that there is a distinctive, action-
guiding requirement that one ought to think about whether to intend an action x qua the 
only necessary means to one‘s end, in thinking about whether to intend a distinct action y 
qua one‘s end, because the elementary structure of intentional action is the rationalizing 
order of means-end descriptions of a process. 
This claim is bound to sound puzzling if we assume that intention is a propositional attitude, 
which is of the same genus as appetite, wish, hope, fear, etc..  The elementary structure of 
intention is commonly conceived of as the composite of a distinctive propositional attitude and a 
state of affairs or a proposition which is its object.  In this case the task is to explain why thought 
of whether to form this distinctive propositional attitude towards a particular action A ought to 
involve thought of whether to form this distinctive propositional attitude towards a different 
action B.  This is to say that we need to explain the particular actions A and B as falling under 
more general specifications (e.g. descriptions as means and ends) such that we can then 
formulate principles about the necessary connections of these more general specifications.  The 
existence of an irreducible (narrow or wide scope) instrumental requirement was postulated in 
order to explain just one such connection.  Therefore, to say now that what explains the 
appearance of this requirement is this very connection is either to say something trivial or to say 
something viciously circular.   
The main claim of a Structure-of-Intention Error Theory will both be substantial and non-
circular if we make room for an alternative conception of the structure of intention.  One good 
place to start is Donald Hubin‘s unsuccessful defense of instrumentalism.  In his paper, ―What‘s 
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Special about Humeanism,‖74 he tries to save the simple narrow scope reading of the 
instrumental requirement.  He argues that a fuller and more accurate description of the end one 
intends should involve mention of the means by which one intends to achieve the end.  On his 
picture, simply saying that one intends to get the job is an elliptic way of saying that one intends 
to-get-the-job-by-doing-the-things-one-typically-does-when-one-wants-to-get-a-job.  When one 
realizes that the only way to get the job is to kill one‘s competitors, one realizes that getting-the-
job-by-killing-one‘s-competitors is not what one intends when one intends to get the job.  For 
killing one‘s competitors is not one of the typical things one does to get a job.  On this account, 
intending the end of getting a job puts one under no rational pressure to take the means of killing 
one‘s competitors.  The reason is that to intend an end just is to-intend-an-end-by-taking-the-
means-to-it, and in this case killing one‘s competitors is not part of the means one intends to take 
in order to achieve one‘s end.   The simple narrow scope requirement then to take the means to 
one‘s end does not yield counter-intuitive consequences, such as the consequence that if one 
happens to intend an end one is under rational pressure to take the means even if they are entirely 
unacceptable.   
But this account cannot be a simple narrow scope account.  It cannot explain how the 
requirement to take the means may nevertheless be generated from the requirement to intend the 
end.  If one has a reason to bring-about-one‘s-end-by-taking-the-means then it of course follows 
logically that one has a reason to take the means.  But this logical implication cannot be the sense 
in which, on the narrow scope reading, reasons to intend ends generate reasons to intend means 
or are transmitted to the intentions for means.  For on the narrow scope reading, reasons for 
intending the means are not merely logically derived from reasons for the ends, but generated or 
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transmitted from them.  The reason Hubin fails to see the problem is that he has a very 
permissive picture of the fundamental commitments of instrumentalism.  In the beginning of his 
discussion of instrumentalism in his ―What‘s Special about Humeanism‖ he says: ―The thesis of 
pure instrumentalism holds that reasons are communicated from ends to means – that he who has 
a reason for the ends has also a reason for the means.‖75  This equation is mistaken.  To say that 
reasons are communicated from ends to means is not merely to say that he who has a reason for 
the end also has a reason for the means.  It is to say that he has a reason to take the means 
because he intends the end.   The claim that he who has a reason for the ends also has a reason 
for the means is a claim that even a radical skeptic like Finlay could accept.  For if to intend an 
end just is to intend the means to it, it will be true that if one intends an end for a reason, then ―he 
who has a reason for the end also has a reason for the means.‖ 
Even though Hubin‘s account fails as a narrow scope account, we can nevertheless get a 
valuable hint for the development of our error theory.  The structure along which the apparently 
―instrumental‖ normative force moves is not the structure of a nexus of distinct intentions 
towards states of affairs or propositions, as both the narrow and the wide scope accounts assume.  
It is the structure of the connection of means-end thoughts which is intra-intentional.    I will 
argue now that if this structure is merely taken to be the structure of the content of a 
propositional attitude, it will not be able to ground the normative connection between means and 
end descriptions, or thoughts. 
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In her article ―Reasons for Action‖76 Korsgaard also suggests that the object of an intention 
(―choice‖ in her terminology) is an ―action‖: a complex composed out of an ―act‖ and its 
―purpose‖.  An act is, for Korsgaard, the doing which is the means to one‘s end and an action is 
the whole which is composed out of the act and the purpose for which it is performed.   When an 
agent chooses in Korsgaard‘s terms to do this, she chooses to-do-this-act-for-the-sake-of-this-
end.  To use some of Korsgaard‘s examples, to say that Jack chooses to go to Chicago is an 
elliptical way of saying that he chooses to-go-to-Chicago-to-see-his-mother, or chooses to-go-to-
Chicago-for-the-sake-of-seeing-his-mother.  To say that the soldier chooses to sacrifice himself 
is an elliptical way of saying that he chooses to-sacrifice-himself-to-secure-a-victory-for-his-city, 
or to-sacrifice-himself-for-the-sake-of-securing-a-victory-for-his-city.   
But this is not the end of the story, for we can now ask for the reason for the whole action.  
Jack may choose the former ―action‖ as profitable (he may e.g. expect to get cash from his 
mother) and the warrior may choose the latter ―action‖ as noble (he may live in pre-capitalistic 
times).  In this case, ―‗Noble‘ describes the kind of value that the whole package has, the value 
that he sees in it when he chooses it‖.77  This, Korsgaard claims, is the proper use of the term 
―reason.‖   In contrast, what people usually ask for, when they ask for the reason for which an 
action is performed is the purpose of the ―act‖.  The purpose of an ―act‖ is separate from and 
behind the act, whereas the reason for his ―action‖ is not separate from the ―action.‖  For, in 
Korsgaard‘s words: 
Giving a description or explication of the action and giving a description or explication of 
the reason is the same thing. The logos or maxim that expresses the reason is a kind of 
description of the action, and could be cited in response to the question: what is he doing? 
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just as easily as it can in response to the question why is he doing that? Indeed—to make 
one last appeal to our ordinary practices—their view explains why in ordinary language 
these questions are pretty much equivalent. For the demand for justification can as easily 
take the form: what are you doing? or more aggressively and skeptically what do you 
think you are doing? as it can why are you doing that? The reason for an action is not 
something that stands behind it and makes you want to do it: it is the action itself, 
described in a way that makes it intelligible.
78
 
The reason for an ―action‖ is thus the account, or the story which spells out the act-for-the-sake-
of-an-end whole in a way that makes it intelligible as worth pursuing in some sense.  In what 
follows I will be calling ―intending‖ what Korsgaard calls ―choosing‖, and what Korsgaard calls 
―a reason for an action,‖ I will later on be calling ―the guise of the intention‖.  A first stab at 
getting to the picture of intention I‘m proposing in this chapter is to say that intention is not an 
attitude towards a mere ―act,‖79 but the description of a whole ―action‖ as an intelligible object.  
This description appears to have the following structure: (1) it is a complex composed out of an 
―act‖ and a ―purpose‖ component; it is a to-do-this-for-the-sake-of-this-end, or to-do-this-in-
order-to-achieve-this-end,
80
 and (2) it is held together by what Aristotle would call a logos, or 
Kant a maxim: a description which makes it (the whole ―action‖) intelligible as worth pursuing 
under some light. 
This much, though, is not sufficient to generate a convincing error theory of the sort I‘m 
envisaging.  The following objection makes this obvious.  Korsgaard may be right that we rarely 
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just intend to do something without giving any thought whatsoever to what we want it for, or 
what we will thereby achieve, or even how it fits in with our other intentions and plans.
81
 But, 
contrary to what Korsgaard has to say, we often just do things without doing them for the sake of 
anything else.  Korsgaard attempts to answer just this objection by suggesting that even when we 
do not do things for the sake of doing other things we may be doing them for their own sake; we 
may for instance be dancing-just-for-the-sake-of-dancing.
82
  But as Anscombe points out, the 
question Why, the applicability of which determines when an action is intentional, ―is not refused 
application because the answer to it says that there is no reason [―purpose‖ in Korsgaard‘s 
terms], any more than the question how much money I have in my pocket is refused application 
by the answer ‗None‘‖.83  Imagine I am tapping my fingers rhythmically on the table during a 
boring talk.  Are we always willing to say that I intend to-tap-my-fingers-rhythmically-for-the-
sake-of-tapping-them, or that I intend to-tap-my-fingers-rhythmically-for-the-sheer-joy-of-doing-
so, or that I intend to-tap-my-fingers-rhythmically-to-entertain-myself, etc.?  There surely are 
descriptions of cases in which I‘m not tapping my fingers for the sake of anything else.  But, 
Korsgaard may respond, these would be cases of intentional action which lie on the periphery of 
intentionality.  Why should we bother?   
We should bother because Korsgaard‘s account can only explain the normativity of the 
connection between the thought of means and the thought of ends by reverting to the specific 
interpretation of the ―for-the-sake-of‖ part of the action.  But this material, i.e. the specific light 
in which a means-end connection is thought (e.g. the light of avarice in the case of the avaricious 
son who intends to go-to-Chicago-to-visit-his-mother, and the light of nobility in the case of the 
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warrior) is not what makes an action intentional.  The soldier‘s nobility for instance is not what 
makes his action intentional.  In this case the specific interpretation of the ―for the sake of‖ part 
of the action is not part of the elementary structure of intention, and our error theory cannot be 
based on the structure of intention, as I said I think it should be.  For the structure of intention 
alone to provide the basis for our ideal error theory we need to explain how the description of the 
connection as a means-end connection has a normative force of its own, independently of the 
specific light in which the connection is thought.  To manage this, I will go on to show, we need 
to understand the structure of intention as something other than the structure of the content of the 
proposition, which is the object of a distinctive propositional attitude.  Instead, we need to 
understand the structure of intention as the structure of a distinctive form of event or process. 
The first step to get to this account is to explain how the means-end connection itself – 
independently of the particular light in which it is thought – may be normative, in a way that 
explains away the appearance of the imperatival ―ought.‖ G. E. M. Anscombe departs from 
Korsgaard‘s account in attempting to give just that: an interpretation of the generic normative 
connection between means and end descriptions, which constitutes the structure of intention.
84
  
Intention in acting is for Anscombe given by what she calls ―a series of means end thoughts.‖   
―Why are you moving your arm up and down? – To pump the water. – Why are you pumping the 
water? – To poison the inhabitants, etc.‘, is Anscombe‘s infamous example for the kind of 
exchange which defines a series of means end thoughts.  The series is this: ―I‘m moving my arm 
up and down in order to pump the water, I‘m pumping the water in order to poison the 
inhabitants, etc.‖ Its form is this: ―I am doing x in order to do y, I am doing y in order to do z, 
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etc..‖ And it is determined as a distinctive form of thought by the fact that a certain sense85 of the 
question Why is applicable to all these descriptions (moving my hand up and down, pumping 
water, poisoning the inhabitants, etc.).
86
  The last term in this series of means-end thoughts is 
what Anscombe calls an ―intention in acting;‖ this is what Korsgaard calls a ―reason for an 
action,‖ and what I will later on call ―the guise of an intention.‖  This is the specific87 way in 
which the means-end descriptions are thought together in the means-end syntheses.  Each such 
way reflects either one of the most general concerns of the agent or the most general concern of 
the agent.
88
   
To go back to the point I made against Korsgaard above, her account does not suffice to give 
us the kind of error theory we need.  This is because she assumes that the only normativity that 
can exist in a means-end structure is the normativity of the last term in the series, in Anscombe‘s 
words.  But what is distinctive of Anscombe‘s account is that an action description should count 
both as the description of the means to an end (or an act, in Korsgaard‘s terminology), and the 
description of an end (or a purpose, in Korsgaard‘s terminology).  On her view, what qualifies 
each of the above descriptions (pumping the water, poisoning the inhabitants, etc.) as action 
descriptions is not just that they find their place in an etiological structure of the form to-do-x-
for-the-sake-of-doing-y, as Korsgaard assumes.  What qualifies them as action descriptions is 
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that it is in their essence to be describable as both the means to an end and an end.  Pumping the 
water in Anscombe‘s example is both the answer to the question Why are you moving your arm 
up and down?, and itself the subject matter of the further question Why are you pumping the 
water?  In other words, pumping the water is both the end of moving one‘s arm up and down, 
and the means of poisoning the inhabitants.  Similarly, moving one‘s arm up and down is both 
the means of pumping the water, and itself the end of, say, moving one‘s arm from point A to 
point B (where, for instance, moving one‘s arm from point A to point C is what it is to move 
one‘s arm up and down, and B is between A and C).  If what makes an action description an 
action description is the fact that it can be both the ground and the grounded in a series of means-
end thoughts, then it would be weird, to say the least, to suggest, as Korsgaard does, that the 
purpose of an act is separate from and behind the act.   
In fact, this view of the end or ―purpose‖ of an action as separate is exactly the kind of 
picture Thompson warns us against in his ―Naïve Theory of Action.‖89  There, Thompson argues 
that to appreciate the structure of intentional action we need to realize that what he calls the 
naïve rationalization of action is the primary form of action rationalization.  The naïve 
rationalization is manifested in reason giving exchanges of the form: Why are you moving your 
arm up and down? – I‟m pumping the water; Why are you pumping the water? – I‟m poisoning 
the inhabitants; etc.  For Thompson, it is possible to answer these Why questions with answers 
such as ―Because I want to poison the inhabitants,‖ or ―In order to poison the inhabitants,‖ etc., 
only because it is possible to answer them ―naïvely‖ by saying ―I‟m poisoning the inhabitants.‖  I 
said above that on Korsgaard‘s view, what intentional action embodies is the ―reason for the 
action.‖    On Thompson‘s picture, intentional action does not just embody the specific light in 
                                                          
89
 In Thompson 2008. 
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which the means-end synthesis is made intelligible; the ―reason of the action‖ in Korsgaard‘s 
words, or the ―final term of the series‖ in Anscombe‘s words.  Intentional action also embodies 
what Anscombe calls the form of rationalization itself: the series of means-end thoughts.  Thus, 
Thompson explains the elementary structure of intention as a certain synthesis of means-end 
descriptions.   In this synthesis the action description as an end is not separate from and behind 
the action description as a means, but is united with it in the peculiar synthesis exhibited in a 
naïve rationalization.90  Let me explain this some more. 
In Anscombe‘s example, the peculiar synthesis is exhibited in the rationalization according 
to which the man is pumping the water because he is poisoning the inhabitants.  Poisoning the 
inhabitants is not behind and separate from the action of pumping the water.  To deny this on the 
grounds of cases in which one fails to poison the inhabitants is to merely assume that one cannot 
be doing something even though one has not yet done it, or may never actually do it.  That I‘m 
walking to school, as Thompson stresses, does not of course imply that I have walked to school.  
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 “The nature of intentional action, or the kind of being-subject-of-an-event that characterizes a rational agent 
and a person, resides in the peculiar “synthesis” that unites the various parts and phases of something like house-
building, for example, mixing mortar, laying bricks, hammering nails, etc.  This synthesis is rendered explicit in 
naïve rationalization, which brings them successively to the one formula ‘I’m building a house’.  But the synthesis 
can be exhibited, I will suggest, even in the moving of a finger.” (Thompson 2008, p. 91)  On this view of course, 
there cannot be any basic intentional actions, in the sense of an action which is performed without performing any 
other action.    In fact, one of Thompson’s initial definitions of intentional action is that “X’s doing A is an 
intentional action (proper) under that description just in case the agent can be said, truly, to have done something 
else because he or she was doing A.” (Thompson 2008, p. 112) I have no space here to argue explicitly for the 
impossibility of basic action, since it is not my purpose here to defend Thompson’s view of intention so much as to 
show that it helps us build an adequate error theory of the instrumental principle of rationality.  All I should note 
for now is that the rejection of the possibility of basic intentional action on Thompson’s part is not to deny the 
commonsensical claim that we do not perform all of our actions as instruments for performing other actions; in the 
way for instance of someone who is being nice to someone else so as to earn their favor.  Instead, Thompson’s 
rejection of the possibility of basic intentional action is his denial of the not so commonsensical thought that a 
certain bit of behavior becomes intentional “by its being caught up in a rationalizing order” (Thompson 2008, p. 
112).  For, to identify an intentional action as basic is to identify exactly that bit of behavior in the rationalizing 
order which became intentional by entering the rationalizing order.  But if “rather, the rationalizing order, that 
peculiar etiological structure, is inscribed within every intentional action proper” (Thompson 2008, p. 112), then to 
want to identify an intentional action as basic is either to want to point to the commonsensical thought above, or 
to want to sustain a mythical conception of action. 
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That I did not walk to school does not imply that I was not walking to school either.  So it may 
be true to say that I‟m pumping water because I‟m poisoning the inhabitants, even if no-one has 
yet been poisoned or no-one will be poisoned because the plan will fail.
91
  For the truth of the 
etiological relation in the imperfective
92
 (I am pumping the water because I‘m poison-ing the 
inhabitants) does not imply the truth of the perfective (I poison-ed the inhabitants) even though 
the latter implies the former.   
In fact, as Thompson claims, the kind of explanation of action which is peculiar to action 
theory is the kind of explanation which locates action in what might be called a developing 
process.
93
  To explain an action as intentional is to provide the particular etiological relation 
(e.g. I am breaking the eggs because I‘m making an omelet) of happenings (e.g. breaking eggs, 
heating the oil in the pan, etc.) to an imperfectively present overarching process (e.g. omelet-
making).
94
  It is not, as Korsgaard assumes, to place a piece of behavior in a rationalizing 
connection (e.g. to put a ―this‖ in a ―to-do-this-for-the-sake-of-an-end structure‖).  It is to explain 
how the action itself constitutes a distinctive unfolding or process.  As Thompson 
characteristically puts it, ‗Any intentional action (proper) figures in a space of reasons as a 
region, not as a point; or, equivalently, each of them, whether hand-raising or house-building, is 
itself such a space.‘95 
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 For this to be true it doesn’t have to be the case that the naïve rationalization is true no matter what is going on 
in the world.  In other words, that there is some failure of getting y done, which makes it the case that one is not 
doing-x-because-one-is-doing-y, does not mean that all failure of getting y done falsifies the naïve rationalization.  
For the point that I see Thompson as making it suffices to say that there is some failure of achievement that does 
not falsify the naïve rationalization in a way that makes room for a special normative relation, as I will point out in 
what follows in the chapter. 
92
 The imperfective, e.g. poisoning, is that which describes the event in its unfolding and the perfective, e.g. 
poisoned, that which describes the events as “unfurled or finished or whole.” (See Thompson 2008, 131) 
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 See Thompson 2008, p. 132. 
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 See Thompson 2008, p. 112. 
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But if the end of the means is not separate from and behind the means, then we do not have 
to look to what Anscombe calls ―the final term in the series of rationalizations,‖ in order to 
establish that there is a normative relation between the means and end descriptions.  In fact, we 
can now claim, it is the nature of event forms or processes as such which guarantees that there is 
a normative relation between the means and the end description of an action.  For now the 
following possibility arises: an agent may be pumping water because he is poisoning the 
inhabitants even though he may be (under certain circumstances) failing to be poisoning the 
inhabitants - in the sense that one has failed to poison the inhabitants when one has not yet 
poisoned them or will never actually get them poisoned.  He may still count as ‗pumping the 
water because he is poisoning the inhabitants‘, because the truth of this imperfective 
rationalization does not imply the truth of the perfective that the agent poisoned the inhabitants.  
This is the only sense in which the end of an action is both constitutive and normative for an 
action. 
The account proposed here will not exclude cases where we seem hard pressed to think for 
―the sake of what‖ we are performing an intentional action, such as doodling or tapping our 
fingers on the table.   For even when I‘m tapping, my tapping can be conceived of as the 
normative unity of phases such as taking my hands out of my pocket, placing them on the table, 
moving the index first, then moving the middle finger, etc., such that in doing each one of these 
things because I‘m doing the other, I may be failing to do the other.96  This is how we get an 
error theory which is based solely on the elementary structure of intention.  This error theory can 
explain away the appearance of a distinctive, action-guiding requirement of instrumental 
rationality.  Let me spell out how. 
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 For a detailed argument for this view see Thompson 2008, chapter 7.   
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At the end of the last section I said that this action-guiding requirement is posited to explain 
why it is that we ought not to determine whether or not to intend an end in abstraction from how 
it figures in the means-end connection of which we are aware.  But no interpretation of the 
requirement could avoid yielding counter-intuitive results, and Kolodny‘s and Raz‘s error theory 
of reason could not fully explain it away.  So, I suggested that we should follow Thompson in 
conceiving of the elementary structure of intention as the rationalizing order which connects 
happenings with an overarching imperfectively present process by naïve rationalizations of the 
form “I‟m doing A because I‟m doing B.”  On this view, to intend an action as an end just is to 
locate a distinctive (it doesn‘t matter which exactly) imperfective rationalizing means-end order 
in an action; whereas to consider an end in isolation from this means-end structure is to take it 
out of this order and so to strip it of its character as an end.  This explains why it seems that an 
agent ought to think of her action as figuring in a means-end connection.
97
  It appears that this 
―ought‖ should be explained in terms of the possibility of a distinctive rational failure, because a 
distinctive failure is indeed possible.  This is not the failure to conform to a distinctive action 
guiding, i.e. instrumental, requirement of practical rationality; it is the failure to do B, when one 
is doing A because one is doing B.  It appears, then, that there is a distinctive requirement of 
rationality we can fail to conform to, because we can fail to be doing A because we are doing B – 
even though we may be indeed doing A because we are doing B – in the way of someone who 
has failed to do B when one has not done B.
98
   
 I suggested above that intention just is the distinctive (i.e. etiological) representation under 
which the imperfective forms of means and ends descriptions are thought together in acting. If 
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 This is part of what Anscombe means when she says that the agent must be able to answer the Why question 
even if her answer is “For no reason”. 
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 For what I take to be a similar suggestion see Lavin, 2004. 
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this is true, there can be no issue of either transmission of reason-hood from one attitude to 
another (as on the narrow scope reading) or of coherence between types of attitudes (as on the 
wide scope reading).  Instrumental normativity will not constitute the rationality of our attitudes 
but the normativity of a distinctive kind of etiological form of events: intention. 
 But one may raise the following objection.  I may have managed to come up with a story 
about instrumental normativity which explains why it appears that what is required on the part of 
the agent is the thought of an action as figuring in a means-end order (and not in isolation from 
it).  But I have avoided dealing with the puzzling intuitions that the narrow and wide scope 
theorists try to explain.  Do I have something helpful to say about these puzzling intuitions?  In 
particular, why do we think it appropriate to sometimes say that, if an agent intends an action, 
then she ought to take the means, and some other times say that if she intends an action, she ought 
to either intend the means or revise the end?  What explains this divergence?  Nothing in the 
elementary structure of intentional action, I want to respond.  What explains this divergence in 
our judgment is a function of the different each time ―guise of one‘s intention:‖ i.e. the different 
character of the last term in the series of the rationalizing order one identifies in one‘s action, in 
Anscombe‘s words, or the different (individual) determination of the thought of means-end 
descriptions in a means-end synthesis.   
 Assume, for instance, that this character is determined by thought of moral value, whatever 
that is exactly.  In other words, assume that doing y as the means has been thought together with 
doing x as the end under the guise of what is judged as, e.g., the honest thing to do.  In this case, 
one is under the unconditional practical requirement to do y.  This is no more than the moral 
requirement, whatever its exact nature.  If, on the other hand, doing y has been thought together 
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with doing x as what appears pleasant, then one is under the conditional requirement to do y.  
Assume, for instance, that one thinks of going to the shop together with buying chocolate under 
the guise of pleasure (i.e. of the last term in the rationalizing instrumental order is some 
description of the sort ―to enjoy myself‖).  And one realizes that the only way to do so is to steal a 
car.  Then from the perspective of pleasure, one is subject to a conditional requirement: one can 
satisfy the requirement one is under either by stealing the car or by putting down the desire to 
buy chocolate.  From the perspective of moral value, the requirement one is subject to is 
unconditional: one has to satisfy it by not stealing the car.  So, if one steals the car one may 
manage to satisfy the conditional requirement of pleasure but not the unconditional requirement 
of morality.  If one does not steal the car but does not put down one‘s desire for chocolate, one 
may manage to satisfy the unconditional requirement of morality but not the conditional 
requirement of pleasure.  If, again, one does not steal the car but quiets down one‘s desire then 
one may manage to satisfy both, etc.   
 Ultimately, the reason why both the wide scope and the narrow scope interpretations fail is 
that (a) they have confused non-instrumental requirements, such as the above requirements of 
morality and pleasure, with manifestations of instrumental normativity, and (b) they have failed 
to appreciate that if it makes any sense to talk of a specifically instrumental requirement, this is 
the sense in which the structure of intention itself as the distinctive form of an event consists in an 
instrumental, normative order; not the sense in which one is required to form an attitude towards 
this or that proposition.  Kolodny‘s error theory is inadequate, because even though he has 
appreciated the truth of the first diagnostic claim, he has not appreciated the truth of the second.   
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1.7 CONCLUSION: BACK TO THE DBT AGAIN 
I said above that the guise of one‘s intention is the (individual) determination of the way the 
means-end descriptions are thought together in the means-end syntheses by different 
requirements.  And I suggested that this guise is what explains why we sometimes think that one 
is under the unconditional requirement to perform an action that is described as the means to an 
end, and why we sometimes think that one is under the conditional requirement to perform an 
action that is described as the means to an end.  I gave two examples to spell out this divergence 
in our judgment.  In the first example I postulated that the connection between imperfective 
ends- and means- action descriptions was effected under the guise of moral value.   In other 
words, that the last term of the rationalizing order of imperfective ends- and means-descriptions 
was a description pertaining to what is morally valuable.  In the second example I postulated that 
the connection between imperfective ends- and means-descriptions was effected under the guise 
of appetite, or what appears pleasant.  In other words, that the last term of the rationalizing order 
was a description pertaining to what is or appears pleasant. 
Now in this chapter I argued that the DBT – the views on which action motivation is 
explained as such only if it is revealed as being subject to the instrumental requirement to take 
the means to one‘s end and the source of the normative force of this requirement is a desire for 
the end – fail because they fall under a genus of theories of rationality that fail.  I took this genus 
to be the genus of instrumentalism: the family of views on which (1) action motivation is 
explained as such only if it is revealed as being subject to the instrumental requirement to take 
the means to one‘s end, and (2) the source of the normative force of this requirement is taken to 
lie in the agent‘s propositional attitude (intention broadly speaking) towards the end.  I argued 
that instrumentalist theories fail to do justice to our intuitions concerning the apparent 
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requirement to think of our actions as figuring in means-end connections.  Eventually I argued 
for an alternative conception of instrumental normativity based on a different understanding of 
the structure of intention.  On this understanding, intention is not a propositional attitude but the 
distinctive form of an event or process: the rationalizing order of means-end descriptions of 
actions, which may take a different character depending on the nature of the last term in the 
order. 
If I‘m right, and the DBT fail because there is no irreducible, action-guiding requirement of 
instrumental rationality, this is not bad news for all normativist theories of action motivation 
which attempt to ground motivation in the normative control of desire.  For these theories may 
assume that desire is the ground of the normativity of motivation in the sense that desire is the 
only thing that determines the ―guise of intention.‖ In other words, in the sense that desire as 
such or a specific desire is the only source of (individual) determination of the way in which 
means-end descriptions are thought together in means-end syntheses.  
To return to Anscombe‘s ―mud‖ example, it makes sense to say that I desire to get a saucer 
of mud when ―getting a saucer of mud‖ figures in my thought of what I desire to do as a means-
to-an-end which makes sense in the light of desire; as for instance getting-a-saucer-of-mud-
because-I-am-fighting-a-mud-fight, which makes sense in the light of my desire for play.  It is 
true that it sounds weird to merely say ―I want a saucer of mud‖ when it does not sound weird to 
merely say ―I want a plate of food.‖  This is because in the latter case but not in the former it is 
easy to imagine what the means-end rationalizing order is which may be the object of motivation 
and which may be thought under the guise of desire.  This is how we can both understand 
Anscombe‘s claim and do justice to Dennis Stampe‘s thought that when desire moves us, it 
moves us with a certain right.  To say of desire that it is the only source of the guise of intention 
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is to say the following: that desire is the sole ground of the practical norms to which action 
motivation is subject.  And this is to give a desire based theory of the normativity of motivation, 
which evades the criticism I ventured against the specific variety of Desired Based Theories in 
this chapter.  To argue against the emerging desire based theories, we need a different argument: 
one that I will give in the next chapter.  
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2. PRIMARY MOTIVATIONAL CONFLICT AND MONOLITHIC THEORIES OF 
ACTION MOTIVATION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
2.1.1 Preview of the Argument 
In the first chapter of this dissertation I argued against the view that to explain intentional action 
as such is to reveal it to be subject to a distinctive, action-guiding requirement of instrumental 
rationality.  I argued that intention does not guide intentional action as a means to an end.  
Therefore to explain intentional action as such cannot be to reveal it to be subject to the 
normative authority of a propositional attitude towards an end that will thereby be served.  The 
truth, I suggested, is that there is no distinctive action-guiding instrumental requirement at all.  
What explains the appearance that there is such a requirement is the elementary structure of 
intentional action conceived of as the structure of a distinctive form of event and not the structure 
of a propositional attitude.  In particular, what explains this appearance is the fact that a certain 
instrumental, rationalizing order is internal to the structure of intentional action. 
But, as I pointed out at the end of the first chapter, we can nevertheless take desire to be the 
ground of action motivation, in a broadly neo-Humean manner.  This is possible because there 
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are two distinct ways in which intentional action might be subject to normative standards.  On 
the first, the normative standards are non-practical in the sense that they do not guide us in 
choosing an action.  And they are internal to the instrumental order as such (so that in doing A to 
do B one may succeed in doing B or fail to do B).  On the second, the normative standards are 
practical in the sense that they guide us in choosing an action.  They are internal to the relation 
between the means-end synthesis which is the action and the non-instrumental practical 
requirement(s) which determine(s) its guise (so that in doing A because one is doing B one may 
be succeeding in doing or failing to be doing what one is required to do.) 
The guise of the means-end synthesis is what I called in the previous chapter the ―guise of 
intention.‖99  And I said that this is the (individual) determination of the way in which the 
means-end descriptions are thought together in the means-end syntheses, and each such way 
reflects the most general concern or one of the most general concerns of the agent.   I can say 
now that the guise of intention (or action motivation) is the (individual) determination of the way 
means-end descriptions are thought together in a means-end synthesis by a non-instrumental 
practical requirement.  For instance Jack may be motivated to drive to Chicago to see his dying 
mother out of love, or out of a sense of duty or out of avarice, etc.  It may be the case, that is, that 
going to Chicago and seeing his dying mother are represented together by the agent as what 
constitutes loving someone, or what it is to discharge one‘s duty as a son, or what brings about 
the desired inheritance, etc.  In all these cases, Jack would count as going-to-Chicago-because-
he-is-seeing-his-dying-mother; i.e. as doing something with the elementary structure of an 
intentional action.  The guise of this structure would in each case be different.  Whether this 
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guise is ultimately constituted as such by a normatively authoritative desire, concept, judgment, 
belief, form of thought, etc. will depend, as we will see, on the details of each theory of practical 
rationality.  In this chapter I will examine the monolithic family of views on which the guise of 
intention is ultimately constituted by a single commensurable requirement.  And I will argue 
against these theories on the basis of considerations about action motivation: that activation of 
psychic structures which issues in intentional action. 
Thus, even if action motivation is not subject to the normative control of a propositional 
attitude towards the action as a means, it may nevertheless be subject to the non-instrumental, 
normative control of desire.  For (a specific) desire may be what one is required to satisfy or 
approximate or aim at in order to count as non-instrumentally practically rational.
100
  In other 
words, (a specific) desire may constitute the guise of intentional action.  This would preserve a 
broadly Humean narrative about the constitution of intentional action.  This understanding, on 
which there are two distinct ways in which action motivation and intentional action may be 
subject to normative standards, makes room for a Rationalist alternative, as well.  According to 
the Rationalist family of theories, the guise of intention will constitute either the accordance of 
intention with judgments about one‘s reasons (what I shall be calling ―practical judgments‖ from 
now on), or an instance of the activity of sound practical reasoning.  In either case, to explain 
intentional action as such is not to explain it to be or fail to be as it ought to be from the 
perspective of a distinctive, action-guiding requirement of instrumental rationality.   It is to either 
reveal it to have the elementary normative structure of intentional action, or to reveal this 
instrumental structure to be subject to non-instrumental practical requirements. 
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In this chapter I will argue that certain considerations about our motivational life have an 
important consequence if combined with the Thompsonian picture of the elementary structure of 
intentional action.  The fundamental premise of these considerations is the platitude that there 
are two kinds of motivational conflict: derivative and primary motivational conflict.  Roughly 
speaking, derivative motivational conflict is conflict between two motivations with regard to two 
different actions, which happen to be jointly unrealizable, and primary motivational conflict is 
conflict with regard to one and the same action at the same time.  The consequence of the proper 
consideration of this platitude is that there cannot be a single commensurable source of the 
practical standards to which action motivation is subject; in other words, that the standards of 
practical rationality must issue from incommensurable practical requirements.   If action 
motivation must be subject to incommensurable practical requirements, then the means-end 
synthesis which is the intentional action cannot take a single guise; i.e. it must be determined by 
incommensurable practical requirements.  I will call any theory which assumes that action 
motivation, and hence intentional action must be subject to a single (commensurable) 
requirement of practical rationality monolithic.  And I will argue that no monolithic theory can 
account for the possibility of primary motivational conflict.  
In what follows, I shall argue that both Humean and Rationalist monolithic theories fail to 
make room for the possibility of contrary motivations towards one and the same action at the 
same time.  To see this we have to keep before our eyes the conception of action as a means-end 
synthesis in the way presented in the previous chapter.  In the rest of this introduction I will trace 
the roots of this argument to Plato‘s Republic, and defend the intuitiveness of the distinction 
between primary and derivative motivational conflict.  In the second section of this chapter I will 
distinguish between Humean, or Motivation-first, and Rationalist, or Rationality-first, monolithic 
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theories of action motivation and intentional action.
101
 In the third and fourth section I will argue 
that neither the Humean nor the rationalist theories can make room for primary motivational 
opposition.  In the fifth section I will propose an alternative: we can understand the guise of the 
instrumental order inscribed in intentional action, and hence action motivation, as being 
determined by incommensurable requirements of practical rationality.  We can, that is, allow for 
a multi-dimensional account of intentional action and action motivation.
102
   
In the final chapter of this dissertation I will investigate several multi-dimensional accounts.  
I will argue that to make sense of choice in the face of conflict between incommensurable 
requirements of practical rationality, we need to conceive of the incommensurable guises of 
means-end syntheses as taking a single form: the form of practical knowledge.  This is 
knowledge of oneself as determined in her reasoning by the right practical requirement for the 
circumstances.  
2.1.2 Plato‟s Argument from Conflict for the Division of the Soul 
The suggestion that a distinctive type of motivational conflict is philosophically important is not 
new.  Plato, in the fourth book of the Republic, took a distinctive sort of motivational conflict 
specified as such by the so-called principle of opposites to entail the division of the soul.
103
  The 
appearance with which Plato‘s argument starts is the appearance of a certain reflexive type of 
conflict.  The example he gives is of a thirsty man who may both yearn for a drink, and thus be 
moved towards it, and be pulled back from it by something which forbids him to do so.  Then he 
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goes on to argue that desire for drink cannot all be desire for good drink; some has to be desire 
for drink as such.  According to the principle of opposites, one and the same subject cannot do or 
suffer opposites, in the same respect, towards the same thing and at the same time.  Therefore the 
movements to and away from the drink must originate in different parts of the soul.  What 
exactly the premises of the argument are and how they should be interpreted has been a matter of 
great controversy.  What a great number of interpreters seem to agree on is that this type of 
argument has more defects than merits.
104
  The fiercest criticism against the Platonic argument is 
that the principle of opposites ―could easily disrupt the parts which it creates‖105 by generating 
parts every time there is conflict.  For instance, every time two appetites – e.g. being hungry and 
thirsty - came into conflict they would, on this objection, generate parts in the soul.  On one 
interpretation, we should take the Platonic text to imply that conflict generates parts of the soul 
only if it constitutes conflict between a disposition arising from appetite and a contrary 
disposition arising from reason; where appetite and reason are conceived of as distinct 
independently of conflict.  Otherwise, all conflict will always be re-describable as conflict 
between distinct appetites, or distinct manifestations of reason.  As Michael Woods observes, the 
problem is that ―the bare fact of conflict is not enough to exclude a Humean analysis of the 
example [of the man who is at once pulled towards this drink and away from it]; and if appeal is 
made to the fact that the impulses have different origins, the argument from the occurrence of 
conflict drops out as superfluous.‖106 [my emphasis]   
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One plausible solution to this interpretative problem is to make a distinction along the lines 
of Bernard Williams‘ distinction between contingent and non-contingent conflicts.107  On the one 
hand, we have contingent conflict: conflict between desires that arise from a contingent matter of 
fact, such that it is impossible that both desires should be satisfied, even though we can conceive 
of cases in which they could.
108
  On the other hand, there are cases of conflict in which we 
cannot conceive of any change in the circumstances that would enable the contrary motivations 
to be jointly satisfied.  These would be the non-contingent conflicts.  As Williams himself puts it, 
could we figure out what would have to be different for it to be possible that an Australian ―torn 
between spending Christmas in Christmassy surroundings in Austria, and spending it back home 
in the familiar Christmas heat of his birth-place‖ could satisfy both of his desires?109  On this 
interpretative solution, if we could make some such distinction we might be able to claim that 
only non-contingent conflict between desires generates parts of the soul.  But this would not 
solve the problem of the plausible generation of infinite parts.  The reason is that it takes for 
granted what we need to argue for: that some conflicts are not dependent on contingent facts in 
the world, but on the (divided) nature of our soul.  This conflict cannot be imagined away if we 
imagine a slight alteration in facts in the world.   What we need to do is give an argument from 
non-contingent conflict to parts of the soul.  This is what is lacking, and this is what I hope to do 
in this chapter. 
As I will show in the rest of this chapter, promoting a certain distinction between types of 
motivational conflict does reveal that not all action motivation can be determined by a single 
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commensurable source of practical standards.  All we have to do is give the proper analysis of 
two components of the Platonic principle of opposites.  The first concerns the meaning of the ―in 
the same respect‖ [κατά ταύτόν] part of the principle, and the second has to do with what the 
―one and the same object‖ [πρός ταύτόν] could be, in the case of action motivation.110  In this 
chapter I will argue that the distinction between derivative and primary motivational conflict 
helps us appreciate how a certain kind of conflict generates parts of the soul, if the following two 
conditions hold: (1) if ―one and the same object‖ is taken to be an intentional action with the 
Thompsonian elementary structure presented in the previous chapter, and (2) if ―in the same 
respect‖ is understood as the specific guise or the specific character of this elementary structure.  
The distinction between primary and derivative conflict allows us to show that one and the same 
agent cannot be motivated in opposed ways towards one and the same means-end synthesis at the 
same time, provided the guise of this synthesis is determined by a commensurable normative 
source; or in more Platonic terms, if the action is taken to originate in a single part of the soul.
111
  
As Woods, along with a great number of commentators, emphasizes, the bare fact of 
conflict is not sufficient to exclude a Humean analysis of conflict.  These commentators often 
neglect to note that conflict should be understood in such a way as to exclude not only Humean, 
but also Rationalist alternatives.  Otherwise, the argument from conflict cannot yield parts of the 
soul.  In this chapter I will argue that a proper understanding of practical conflict is sufficient to 
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 Remember the principle is that one and the same subject cannot do or suffer opposites, in the same respect, 
towards the same thing and at the same time. 
111
 My interpretation of the Platonic argument moves in the general direction of the interpretation of Woods 
(Woods, 1987) and Price (Price, 1995) against the interpretation of Bobonich (Bobonich, 2002).  It assumes that 
“one and the same subject” refers to the agent and not the parts of the soul and that the parts of the  soul are 
specified in the “in the same regard” component of the principle of opposites.  So, on my reading, the principle of 
opposites translates in the following way for the case of action motivation: one and the same agent cannot be 
moved in contrary ways towards one and the same action, with the same part of his soul (i.e. under the same guise 
of intentional action), at the same time.    
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exclude both the Humean and the Rationalist monolithic accounts.  If this is so, then Plato‘s 
argument cannot have been as bad as interpreters have supposed.  What was wrong all along was 
their shared assumption concerning the elementary structure of intentional action and hence 
action motivation. 
2.1.3 The Intuitiveness of the Distinction between Primary and Derivative Motivational 
Conflict 
I said above that derivative motivational conflict is conflict between two motivations with regard 
to two different actions which happen to be jointly unrealizable.   In such cases conflict is 
derived from the existence of the two initial motivations, together with facts about the promotion 
of at least one of these motivations.   The formal definition of this kind of conflict is the 
following:  
Derivative motivational conflict:  being motivated to do-A-to-do-B and to not-do-
A-to-do-B, at the same time, where the latter motivation derives from the motivation 
to do-C-to-do-D and the fact that one or both of its components (means or end 
descriptions) are jointly unrealizable with one or both of the components of the 
motivation to do-A-to-do-B. 
The second kind of conflict, which I shall be calling primary motivational conflict, is conflict 
between a motivation towards and a motivation away from one and the same action; where 
neither motivation is derived in the above manner from a distinct motivation towards a different 
action together with facts about how it can be promoted.  Again, more formally: 
Primary motivational conflict: being motivated to do-A-to-do-B and to not-do-A-
to-do-B, at the same time, where the latter motivation is not derived from the 
motivation to do-C-to-do-D and the fact that one or all of its components (means or 
end descriptions) are jointly unrealizable with one or all of the components of the 
motivation to do-A-to-do-B. (Where what one is motivated against when being 
motivated to not do-A-to-do-B is the whole of doing-A-to-do-B, and not A, B, or 
both.) 
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But why should we accept that there is any important distinction in the vicinity?  Why 
should we not simply assume that all conflict is derivative?  Is there any pre-theoretic purchase 
to this distinction?  To see that there is, think of the following.  Say that on a given occasion I 
both want to buy a beer to have fun and want to buy a book to have fun but there is only enough 
money for one purchase.  In this case we can say that no matter what I wanted to buy the beer 
and the book for, if I both wanted to buy the beer (to do x) and wanted to buy the book (to do y), 
I would be in conflict, for the corresponding motivations would not be jointly realizable.  In 
other words, if we re-described the relevant motivations as the motivation to buy the beer to x 
and the motivation to not buy the beer to y, this material would be enough to generate conflict.  
The reason is that in this case conflict would essentially concern the first component, or action 
description of the instrumental structure and not the connection between the components.  Is it 
possible for conflict to irreducibly concern something other than merely one or both of its 
components as such?  
To deny the possibility that conflict between two motivations may concern more than 
merely one or both of its components is to deny the intuitive possibility of a reflexive type of 
conflict.  In this case of conflict what one is motivated against when one is motivated against 
doing-A-to-do-B is the very connection between doing A and doing B.
112
  Imagine I‘m bored at a 
bar wanting both to get another beer in order to have fun, and to not get another beer to have fun.  
If we take this to be a case of derivative motivational conflict in my sense, we would have to say 
that the latter motivation is derived from a further motivation together with facts about the 
incompossibility of one or both of their components.  So we can imagine the following cases of 
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motivational conflict. 
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derivative conflict: I may be both motivated to get another beer in order to have fun and be 
motivated to get another beer to treat a friend, when I only have enough money for one 
purchase.  Or I may be both motivated to get another beer in order to have fun and to be 
motivated to go to another bar to have fun, or I may be both motivated to get another drink to 
have fun and motivated to start reading my stupid book to see what will happen next, when I 
can‘t do both.  To say that these cases exhaust the possibilities for conflict is to exclude cases of 
reflexive conflict, in which what I‘m conflicted about is the very connection between the means 
and end descriptions of a certain means-end synthesis.  If I am both motivated to get another beer 
to have fun and to not get another beer to have fun in the manner of this reflexive type of 
conflict, the conflict does not concern the ―getting another beer‖ or the ―having fun‖ action-
descriptions, or both.  The conflict concerns the specific character of the connection between 
getting another beer and having fun.  In being motivated against getting another beer to have fun 
I may not be motivated against getting another beer; and I may not be motivated against having 
fun as such either.  I may instead be motivated against thinking of getting beer together with 
having fun, because I puritanically think that one should not be drinking alcohol to have fun.  Or, 
more typically, I may be motivated against thinking of getting another beer together with having 
fun, because I prudently think that if getting beer will give me a hangover then it will not be 
fun.
113
 
As I will argue in the final chapter of this dissertation, what I‘m in two minds about when 
I‘m both motivated to get another beer to have fun and motivated to not get another beer to have 
                                                          
113
 Of course, this type of conflict need not take the specific reflexive form.  It may take a less reflexive form, as for 
instance some of the cases in which I’m both motivated to get another beer to have fun, and I am motivated to go 
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beer will not be fun. 
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fun in the manner of primary conflict is this: whether getting another beer to have fun is indeed 
called for in the circumstances or not; i.e. whether it is indeed enjoyable or not.  What I‘m 
interested in for now is that to assume that it is not possible to be in primary motivational conflict 
towards one and the same action of the form ―doing A to do B‖ is to assume that one cannot be 
in two minds about whether a specific instrumental connection is appropriate or not in the 
circumstances.  In other words, it is to assume that one cannot be in doubt about whether a 
specific means-end connection is well thought of or not.  But to assume this would be to deny the 
appearances, for it would exclude the possibility of the clearly reflexive types of conflict.  
In the rest of this chapter, I will assume then that the distinction between primary and 
derivative motivational conflict is an irreducible, sound distinction we readily make in our daily 
lives.   
 
2.2 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ACTION MOTIVATION AND PRACTICAL 
RATIONALITY 
In what follows I will explore the suggestion that to explain action motivation as such is to show 
that the intentional action one is motivated towards is subject to a single, commensurable 
requirement of practical rationality.  This may be so in two cases: (a) if what it is to be 
practically rational is defined in terms of independent facts about the perfect instance of acting 
intentionally, and (b) if what it is to act intentionally is defined in terms of independent facts 
about what it is to be practically rational.  In the first case, to explain acting intentionally would 
be to show how if it were a perfect instance of its kind, it would be practically rational, and in 
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this sense it would be to reveal it to be subject to norms of practical rationality.  In the second 
case to explain acting intentionally would be to show it to be to some extent at least practically 
rational, and in this sense it would be to reveal it to be subject to the norms of practical 
rationality.  
Thus, theories which attempt to explain the connection between action motivation and 
practical rationality usually take one of two general forms. They may either suppose that we have 
access to independent facts about intentional action, and hence action motivation, in terms of 
which we can then explain facts about practical rationality; or they may suppose that we have 
independent access to facts about practical rationality in terms of which we can then explain 
intentional action and hence action motivation.  I will call theories of the first form Motivation-
first because they take motivation to be prior to practical rationality in the order of explanation.  I 
will call theories of the second form Rationality-first because they take rationality to be prior to 
motivation in the order of explanation. 
The distinction between Motivation-first and Rationality-first theories maps in part
114
 onto a 
particular interpretation of the popular, although much debated, distinction between internalism 
and externalism about practical reasons.
115
   On a standard interpretation of the 
internalism/externalism debate suggested for instance by Parfit, ―Internalists derive conclusions 
about reasons from psychological claims about the motivation that, under certain conditions, we 
would in fact have.  Externalists derive, from normative claims about what is worth achieving, 
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conclusions about reasons, and about the motivation that we ought to have.‖116 But, as a number 
of philosophers have suggested, this definition is not helpful because both Kantians, like 
Christine Korsgaard, and non-Humeans about rationality, like David Smith, may count as 
internalist by these lights.
117
  As far as my purposes here are concerned, this distinction does not 
map on to my distinction between Motivation-first and Rationality-first theories.  This is 
because, as Korsgaard herself argues, we do not need to claim that we have access to facts about 
the constitution of action motivation independently of facts about practical rationality, in order to 
derive conclusions about reasons from facts about how we would be motivated under certain 
conditions.
118
  We can for instance suggest that one has a reason to φ in case one would be 
motivated to φ if one were fully rational. 
The interpretation of the distinction that in part maps on to my distinction between 
Motivation-first and Rationality-first theories is based on Setiya‘s interpretation of Williams‘ 
internalism.
119
 Reformulating Setiya‘s120 formulation of Williams‘ view, I can say that according 
to internalism about reasons the fact that p is a (practical) reason for A to φ only if there is a 
sound
121
 deliberative route from A‘s relevant beliefs taken together with his subjective 
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 I have replaced “broadly instrumental route” with “sound deliberative route” in Setiya’s formulation, to lay 
emphasis on the fact that for Williams’ Internalism the route through which one comes to the desire to p is a route 
which is subject to certain standards of correctness.  McDowell (McDowell, 1995) objects, I think, to Williams’ 
Internalism on exactly this score.  He insists that the externalist need not suppose that the agent needs to come to 
be motivated by an external reason through a sound deliberative route.  Williams responds to McDowell’s 
objection that the fact that there are some constraints on what counts as a sound deliberative route (constraints 
on what would count as deliberatively arriving from one’s existing S at the project of φ-ing (See Williams, 1995a p. 
188)) does not mean that the agent for whom this route is available should in fact be able to deliberate in this way. 
(Williams, 1995a)  But I believe that McDowell means to doubt that the externalist should have to specify general 
criteria of what counts as soundly deliberating from an existing motivation to φ-ing for every normative reason to 
φ.  What she should perhaps specify is specific criteria of what counts as deliberating correctly in order to claim 
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motivational set, and the belief that p, to the desire to φ.  As Setiya nicely shows this view is 
committed to two substantial claims: (1) for a fact to be a practical reason for an agent, the agent 
must be capable of being motivated by that fact, and (2) an agent is capable of being motivated 
to act by some fact only if there is a sound deliberative route from his belief concerning that fact 
together with (some elements in) his (actual) motivational set to the desire to so act.  
On this interpretation of reasons internalism, a fact is a reason for an agent to perform an 
action just in case the agent can be motivated to perform the action in question.  And to be 
motivated to act should be understood as independent of facts about rationality.  Motivation is 
construed out of the following material: an independently determined set of dispositional states 
and a way of reaching new motivational states which is both deliberative (answers the first 
person question about what is to be done) and constrained by standards of correctness.   In other 
words, to be motivated to φ is conceived of as reaching the desire to φ from an existing set of 
motivational states as a result of sound deliberation, broadly conceived.
122
  On the corresponding 
conception of externalism, a fact is a reason for an agent to perform an action, independently of 
whether the agent can be motivated to perform the action in question, on a non-rationally 
constrained conception of motivation.   
With this distinction in hand, we can now see that the Motivation-first theories are internalist 
theories of reasons.  This is because on the Williams variety of internalism about reasons, we 
need to have an independent grasp of what counts as motivation in order to determine what 
counts as a practical reason for an agent.  But this just is the Motivation-first view.  I said above 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that one has an external reason to φ. Otherwise McDowell is ready to admit, the charge of irrationality is indeed a 
bluff. 
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 As Williams himself notes, these constraints are not to be conceived of narrowly on the instrumentalist 
conception of deliberation; i.e. figuring out the means to one’s ends.  (See Williams, 1995a)  
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that my distinction maps onto this interpretation of the Internalism/Externalism distinction only 
in part.  This is because the externalist view does not need to be committed to a Rationality-first 
theory.  The reason is that an externalist by the lights of the above distinction may determine 
what it is for a fact or consideration to be a practical reason for someone independently of prior 
facts about motivation, without having to explain motivation in terms of practical reasons.  The 
externalist in question may for instance be an instrumentalist about motivation, or she may 
simply develop a non-explanatory version of the connection between rationality and 
motivation.
123
 But on my distinction, Rationality-first views are the theories on which motivation 
is explained as such in terms of (independently) available facts about practical rationality.  The 
most that we can say then about the connection between Reasons-first and Externalist views is 
that Reasons-first theories are compatible with externalism about reasons.   
In what follows I shall take up the Motivation-first and Rationality-first theories in turn and 
argue that the monolithic versions of these theories cannot allow for the possibility of primary 
motivational conflict. 
2.2.1 Motivation-first Monolithic Theories 
In the first chapter I argued that the view that the norms to which action motivation is subject are 
the norms of propositional attitudes towards the ends of the relevant actions is a non-starter.  
Someone like Williams may argue that in doing so I focused on a very narrow version of the 
Humean picture and not against what he would call internalism about reasons.  I focused, that is, 
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on instrumentalism: the view that one is rationally required to take the means to the ends one 
intends or desires.  In doing so, Williams may argue, I ignored ―much wider possibilities for 
Humean deliberation, such as: thinking how the satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, 
e.g. by time-ordering; where there is some irresoluble conflict among the elements of S, 
considering which one attaches most weight to… or again, finding constitutive solutions, such as 
deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment.‖124 
As I showed in the first chapter, instrumentalism does not fail because of the narrow 
scope interpretation commonly attached to it (on which the only possibility for deliberation 
ultimately consists in the thought of what action is the means to the satisfaction of an element in 
S).  Instrumentalism fails because of its assumption about the elementary structure of intentional 
action.  The assumption is that the source of the ―instrumental‖ requirement (whether it is the 
requirement to do or intend what serves the end on a narrow conception, or what constitutes the 
end, what better harmonizes the end with other ends, etc. on a broader such conception) is a 
propositional attitude towards the end description of what in reality is the means-end structure of 
a type of event.  To show this, I first argued that the narrow scope reading of the instrumental 
requirement (however broadly conceived) yields counter-intuitive results.  Of course Williams 
claims that ―The deliberative process can also subtract elements from S.‖125  And then he adds 
that it can subtract both beliefs and desires.  But as I also argued in the first chapter, the wide 
scope reading of instrumental rationality is as inadequate as the narrow scope interpretation.  The 
problem with any instrumentalist picture which makes the above assumption concerning the 
structure of intention, and thus the problem with the broadly instrumentalist picture that Williams 
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advocates, is that it cannot explain the following: why in deliberating about whether to subtract a 
desire from S the agent ought to take into consideration what she knows would be involved in 
satisfying a desire.  In other words the instrumentalist view cannot explain why the agent ought 
to think of an action in a means-end connection.  At most, it explains that sometimes a fuller 
appreciation of what‘s involved in satisfying a desire may indeed lead to the subtraction of the 
desire from S.
126
  
But as I myself noted at the end of the previous chapter and at the beginning of this one, 
refuting instrumentalism, even of the broader Williams variety, does not prove that desire may 
not constitute the normative ground of action motivation.  Desire may constitute this normative 
ground qua disposition towards individual means-end syntheses.  Suppose then we accept that an 
intentional action is an etiological, means-end synthesis expressible in naïve rationalizations of 
the form ―I‘m doing A because I‘m doing B.‖  We can still claim that the particular disposition 
to do A in order to do B (where doing A to do B is an individual synthesis) can only count as an 
instance of action motivation to the extent that it realizes a general disposition towards specific 
means-end syntheses; for instance means-end syntheses which bring about pleasure, or manifest 
self-control, self-consciousness, etc.
127
  This is the distinguishing claim of what I shall be calling 
from now on the monolithic Motivation-first theories.  Let me explain the sense in which these 
theories count as both monolithic and Motivation-first. 
These Humean accounts develop mainly as a response to the problem of objectivity that 
Internalist theories of the Williams variety are commonly taken to face.  On this objection, the 
main fault of the internalist theories of reasons, even the supposedly non-myopic non-
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instrumentalist theories, is that they relativize practical reasons to an agent‘s contingent 
motivational set.  Rendering practical reasons relative to particular agents‘ actual motivational 
sets threatens the objectivity of reasons claims on the one hand, and the possibility of rational 
criticism of people‘s behavior, on the other.  Williams himself, in responding to this last charge, 
retorts that there is a whole battery of concepts we use to criticize people‘s behavior like ―This 
was a cruel thing to do.‖  We should have no use for a concept of practical rationality for the 
specific purpose of passing judgment on people‘s behavior anyway, he insists.128 But even if we 
grant Williams‘ response to the charge of losing our grip on the possibility of rational criticism 
of people‘s behavior,129 what is more troubling is the risk of losing our grip on the sense in 
which practical reasons are objective.
130
  The externalist can determine this sense negatively by 
claiming that a practical reason is objective only if it does not depend on (elements of) the 
agent‘s contingent motivational set.  The internalist does not have recourse to this negative 
definition.   
Instead, the internalist needs to have recourse to a positive definition of objectivity.  This 
motivation leads to a monolithic version of the Motivation-first theories.  On this monolithic 
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 Here’s what Williams himself says “The truth of the sentence *A has a reason to φ+ implies very roughly that A 
has some motive which will be served or furthered by his φ-ing, and if this turns out not to be so the sentence is 
false: there is a condition relating to the agent’s aims, and if this is not satisfied it is not true to say…that he has a 
reason to φ.” (Williams, 1971, p.101)  But if there is a condition relating to the agent’s aims, then, unless we 
postulate that all agents have more or less the same aims, then we seem to lose our grip on the sense in which a 
practical reason is a reason for anyone in the circumstances.   
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version the guise of the means-end synthesis one is motivated towards is determined by a single 
commensurable requirement of practical rationality: in this case, the requirement to realize to 
some extent a specific disposition which is what makes one an agent.   On a positive definition of 
objectivity, practical reasons are objective in the sense that they depend on an element in the 
agent‘s existing motivational set that is necessarily present in all beings of some relevant set.  
Depending on the details of each view this set could be the set of all beings with desires, all 
agents, all rational agents, etc.
131
  The Motivation-first theorist does not relativize normative 
reasons to those elements in the agent‘s existing motivational set that are necessarily present in 
all rational agents.  The reason is that by definition on the Motivation-first theory, facts about 
practical rationality are explained in terms of motivation and not the other way around. What the 
Motivation-first theorist relativizes the agent‘s practical reasons to is an element which is 
necessarily present in the motivational sets of all agents as such.  This relativization is what 
makes the Humean accounts both Motivation-first and monolithic. 
This strategy of relativizing the agent‘s normative reasons to an element necessarily present 
in the motivational sets of all agents takes the form of a function argument. On this strategy, one 
starts from independent facts about the function of agency and proceeds to show that a state of 
practical rationality is a state in which this function is performed excellently or fully.  In 
particular, the Motivation-first theorist starts from a conception of the function of agency which 
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presupposes the engagement with a specific agent-general disposition,
132
 and proceeds to show 
that practical rationality is the state at which this specific disposition is maximally realized.  This 
account of practical rationality is a maximizing account; one on which the agent is rationally 
required to pursue the greatest realization of the agent-general disposition. 
As Velleman puts it, ―…reasons for acting apply to someone only because he has an 
inclination that lends them an influence, but the requisite inclination is the one that makes him 
an agent, not one that determines his individual course of action‖133[my emphasis].  So, 
following a Motivation-first theorist like Velleman, we can take action to have a constitutive aim 
or function.  On Velleman‘s view, we can take intentional action to be constituted as such out of 
mere behavior by the specific aim that a higher order activity controlling this behavior 
exhibits.
134
  We may, for instance, assume that this action constitutive aim is to be in conscious 
control of one‘s behavior or have a guiding awareness of what one is doing,135 or to do what 
makes sense,
136
 or to act in accordance with reasons,
137
 etc.  We may, in general, take it that 
unintentional behavior on this strategy is constituted as intentional action if it is prompted by the 
constitutive aim to achieve x.  On this picture, for a piece of behavior to be prompted by one‘s 
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aim to x, one must have a specific inclination or disposition towards x.  On Velleman‘s 
autonomist view, this inclination would for instance be ―an inclination towards autonomy.‖138   
In principle, there is no constraint on what this general inclination could be.  It could turn 
out that the inclination which makes us agents is the inclination towards pleasure, or the 
inclination towards inner harmony and balance, the inclination towards the satisfaction of one‘s 
desires, etc..  The details of the different versions of the Motivation-first theories do not matter 
here.  What matters is that for a piece of behavior to qualify as intentional action, this behavior 
needs to engage with, i.e. realize to some extent, an agent-general inclination.  On this most 
general characterization of a Motivation-first theory, one counts as having a practical reason to φ 
to the extent that one achieves the constitutive aim to x, and so to the extent that one realizes the 
specific agent-general disposition to x.  On this conception, to reveal action motivation to be 
subject to practical norms is to show it to be subject to the standards of what counts as having a 
practical reason for what one does.  In other words, it is to reveal it to approximate the maximal 
realization of the specific agent-general disposition to x. 
Philip Clark objects to Velleman‘s view, and, I take it, to all constitutivist views of the 
Motivation-first variety, claiming that if no fully intentional action can fail to achieve the 
constitutive aim of action, then no fully intentional action will be rationally criticizable as being 
performed against the weight of practical reasons.
139
  In Clark‘s words, on Velleman‘s account of 
the constitutive goal of intentional action ―...any fully intentional action reaches that goal. Any 
                                                          
138
 Velleman, 1996, p. 723. 
139
 See Clark, 2001. 
 90 
fully intentional action is, literally, perfectly well suited to the goal. Consequently, Velleman 
must deny that any fully intentional action is contrary to the weight of reasons.‖140 
But this line of criticism makes the unwarranted assumption that the constitutive aim of 
action is an aim that cannot be realized to varying degrees.  If we take action‘s constitutive aim 
to be the exercise of a particular capacity (or the activation of a certain disposition), and we take 
this capacity to be realizable with varying degrees of success, we can claim that it is a minimal 
exercise of this capacity that suffices to turn mere behavior into an intentional action.  That only 
a minimal exercise of this capacity is sufficient to turn behavior into action does not mean that 
only this minimal exercise is involved in all actions.  Michael Smith points this out, when 
discussing Donald Davidson‘s similar criticism that views which postulate the realization of the 
disposition to x
141
 as constitutive of intentional action leave no explanatory role for the claim that 
an agent φs because she has the disposition to x.142  As Smith notes, it may be true that the 
minimum requirement for the constitution of action is that the agent possesses and exercises the 
very local capacity or the disposition to x.  It would be a fallacy to conclude from this that it is 
only an agent‘s possession and exercise of this minimal local capacity or disposition that figures 
in the explanation of her actions.  Similarly, it would be a fallacy to suppose that just because a 
minimal exercise of the capacity or the disposition to x is what an agent needs to engage with in 
order to act intentionally, only this minimal capacity should figure in the explication of the 
practical reasons for what the agent did.  In fact, on a Motivation-first theory, an agent counts as 
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being more or less practically rational in performing an action, to the extent that she 
approximates the maximal realization of the agent-general disposition.  The fact that the agent 
needs to realize this disposition to some minimal degree to count as acting intentionally does not 
mean that she cannot realize this disposition to a fuller degree.  On this picture then, the agent 
ought to realize the specific agent-general disposition to a minimal degree for her behavior to 
qualify as acting intentionally, and she ought to realize it to a fuller degree for her intentional 
action to qualify as more rational; the same way a piece of metal must supposedly to some extent 
cut to count as a knife, and it must to some extent cut well to count as a good knife.
143
  Thus one 
and the same criterion can count as both the all or nothing principle of what counts as an 
intentional action and the maximization principle of what counts as a rational intentional action.   
The problem with the monolithic Motivation-first views is not that the realization of the 
agent-general disposition to x cannot admit of degrees; i.e. that a function argument which starts 
from the constitutive aim of action cannot render an account of rationality on this score.  In fact, 
the possibility of realizing the agent-general disposition to degrees is what explains how an agent 
may be in derivative motivational conflict, even though there is only one disposition that must 
each time be realized for the agent to count as being motivated to act.  One may for instance both 
be motivated to bake a cake to eat something sweet and motivated to not bake the cake to avoid 
the calories, because the two motivations both constitute realizations of the agential disposition 
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to x (to be in control of what one does, for instance), only to varying degrees.  For instance, on 
given occasions, the motivation to not bake the cake to avoid the calories may realize the 
agential disposition to be in control of what one does to a fuller degree than the motivation to 
bake the cake to eat something sweet, and vice versa. 
The question that I want to raise in what follows is this:  how is it possible for two contrary 
dispositions towards one and the same action to realize one and the same agent-general 
disposition at the same time?  In other words, how is primary motivational conflict possible on 
this picture?  In what follows I will argue that it is not.  Let me take things slowly.  On all 
monolithic Motivation-first accounts, a particular disposition towards φ counts as the action 
motivation to φ, to the extent that it approximates the agent-general disposition to x.  Of course 
on these theories, the disposition in question has an extremely wide scope.  On one of 
Velleman‘s views, it is the agent-general disposition to be-in-conscious-control-of-one‘s-
behavior, on another it is to do-what-makes-sense, etc..  The point of assuming the extremely 
wide scope of the dispositions in question is to allow an agent‘s peculiar practical conditions to 
further specify exactly which particular action motivations will realize the agent-general 
disposition.  If Velleman is right, the fact that our particular dispositions ought to realize the 
agent-general disposition to be in conscious control of what one does leaves it open whether on a 
particular occasion one‘s disposition to go to the moon to take some air, travel in time to prevent 
an accident, or just bake a cake to perfect one‘s baking skills might count as action motivations 
in this sense. 
But one could claim that however wide the scope of the agent-general disposition may be, it 
is nevertheless specific.  As I pointed out above, the agent-general disposition is picked out as 
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such from an even more general set of dispositions; the dispositions to be moved to do both 
intentional and non-intentional things.  In other words they belong as species to a genus of 
dispositions for movement.  They are determined as such prior to facts about practical rationality.  
If the agent-general disposition is specified prior to facts about practical rationality, if it is 
recognized as belonging to the genus of mere dispositions to move, then the criteria of its 
identification as agent-general will have to make no reference to facts about practical rationality.  
A good first candidate for such a criterion is the principle of non-contradiction, on which if the 
disposition to do-A-to-do-B realizes the agent-general disposition to x to a certain extent, then to 
this extent the disposition to not do-A-to-do-B will not count as realizing this disposition.  
Assume we take this agent-general disposition to be the disposition to be in control of what one 
does, and this disposition is identifiable as such prior to facts about practical rationality.  In this 
case, it must be clear in advance whether going-to-the-moon-to-get-some-air in particular 
circumstances realizes the agent-general disposition to be-in-conscious-control-of-what-one-does 
or not.  If we assume it does, it must be clear in advance that there is a fact of the matter about 
whether it will realize the agent-general disposition to a certain degree or not.  In other words, 
however wide the scope of the agent-general disposition may be, it must be specified in some 
way.  If it is specified independently of facts about practical rationality, since the order of 
explanation is supposed to move from facts about motivation to practical rationality, we need a 
criterion of specification.  For how else would we be able to individuate this specific disposition 
against the background of all dispositions to be moved to do things, if not by specifying what 
things falls under the scope of its object?  To do this we would need a criterion of specification.  
The most obvious candidate for such a criterion is the principle of non-contradiction, on which it 
must be clear in advance whether e.g.  going-to-the-park-to-get-some-air in particular 
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circumstances realizes the agent-general disposition to be-in-conscious-control-of-what-one-does 
or not.  If this is so, it will have to be the case that either the disposition to do A to do B or the 
disposition to not do A to do B, but not both, will count as the motivation to φ (where φ stands 
for a specific means-end synthesis).  And primary motivational opposition will be impossible.   
But Velleman may still insist that it may be the case that both the disposition to go the park 
to get some air and the disposition to not go to the park to get some air may to varying or even to 
the same imperfect degree realize the agent-general disposition to be in conscious control of 
what one does.  It may turn out for instance that going-to-the-park-to-get-some-air realizes the 
disposition to be in conscious control of what one does, because it is an instance of caring for 
one‘s own well-being, and doing something for one‘s own well-being is a way of being in 
conscious control of what one does.  And it may also be the case that not going-to-the-park-to-
get-some-air realizes the agent-general disposition because it is an instance of acting against 
one‘s dispositions, and acting against one‘s own dispositions is a way of being in conscious 
control of what one does, however adolescent the mood of such a disposition.   
To see how the argument would work, grant that what I proposed in the first chapter about 
the elementary structure of intentional action is right.  Grant, that is, that the means-end synthesis 
is not a mere complex of a means and an end description as Korsgaard seems to assume.  Grant 
that it is a series of means-end thoughts of the form ―I‘m doing A because I‘m doing B, and I‘m 
doing B because I‘m doing C, etc.,‖ where this series cannot include a description of a doing 
which was not performed by doing something else as means.  If we also grant now, together with 
Velleman, that each of these descriptions ultimately constitutes the realization of an agent-
general disposition, then we have to also grant that each of these dispositions constitutes the 
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realization of a further disposition, which constitutes the realization of a further disposition, 
which ultimately constitutes the realization of the agent-general disposition.  If this is so, we also 
have to grant that a particular disposition to do A-to-do-B and a disposition to not do-A-to-do-B 
may realize the disposition to do-B-to-do-C, and the disposition to do-B-to-do-D respectively, 
both of which realize in turn the agent-general disposition to x (where x is the agent-general 
desire posited by our preferred motivation-first theory).  And, thus, Velleman might be able to 
claim that he can accommodate the possibility of primary motivational conflict. 
The point is that it seems hard to understand why it is not possible for both doing-A-to-do-B 
and not doing-A-to-do-B to realize one and the same agent-general disposition at the same time, 
via the realization of different intervening dispositions which both happen to realize the agent-
general disposition.  The question I want to raise now is how these intervening dispositions 
might realize the agent-general disposition.   
There are two options here. Either these intervening dispositions are commensurable or 
not.
144
  Take David Wiggins‘ definition of incommensurability, ―The set (A, B, C, D…) 
constitutes an incommensurable set of options if and only if it is not the case that there is one 
property φ and one measure M of φ-ness such that φ and M satisfy all the following conditions: 
a) It is determined by M which is the more φ member of any pair (X, Y) consisting of options 
drawn from the set (A, B, C, D…), b) comparisons in respect of φ-ness ground correct 
deliberative choice between the members of each and every pair drawn from the set (A, B, C, 
D…) and are antecedent in reason to choice between them.  c) Comparisons in respect of φ-ness 
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“incommensurable” for items that cannot be precisely measured by some common scale of units and of value and 
the term “incomparable” for items that cannot be compared.” (Chang, 1997, p. 5)  I use the term 
incommensurable here in the more specific sense that Wiggins defines which comes close to Chang’s first sense. 
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reflect a proper regard for every choice-relevant feature of any member of the set (A, B, C, 
D…)‖145   
In our case here, if the intervening dispositions are commensurable, there is a measure M by 
which one can establish that each of these intervening dispositions is more or less φ (i.e. realizes 
the agent-general disposition to a greater or lesser degree than another disposition in the set of 
intervening dispositions).  And one can ground correct deliberative decisions based on 
comparisons in respect of the maximal realization of the agent-general disposition which reflect 
all that is choice-worthy about the alternative intervening dispositions.  Assume that there is such 
a measure M and property φ, that the intervening dispositions are thus commensurable, and that 
it is possible to be in primary motivational conflict with regard to them.  Velleman must in this 
case look for a further criterion of the specification of the scope of the agent-general disposition, 
other than the principle of non-contradiction.  For if it is possible to both have the intervening 
disposition to do-B-to-do-C and the intervening disposition to not do-B-to-do-C at the same time 
because each disposition realizes the agent-general disposition to x to the same degree, one 
would have to provide an alternative criterion for the specification of the scope of this agent-
general disposition.  I cannot argue here that it is not possible to provide any such criterion, but 
as far as I can tell, no promising criterion is in the offing.   
But even if this quest for an alternative criterion is satisfiable, Velleman would still not be 
able to do full justice to the reality of motivational conflict.  For even if we assume that the 
intervening dispositions can be contrary and still count as action motivations, because they 
realize the agent general disposition to varying, measurable degrees, it will be a wonder how 
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anyone chooses to do what realizes the agent-general disposition to a lesser extent.  So, 
motivational conflict would never actually translate to action, and would thus be rendered totally 
irrelevant for our deliberative situation in the world. 
If on the other hand, there is no measure M against which to judge whether one of the 
intervening dispositions realizes the agent-general disposition to a greater or lesser extent, we are 
in danger of losing the explanatory and deliberative criterion for what counts as the most rational 
thing to do.  For in this case to say that non intervening dispositions count as action motivations 
because they realize the agent general disposition to the maximum is to say one of the following 
things: either that the function argument of the Motivation-first views does not work because 
practical rationality cannot be defined as the maximization of any property, or that the 
intervening dispositions simply collectively constitute the set of agent-general dispositions.  If an 
agent counts as acting for reasons to the extent that she realizes an agent specific disposition, and 
there is more than one such disposition, then to this extent the account of intentional action is not 
monolithic.  This latter alternative solution turns the monolithic Motivation-first views into the 
material multi-dimensional views that I will examine in the final chapter. 
The proponent of the Motivation-first view has two more avenues of escape: she may claim 
either that primary motivational conflict is in reality conflict between a disposition that counts as 
an action motivation and a disposition that does not, or that primary motivational conflict is 
always re-describable as derivative motivational conflict.  Both avenues of escape lead to a dead-
end.  On the first response, I shouldn‘t have presupposed in the introduction to this chapter that 
the conflicting items in primary motivational conflict are both motivations.  This response cannot 
be right.  The reason this kind of conflict is conflict between motivations and not conflict 
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between a motivation and a mere disposition is that, in such cases, both dispositions could issue 
in action that would be recognizably intentional.  This is manifest when we are dealing with 
cases of repeated conflict which may on certain occasions get resolved one way and on other 
occasions another way.  Think, for instance, of us habitual smokers and our perennial question 
about whether to smoke just this one cigarette for fun or not.  How could we assume in such 
cases both that the two possible outcomes may count as intentional actions and that the 
dispositions on each side remain pretty much unchanging, if the dispositions to φ couldn‘t both 
count as motivations? 
Alternatively, one may suggest that what I call primary motivational conflict may be 
reduced to derivative motivational conflict, even if action is understood as having the elementary 
structure of a certain means-end synthesis.  On this objection, it could be the case that when I‘m 
motivated to both go to the moon to take some air and not go to the moon to take some air, what 
happens is that I may be motivated to go to the moon to take some air to get some radically new 
air, and I may be motivated to do to the moon to get some air to get the air I usually get.  In this 
case I would have to count as being motivated to do A to do B and to not do A to do C, and so I 
would have to count as being derivatively conflicted.   
The obvious response to this suggestion is that deliberations have to come to an end.   In 
other words, that there is a description which is a final telic description of an action.  We would 
only be able to re-describe every case of primary conflict as derivative if there was always a 
further action description which could be said to relate to the previous action-descriptions as an 
end.  In this way we could always say that to be motivated to do A to do B and not do A to  do B 
should be re-described as doing A to do B to do C and not doing A to do B to do Z.  If there is 
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such a thing as the final term, y, in the series of means-end rationalizations inscribed in 
intentional action, then it will be possible to say of it that an agent is motivated to do something 
else, x, to do that thing, y, and that the agent is motivated to not do x to do y.  In this case 
primary motivational opposition would be perfectly possible, only less frequent.  To allow for 
this objection then we would have to allow for the possibility that reason-giving may go on ad 
infinitum. 
Even if we grant the independent plausibility of assuming that reason giving could go on ad 
infinitum, what we cannot assume is that this plausibility really makes sense against the 
background of a Motivation-first view.  If the rationalizing order inscribed in an intentional 
action is bound to go on forever, we will not be able to ascertain to what extent a given 
disposition to do A to do B will realize the agent-general disposition to do x.  We will not be able 
to ascertain to what extent we are acting for reasons when are in fact doing something, and to 
what extent we have practical reasons to perform an action when we are thinking about whether 
to perform it.  But what can the use of a concept of practical rationality be if it does not allow us 
to assess the relative rationality of actions, and to some extent at least guide our decisions and 
choices? 
2.2.2 Rationality-first Monolithic Theories 
2.2.2.1 Reasons-first Monolithic Theories. It may appear that the solution to this problem is to 
simply give up on the idea that one‘s motivation needs to realize a certain disposition, whose 
scope is specified independently of facts about practical rationality.  One may suggest that 
monolithic Motivation-first views fail to allow for primary motivational conflict because they do 
not specify the scope of the necessary agent-general disposition in accordance with facts about 
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what one has practical reason to do.  But, I will show now, this diagnosis is not promising.  Even 
if the scope of the agent-general disposition is specified by reference to facts about practical 
rationality, it will not admit of contrary specifications either.  Let me present one such view and 
explain why all similar views have to count as failing to allow for primary conflict. 
On a popular view of practical rationality, ―rationality involves systematic connections 
between a person‘s judgments and his or her subsequent attitudes‖146[my emphasis].  On this 
picture, rationality is the state in which the agent‘s judgments about what one has reason to do 
are followed by the appropriate attitudes: i.e. action motivation.  These are judgments about what 
is good, valuable, worthwhile, etc. about the action that are all ultimately reduced to judgments 
about reasons.  From now on, I will call the judgments that are taken by each theory to issue in 
intentional action ―practical judgments.‖147  So, for instance, on Scanlon‘s view, to merely 
believe that drinking beer is a way of having fun is not sufficient to motivate one to act to drink 
beer.  For there are plenty of cases, we are told, in which one believes that doing A is (a way of) 
doing B, but one is left cold by the prospect of doing A to do B.  To be motivated to act, one 
must in addition take the belief that drinking beer is a way of having fun to be a (good) reason 
for doing so.   This last sort of attitude is for Scanlon the paradigmatic form of practical 
judgment.  In Scanlon‘s own words: ―In order for a consideration to be an operative reason for 
me, I have to believe it.  In addition, I have to take it to be a reason for the attitude in question.  
These are separate attitudes. I can believe something without taking it to be a reason for 
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something else, and I can see, without believing it, that it would, if it were the case, be such a 
reason‖(My emphasis).148   
Scanlon insists this does not mean that one must have an independently specified inclination 
or disposition to do what one has reason to do, or what one takes oneself to have reason to do, as 
the Motivation-first views might assume.  Believing that one has good reason to φ is sufficient to 
motivate one to φ.  Contra the Motivation-first view, the fact that things may go wrong, i.e. the 
fact that one may recognize that one has good reason to φ without being motivated to φ, does not 
mean that when in fact one is motivated to φ one has a disposition, etc., whose scope is specified 
independently of the recognition that one has a good reason to φ.149  Again, in Scanlon‘s own 
words: ―…a rational person who judges there to be a compelling reason to do A normally forms 
the intention to do A, and this judgment is sufficient explanation of that intention and of the 
agent‘s acting on it…‖150 
To take a real-life example, on these views (which I shall be calling from now on ―Reasons-
first‖ theories) to count as being motivated to pay taxes to make up for basic political inequalities 
one must be disposed to pay taxes, because one believes that making up for basic political 
inequalities is a good reason for paying taxes.  In other words, to count as action motivation, 
one‘s disposition to do A to do B must be specifiable as the disposition to do what is in 
accordance with one‘s belief about one‘s good reason.  To explain action motivation as such is to 
reveal it to be subject to one‘s beliefs about what one has a good reason to do. 
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One common objection against this view is that it portrays the agent as a square, to use one of 
Velleman‘s phrases; in other words that it ignores the possibility of acting intentionally in or out 
of akrasia, apathy, depression, etc.
151
  Scanlon responds that ―Even when desire in the directed 
attention sense runs contrary to our reason (that is to say, our judgment) in this way [i.e. in the 
way of akrasia], however, it remains true that the motivational force of these states [desires] lies 
in a tendency to see some consideration as a reason.  Akratic actions (and irrational thoughts) are 
cases in which a person‘s rational capacities have malfunctioned, not cases in which these 
capacities are overmastered by something else, called desire.‖152  So on Scanlon‘s view it is 
possible to act contrary to one‘s judgment about the reasons one has, but only because one sees 
competing considerations as reasons, when one shouldn‘t.  Even in this case, one acts 
intentionally to the extent that one exercises one‘s rational capacity, however badly.  One does 
not count as exercising one‘s capacity badly because of an external impediment or interference, 
but because of an internal malfunction.  The idea of an internal malfunction of a rational 
capacity, a malfunction that is not due to an external impediment or interference, is especially 
mysterious.  It is exactly this mysteriousness which is exposed in the objection that this 
conception of action motivation does not make room for primary motivational conflict.   
As Scanlon himself recognizes, derivative motivational conflict is on this picture perfectly 
plausible: ―I can take my hunger to be a reason for getting up and at the same time recognize my 
fatigue as a reason not to get up, and I am not necessarily open to rational criticism for having 
these conflicting attitudes.‖  This possibility would presumably explain the possibility of akrasia. 
But, Scanlon continues, ―…judgments conflict by making incompatible claims about the same 
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subject matter, and attitudes that conflict in this way cannot, rationally, be held at the same time. 
… I cannot simultaneously judge that certain considerations constitute good reason to get up at 
six and that they do not constitute good reason to do this‖153 (My emphasis). 
If, that is, the structure of intentional action is the structure picked out in rationalizations of 
the form ―I‘m doing A because I‘m doing B,‖ and action motivation is to be understood as the 
motivation ―to do A to do B‖, then to be in primary motivational opposition towards one and the 
same action would, on a view like Scanlon‘s, involve the following: judging at the same time 
that certain considerations (i.e. doing B) constitute good reason to do A, and that they do not 
constitute good reason to do A.  If to be motivated to do A to do B one must judge that doing B 
constitutes good reason for doing A, then to be motivated to both do A to do B and not do A to 
do B, one would have to be judging both that doing B is a good reason to do A and that it is not a 
good reason to do A at the same time.  Primary motivational conflict would, in the best possible 
case, merely constitute the expression of a contradiction.  This would be to assimilate primary 
motivational conflict to a simple logical blunder.  And so the sense in which the conflicting agent 
might count as being in two minds about one and the same action would be merely a sense in 
which the agent is in no mind about anything at all.  To reduce primary motivational conflict to a 
simple logical mistake would thus not be any less reductive than reducing it to derivative 
motivational conflict.   
Against this objection one could venture the following defense. We might be able to allow 
for the possibility of primary motivational conflict and still support the view that to be motivated 
is to be disposed to do what one judges one has good reason to do, even on a Thompsonian 
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conception of the elementary structure of action, if we abandon Scanlon‘s assumption that 
reasons are primitive.
154
  This is how Scanlon himself explains the primitiveness of reasons: ―I 
will take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for 
something seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in favor of it. 
―Counts in favor how?‖ one might ask. ―By providing a reason for it‖ seems to be the only 
answer.‖  If we stick with the explanatory primitiveness of reasons talk, primary motivational 
conflict will be impossible.  Suppose we grant that the scope of reasons is not further specified 
by reference to something further they do or are; for instance suppose we cannot specify what it 
is for x to be a reason for y by referring to the fact that x is pleasurable or prudent, or in any such 
way.  Then, the minimal criterion for the individuation of reasons would have to appeal to a 
principle which would disallow the possibility of primary motivational conflict: i.e. that if at time 
t and in circumstances z, x is a reason for y-ing, then at time t and in circumstances z, x is not a 
reason for not y-ing.  This is the reason why Scanlon stresses that one and the same consideration 
cannot constitute a reason both for and against one and the same action at the same time.
155
  To 
allow for this possibility we have to abandon the primitiveness of reasons. 
If we give up the idea that reasons are primitive, we may be able to claim that a 
consideration may count in favor of an action by providing a pro tanto reason for it; by showing, 
that is, what is pleasurable about it, or prudent about it, etc. and thus gives one a reason to do it 
which may be outweighed by other reasons.
156
  Primary motivational conflict may once more 
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 Raz for instance seems to hold a similar view.  He says “We want to do or to have something only if we believe 
that it has some aspect that makes it worth-while, makes it good or valuable.  We want what we want in as much 
as it has that good aspect.  We may at the same time want not to do the action or not to have the object inasmuch 
as they have other properties that make them worthless or bad.” (Raz, 1999a, p. 54) 
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seem possible, for now we may take it that doing B is a good reason to do A in so far as doing B 
is pleasurable, and doing B is not a good reason to do A in so far as doing B is imprudent.  And 
one may be motivated towards both doing A to do b and not doing A to do B at the same time in 
the way of primary motivational conflict. 
But now the question that arises is how firmly a monolithic account can hang on to the 
existence of different kinds of reasons.  For if the respects in which considerations may count in 
favor of actions count in favor of actions in so far as they are reasons, only of different kinds, we 
need to ask what this difference will come down to.  In other words, we need to ask whether 
these reasons will be comparable in terms of reason-hood, even if we grant that they are not 
measurable in these terms.
157
  If they are comparable with respect to reason-hood, if it is possible 
to determine how each respect of reason-hood fares when compared to each other, then the 
ensuing judgment will be a practical judgment that action motivation will have to be in 
accordance with.  And the question of primary motivational conflict would arise once more in 
relation to this second order motivation.  Would it be possible for one to judge at the same time 
that one and the same action is both rational and not rational from the higher order perspective of 
the comparison of the respects of reason-hood?  Given that primary motivational conflict is often 
conflict about what choice to make, and not just between competing considerations or feelings, 
and also that the higher order practical judgments are especially concerned with choice in the 
face of the applicability of different kinds of reasons, we should not limit primary motivational 
conflict to conflict between competing pro tanto reasons.  If these pro tanto reasons are 
comparable in terms of reason-hood and so higher order practical judgments can be made with 
                                                          
157
 For one precise definition of comparability see Chang, 1997.  For another elaboration of the notion see Raz, 
1985-6. 
 106 
regard to them, then we should allow primary motivational conflict to enter into the terrain of 
these higher order judgments.  For this higher order conflict to be possible, one would have to be 
judging at the same time that a consideration counts both as a sufficient reason for and a 
sufficient reason against one and the same action, which is now impossible in a way that cannot 
be remedied by abandoning the primitiveness of reasons. 
We may, on the other hand, suppose that the respects in which a consideration counts in 
favor of an action, i.e. pleasure, prudence, etc., constitute incommensurable reasons.  To suppose 
that pleasure and prudence in the example are incommensurable reasons is not merely to suppose 
that there is no underlying value in terms of which they can be precisely measured (as per 
Wiggins‘ characterization mentioned in the previous section).  It is to suppose that pleasure and 
prudence are incomparable in so far as their reason-giving power is concerned.  In other words, 
that there is no single standard of reason-hood by which they can be compared.
158
  In this case, 
the relation ―being a good reason for‖ would be a mere dummy.  For what we would be judging 
in judging e.g. that doing B is a good reason for doing A, and that doing B is not a good reason 
for doing A, is that doing A to do B would be pleasurable, and not doing A to do B would be 
prudent. 
In this case, to say that action motivation is subject to practical norms to the extent that it 
ought to be in conformity with reason-hood is in reality to say that it is subject to practical norms 
to the extent that it ought to be in conformity with pleasure, or prudence, etc. But this would turn 
the monolithic Reasons-first account into a multi-dimensional account.  For now action 
motivation would be subject to standards deriving their normative authority from 
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incommensurable requirements of practical rationality.
159
    I will deal with this variety of multi-
dimensionalism in my last chapter.  I will argue there that this multi-dimensional view is 
inadequate because it forces on us an unsatisfactory account of choice.   
2.2.2.2 Reasoning-first Monolithic Theories.  One could at this point suggest that the Reasons-
first views fail to allow for the possibility of primary motivational conflict because they 
mistakenly assume that they have to drive a – however minimal – wedge between the disposition 
to judge that something is a reason and one‘s motivation to act.  One could further suggest that 
driving a wedge between these two notions led us to the assumption that a disposition to φ counts 
as an action motivation only if φ figures in the content of our judgments in a particular way: i.e. 
under the guise of the relation ―being a good reason for.‖  One could claim that the Reasons-first 
views seemed forced to suppose that the form of action motivation – the way it is determined by 
practical requirements - is its conformity with the content of the judgment that one has good 
reason to φ, because they could not see that they did not have to drive a wedge between practical 
judgment and motivation.  Instead they could have supposed that the form of action motivation 
just is the form the practical judgment and not its content; i.e. the way the reasoning of which the 
practical judgment is the conclusion is determined by practical requirements. 
So, to correct this problem, what I shall be calling the Reasoning-first family of theories 
suggest that the form of action motivation is not conformity with the content of one‘s judgments 
concerning one‘s reasons, but the form of practical reasoning itself.  On this suggestion, action 
motivation is determined by practical requirements in the way that practical reasoning is 
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 Raz for instance asserts: “Obviously to judge a belief, desire, emotion, etc. as rational is to note that having 
them is at the very least consistent with a successful deployment of our capacity for rationality.  The standard by 
which success is to be measured is far from clear.  It is doubtful that there is only one standard employed on all 
occasions.” (Raz, 1999, p. 74)  
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determined by practical requirements, and not by the fact that it must be in conformity with the 
content of the conclusion of practical reasoning.    On this family of views, action motivation 
should not be conceived of as what follows from, or is in conformity with, one‘s practical 
judgments, but as the very activity of coming to judge that one has reasons to do something.  To 
explain action motivation as such would then be to ultimately reveal it to be subject to the 
requirement to reason correctly about what to do. 
On the Reasoning-first views there is no wedge between coming to recognize doing B as a 
reason for doing A and being motivated to do A to do B.  On the contrary, to come to recognize 
doing B as a reason for doing A just is to be motivated to do A to do B.  Coming to recognize 
that doing B is a reason for doing A may be to reason practically to the conclusion that doing A 
to do B is desirable, choice-worthy, good, required, etc., depending on the details of the theory of 
practical reasoning we choose.   On any such account, reasoning practically to the conclusion 
that doing A to do B is desirable, choice-worthy, etc. is the activity of justifying doing A to do B.  
As Nagel stresses, ―A first person, present tense practical judgment about what one should do is 
not merely a belief.  It is not, of course, an action either.  To be led by certain reasons to such a 
judgment is to accept those reasons as a justification for doing or wanting that which it is judged 
one should do or want‖160 (my emphasis).  Later on the same page he continues ―Hence I 
contend that the judgment that one has reason to do something includes the acceptance of a 
justification for doing it, and that this is its motivational content.‖  On his view, to reason 
practically to the judgment that one ought to perform an action is to accept the justification for 
performing the action that is judged as to be done.  To accept this justification just is to be 
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motivated to do it.  In Nagel‘s own words this acceptance is the motivational content of the 
practical judgment that one should perform the action in question. 
Depending on our preferred view of practical reasoning, the activity of coming to recognize a 
reason for φ-ing, or the truth that doing B is a reason for doing A, or reasoning practically, or 
justifying doing A to do B, may be a matter of doing one of the following: 
1) Deriving the desirability of doing A to do B from more general truths about desirability 
in accordance with a non-instrumental practical principle governing this derivation.
161
  
2) Tracking or perceiving normative facts in the world.162  
3) Making theoretical inferences about what is good to do.163 
 
Of course the list might go on.  What matters for my purposes here is that for a view to fall under 
this list it should have the following characteristics. (1) It should suppose that to be motivated to 
φ just is to come to recognize a reason for φ-ing, or accept a justification for φ-ing.  (2) It should 
assume that coming to recognize a reason for φ-ing, or accepting a justification for φ-ing, should 
be understood as an activity which is guided by standards of correctness. (3) It should suppose 
that the source of these standards of correctness is a single requirement. (4) It should suppose 
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 Nagel might for instance be taken as a proponent of this view, and Kant’s categorical imperative the model for 
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 This is the intellectualist view commonly attributed to Davidson (on the basis of his account of weakness of will 
in Davidson, 2001) and Socrates in the Protagoras.  I believe that this attribution is mistaken in both cases, but this 
is beside the point.  (See for instance Nussbaum, 1984, esp. p.63. for the attribution of this view to Socrates in the 
Protagoras; but see McDowell, 2009, esp. p. 75-76 for an alternative interpretation.) 
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that the single requirement is a non- instrumental principle of rationality, for reasons discussed in 
my second chapter. 
 
On any such account then, to be disposed to do A to do B will be explained as an action 
motivation to the extent that one is thereby shown to track a purportedly normative fact in the 
world; or one is thereby shown to make a deductive inference to a practical judgment about a 
particular action; or to apply a fundamental categorical principle of practical reason to oneself 
when deliberating about what to do in a particular situation, etc.  To allow for the possibility of 
primary motivational conflict we would have to assume either of the following: either that both 
the disposition to do A to do B and the disposition to not do A to do B could at the same time 
constitute the activity of tracking purportedly normative facts in the world, or that they could 
constitute the activity of making a deductive inference to an evaluative judgment about a 
particular action, or that they could constitute the application of a categorical principle of 
practical reason to oneself.  It would seem to follow from this that if our capacity to be active in 
one of these ways was not merely malfunctioning, then the independent normative structure of 
the world would be such as to make impossible demands on us all the time; or that anything 
would follow from our deductive inferences (as it would not be bound by the law of non 
contradiction); or that the practical principle governing our deliberation about what to do would 
be entirely incapable of prescribing any action.    
One will readily object that the view that one should be taken to count as being motivated to 
φ to the extent that one reasons practically to φ is only subject to the above objection, if 
reasoning practically is taken to issue in unconditional practical judgments that doing φ is 
valuable, desirable, etc.  But, the objection will go on, reasoning practically may be interpreted 
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as what issues in conditional judgments that one ought to do φ in so far as φ is χ, ζ, etc., where x, 
ζ, etc. may be different or merely distinct aspects of pro tanto value or desirability.  Now we 
could suppose that one can at the same time both be motivated to do A to do B – because one 
may for instance come to judge that one has reason to do A to do B in so far as doing A to do B 
is χ – and be motivated to not do A to do B – because one may for instance come to judge that 
one has reason to do A to do B in so far as doing A to do B is ζ.  For instance, I may come to 
judge that I ought to get another beer to drink it, because doing so would be pleasurable, and I 
may at the same time judge that I ought to not get another beer to drink it, because doing so 
would be unhealthy or non-pleasurable.  This solution raises similar problems as the solution in 
the previous section.  For now, should we take these aspects to be commensurable with respect to 
value, or not?   
If we take them to be commensurable in the sense that they are comparable with regard to 
value, then presumably the activity of comparing them will constitute a form of reasoning which 
will once more issue in judgments about one‘s reasons or about what is valuable, desirable, etc.  
Given this possibility for practical reasoning, to limit primary motivational conflict to conflict 
between reasoning that issues in conflicting pro tanto reasons would be to expel primary 
motivational conflict from the terrain of choice and confine it to the narrow bounds of mere clash 
of attractions.  As I argued in the last section, we have no reason to do that.  To include primary 
conflict in the terrain of choice would, on this picture, be to conceive of it as conflict between 
reasoning that one and the same action is and is not sufficiently valuable; which would once 
more be impossible. 
 112 
If on the other hand we take these aspects to be incommensurable with respect to value,
164
 in 
the sense that reasoning itself cannot determine which aspect is more valuable, or which value 
ought to be chosen, then primary motivational conflict might seem to once more be both 
perfectly possible and reasonably constrained to conflict between judgments about pro tanto 
reasons.   One would now be able to both come to judge that one pro tanto ought to do A to do B 
in so far as it is χ, and that one pro tanto ought not to do A to do B in so far as it is ζ, at the same 
time. 
But how should we interpret talk of the respect or the aspect in which doing A to do B is χ?  
There are two ways to do this.  One way is to take χ to be just another (non final) action 
description, which can figure further along the line of the rationalizing order of means-end 
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when he discusses Nussbaum’s bagel objection, on which if distinctness of value were enough for rational regret 
then rational regret would be in order even in cases of choosing one identical bagel over another. To this Hurka 
responds by pointing out that the distinctness of one and the same value which justifies rational regret must be 
understood as distinctness in intrinsic properties.  (See Hurka, 1996, p. 566.)  But if we grant this criterion of 
distinctness, then we should have to suppose that it is rational to feel regret almost about all of our simplest 
everyday choices.  I drive to work in the mornings and at a certain intersection I often think about whether to go 
left or right.  The routes are not dramatically different from one another, but they are nevertheless not identical in 
their intrinsic properties.  If I go this over that way I will come across different people, cars, houses, different small 
or big surprises, etc.  Should I feel regret about choosing to take one route over the other?   But it seems that most 
of our mundane, everyday choices are on a par with the route and not the bagel case.  Does it follow that is 
rational to feel regret almost all the time?  To block this objection we should clearly add to Hurka’s account of the 
distinctness of value in order to justify rational regret.  We should add that distinct values in the required sense are 
distinct in their intrinsic value-properties and not merely in their intrinsic properties.  But this will either be to 
abandon the thesis of value monism (i.e. to say that distinct values belong to distinct types of value) or to say 
something trivial (i.e. to say that the values that have distinct value properties are distinct). 
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descriptions that constitutes the elementary structure of the action in question.  Or we could take 
χ to be the specific guise under which means and end descriptions have been thought together in 
the means-end synthesis: the final term in the instrumental, rationalizing order.
165
  In the former 
case, to claim that one is motivated to φ because one comes to judge that one has a reason to do 
A to do B, in so far as doing A to do B is χ, just is to claim that one comes to judge that one has 
reason to φ to χ.  What is purportedly an instance of primary motivational conflict would then 
really be nothing but an instance of derivative motivational conflict between the motivation to φ 
to χ and the motivation to not φ to ζ.  One could always object by saying: ―So be it then! On a 
reasonable conception of the connection between motivation and practical rationality, all 
motivational conflict ought to turn out to be derivative motivational conflict if it has to.‖   
But this response is not available to a Reasoning-first theorist.  For if we take χ or ζ to be 
another (non final) term further along the series of rationalizations, then, as I argued at the end of 
section three when dealing with the Motivation-first views, to assume that all motivational 
conflict is derivative is to assume that practical reasoning must go on ad infinitum.  But, I argued 
there, to assume that all practical reasoning must go on ad infinitum is to assume that practical 
deliberation and explanation never come to an end.  In the case of Motivation-first views I 
argued that this assumption would prevent us from ever determining to what extent a given 
disposition realizes the disposition that makes us agents.  Thus, I argued, we could never 
determine to what extent a given disposition to φ might be rational.   
The spirit of this argument is applicable here as well.  Here is how it would work. (1) A 
disposition to φ is explained as an action motivation to the extent that one thereby comes to 
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judge that one ought (or has reason) to φ to the extent that φ-ing is χ-ing. (2) The series of ―I‘m 
φ-ing in so far as φ-ing is χ-ing‖ rationalizations is infinite (for if χ could be the final term in the 
series, one would be able to be conflicted about both doing φ to do χ and not doing φ to do χ in 
the way of primary conflict).  (3) So χ-ing cannot be the final respect, or sense in which φ-ing is 
justifiable. From (1), (2) and (3) it follows that (4) one could never come to determine what 
reason one has for φ-ing.   For it could always turn out that at some distant point in the 
rationalizing order, to φ might just turn out to be to ζ, such that one ought to judge that one ought 
not to do φ in so far as it is ζ.  In what sense would practical reasoning be reasoning if it 
prevented us from ever determining the reasons for φ-ing? 
There is an alternative.  I said above that we could propose that χ-ing and ζ-ing above, i.e. 
the respects in which one judges that doing A to do B is or is not reasonable, are distinct (in 
Hurka‘s sense, assuming Hurka is right) or different incommensurable guises of means-end 
syntheses; i.e. that they are incommensurable requirements of practical rationality.  If for 
instance we take χ-ing to be ―getting pleasure‖ and ζ-ing to be ―being prudent‖ then we can say 
that primary motivational opposition is indeed possible.  For now one may at the same time both 
be motivated to do A to do B – because one comes to judge that one has reason to do A to do B 
under the guise of ―coming to judge that one has reason‖ which is determined by the final 
constitutive goal of ―getting pleasure,‖ and be motivated to not do A to do B – because one 
comes to judge that one has reason to not do A to do B under the guise of ―coming to judge that 
one has reason‖ which is determined by the final constitutive goal of ―being prudent.‖  These 
incommensurable respects would thus constitute incommensurable requirements of practical 
rationality to which practical reasoning would be subject. 
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This interpretation of the sense in which practical reasoning issues in judgments about 
incommensurable values or aspects of one value is an interpretation that abandons the 
distinguishing assumption of the monolithic views.  If to be motivated to act just is to reason 
practically about what to do, and practical reasoning is subject to incommensurable requirements 
of practical rationality, then action motivation will also be subject to incommensurable 
requirements of practical rationality.  I will consider these multi-dimensional views in the final 
chapter. 
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
In sections one through three, I argued that none of the monolithic accounts of the necessary 
connection between action motivation and practical rationality can allow for the phenomenon of 
primary motivational conflict.  This was the rough structure of the argument: 
1) Premise from previous chapter: We have reason to suppose that φ-ing (where φ-ing is an 
intentional action) should be understood as a matter of doing A to do B, doing B to do C, 
etc.. 
2) Platitude about motivation: It appears that there are cases in which one is both motivated 
to φ and to not φ non-derivatively at the same time. 
3) Argument of this chapter: One and the same agent cannot be motivated in contrary ways 
towards one and the same means-end synthesis, at the same time, if the guise of this 
synthesis is determined by a single commensurable requirement of practical rationality. 
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4) Conclusion: Therefore intentional action must be subject to incommensurable166 practical 
requirements.  
Now I can suggest that the ―guise of a means-end synthesis‖ above is the ―respect in which‖ one 
and the same subject may be moved towards and away from an object in Plato‘s principle.  I can 
also venture the hypothesis that the first premise can be mapped onto Plato‘s claim that some 
desire for drink is not for good drink but for drink simpliciter.  Plato‘s claim, that not all desire 
for drink is for good drink, is commonly taken to be a rejection of the Protagorean dogma that all 
desire is for the good.  I believe there is another, more fruitful interpretation of his claim.  On this 
interpretation, what Plato means to point out is that there must be a level of analysis of actions, 
on which we can think of the relation between doing A (getting a drink) and doing B (quenching 
one‘s thirst) as a bare etiological relation (in the manner of the Thompsonian picture of the 
instrumental structure of agency), without needing to add a further specification of the character 
of the means-end connection or synthesis that holds the two kinds of descriptions together.  On 
this reading, Plato would not be denying any Protagorean thought, for he would not be claiming 
that there must exist actions which are not thought of under the guise of the practical requirement 
to do what is good.  With these two interpretative suggestions granted, we can see that the 
argument of this chapter has the same rough structure as Plato‘s argument in the Republic.  
This was roughly the structure of the Platonic argument.  Appearance: A thirsty man may 
both yearn for a drink and thus be moved towards it, and be pulled back from drinking by 
something which forbids him to do so and thus be moved away from it.  Clarification: Not all 
desire for drink is desire for good drink.  Principle of Opposites: One and the same subject 
                                                          
166
 The sense in which they are incommensurable will depend on the details of the multi-dimensional theory we 
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cannot do or suffer opposites, in the same respect, towards the same thing and at the same time.  
Conclusion: These movements must originate in distinct sources of movement or parts of the 
soul.  This goes, I think, some way towards showing both that Plato‘s argument is not as bad as 
commentators usually suppose, and that it may not be exactly the argument they suppose it is. 
If we grant the conclusion of my argument in this chapter, it may appear that we should 
either suppose that we cannot explain action motivation in terms of non-instrumental practical 
rationality or abandon the idea that primary motivational conflict is possible.  But as I suggested 
at various points, there is an alternative.  We can both develop an account of action motivation or 
intentional action in terms of practical rationality and allow for the possibility of non-derivative 
motivational conflict if we abandon the assumption that action motivation and intentional action 
must be subject to a single, commensurable requirement of practical rationality.  We can 
suppose, in other words, that the guise of the means-end synthesis (which constitutes the 
elementary structure of intentional action) may be determined by incommensurable practical 
requirements.   
It also transpired in the course of this argument that there is more than one interpretation of 
the form of action motivation: the way in which action motivation is subject to practical 
requirements.  Depending on what interpretation we favor we will end up with a different multi-
dimensional view.  A multi-dimensionalist could for instance suggest, following the model of the 
Motivation-first views, that action motivation may be subject to the practical requirement to 
maximize incommensurable agent-general dispositions; and that this would be the way in which 
action motivation is subject to incommensurable requirements.  Others could suggest on the 
model of the Reasons-first theories that action motivation may be subject to the practical 
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requirement to be in conformity with practical judgments about incomparable (in terms of 
reason-hood) pro tanto reasons; and that this would be the way in which action motivation is 
subject to incommensurable practical requirements.  Yet others could suggest following the 
model of the Reasoning-first theories that action motivation may be subject to incommensurable 
requirements in the sense that practical reasoning is subject to incommensurable requirements of 
practical rationality. 
In any case, all multi-dimensional theories, all theories on which action motivation or 
intentional action is subject to incommensurable practical requirements, will have to explain 
intentional action as the object of choice, and not merely as eligible for choice, in the face of 
conflict between these incommensurable practical requirements.  In the final chapter of my 
dissertation I will show that we can assess the various multi-dimensional accounts on the basis of 
their answer to this explanatory demand.  And I will argue that the incommensurable practical 
requirements may all issue in choice, because they constitute potentially cognitive responses to 
the world.  What makes choice in conditions of conflict between these incommensurable 
practical requirements possible is that practical reasoning is determined by them in the way of a 
distinctive self-consciousness; consciousness of oneself as reasoning under the guise of the right 
requirement for the circumstances, which when things go well may constitute practical 
knowledge.  
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3. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL THEORIES OF ACTION MOTIVATION AND THE UNITY 
OF INTENTIONAL ACTION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the second chapter I argued that monolithic theories of motivation cannot make room for the 
possibility of primary motivational conflict.  To allow for primary conflict we have to conceive 
of action motivation as multi-dimensional.  In the course of the argument it transpired that each 
monolithic theory suggests a different interpretation of the form of action motivation: the way it 
is determined by the constitutive requirement of practical rationality.  Multi-dimensional theories 
develop as a reaction to each of these monolithic theories, and so their conception of the form of 
action motivation varies accordingly.  In this chapter I will argue that action motivation is 
subject to incommensurable requirements of practical rationality in the way that practical 
reasoning itself is subject to incommensurable requirements of practical rationality.  And I will 
argue that the form of practical reasoning and hence of action motivation is the form of practical 
self-consciousness; self-consciousness on the part of the agent as determined in her reasoning 
about what to do by the right practical requirement for the circumstances; such that when things 
go well it constitutes practical knowledge of oneself as correctly determining what to do.  What 
exactly this form is will I hope become clearer towards the end of the chapter. 
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In the second sub-section of this introduction I will distinguish between the following multi-
dimensional families of views: material and formal multi-dimensional views.  In the third sub-
section I will show that both versions of multi-dimensionalism need to give a normative account 
of choice in conditions of conflict between incommensurable practical requirements, in the face 
of this incommensurability.  In the fourth section of this chapter I shall show how typical 
material multi-dimensional theories posit the will as an extra practical capacity (along the 
incommensurable action-determining practical requirements), as the true bearer of intentionality.  
But, I shall argue, they fail to give a normative account of intentional action as the object of 
choice.
167
 In the fifth section I will argue that the formal multi-dimensional views posit a genuine 
or ideal form of practical reasoning, as what constitutes choosing an action, and I will show that 
these accounts are also inadequate.
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  In the final section I will present an alternative.  To 
explain intentional action as the object of choice and not merely as eligible for choice in the face 
of conflict between incommensurable requirements of practical rationality we need to appreciate 
the following. (1) That the multiple requirements of practical rationality are incommensurable in 
the sense that one cannot determine in advance how they trade off each other in all possible 
contexts of choice.  (2) That in reasoning practically the agent is self-conscious of the purported 
fact that her reasoning is determined by the right practical requirement for the circumstances. (3) 
That practical reasoning may nevertheless issue in choice even in conditions of conflict because, 
when things go well, in reasoning practically the agent is rightly conscious of herself as being 
determined in her reasoning by the right practical requirement for the circumstances.  In other 
words because  the form of self-consciousness on the part of the agent as engaged in the right 
guise of reasoning in the circumstances may amounts to practical knowledge; i.e. knowledge of 
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oneself as determining correctly what to do.  So the self-consciousness characteristic of each 
guise of practical reasoning may constitute choice, even if its constitutive standards are 
incommensurable, because it potentially constitutes practical knowledge. 
 
3.2 MATERIAL AND FORMAL MULTI-DIMENSIONAL THEORIES. 
In the second chapter I argued against the Motivation-first and the Reasons-first theories, among 
other things.  According to the former, a motivation to φ counts as such because it realizes a 
specific agent-general disposition.  According to the latter a motivation to φ counts as such 
because it is in conformity with one‘s judgment that one has good reason to φ.  I argued there 
that there is no room in these monolithic conceptions for primary motivational conflict.  I also 
pointed out that these families of theories can account for motivational conflict if they abandon 
the assumption of monolithicity.   
I also suggested that a multi-dimensional Reasons-first theory can advance the following 
claim:  for an action motivation to count as such, it must be in conformity with one‘s conditional 
judgment that one has reason to-do-A-to-do-B in so far as doing-A-to-do-B is χ, or ζ, or ψ, etc.; 
where χ, ζ, ψ, etc. (or x*, x**, x***, depending on whether Hurka is right about monism about 
value)
169
 are incommensurable respects of desirability, value, worth-whileness, etc., in the sense 
that they are not comparable in respect of reason-hood.
170
  Alternatively, an advocate of a multi-
dimensional Motivation-first view may suggest that for a given disposition to count as a 
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motivation to act, it must realize one of the maximizing but incommensurable
171
 dispositions to 
y, z, etc., which collectively form the set of the agent-general dispositions.  So, for instance, to 
explain being motivated to-do-A-to-do-B as such might be to reveal it to be in accordance with 
one‘s judgment that doing B is a good pro tanto reason to do A in so far as pleasure, or 
prudence, or etiquette, etc. is concerned, or to reveal it to realize one of the (collectively) agent-
general dispositions. 
On the monolithic Reasons-first views, action motivation must be in accordance with one‘s 
judgment about one‘s comparable (sufficient) reasons.  On the multi-dimensional Reasons-first 
views on the other hand, action motivation must be in conformity with a conditional judgment 
about one‘s incomparable (in terms of reason-hood) pro tanto reasons.  In both cases the form of 
action motivation is determined by the fact that it must be in conformity with one‘s judgment 
about one‘s reasons.  What differs is the specific character of these reasons, and so the matter of 
action motivation.  On the monolithic Reasons-first views, these reasons are comparable as far as 
reason-hood is concerned, and on the multidimensional Reasons-first views they are 
incomparable as far as reason-hood is concerned.  Similarly in monolithic and multi-dimensional 
Motivation-first views, the form of action motivation is determined by the fact that it must 
realize an agent-distinctive disposition.  The difference is that in the former case this disposition 
is a single, agent-general disposition, whereas in the latter case it forms a set of agent-general 
dispositions together with other dispositions.   
I call these two multidimensional theories material because while they respectively accept 
the Motivation and Reasons-first accounts of the form of action motivation, they deny the 
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Motivation and Reasons-first account of the matter of action motivation. On the multi-
dimensional version of the Reasons-first view for instance, the matter of action motivation (what 
the action motivation is motivation towards) is not the action qua object of choice, but the action 
qua eligible for choice; i.e. qua recommended by incommensurable aspects of worth-whileness.  
But, on both monolithic and multi-dimensional versions of both families of views, the form of 
action motivation (i.e. the way it is determined by practical requirements) is the same: it comes 
down to conformity with the content of one‘s practical judgments in the Reasons-first case, and 
approximation to agent-general dispositions in the Motivation-first case. 
In chapter three I also argued against what I called the monolithic Reasoning-first views.  
On this family of theories, the form of action motivation just is the form of practical reasoning 
which issues in all-out practical judgments.  In other words, the form of action motivation is the 
way in which practical reasoning is determined by the single commensurable requirement of 
practical rationality.  To abandon this assumption of monolithicity, I argued in that chapter, 
multi-dimensional views cannot suggest, like the Reasons-first views, that the practical 
reasoning in question issues in conditional practical judgments about incommensurable respects 
of desirability let‟s say.  For, I argued there, these incommensurable respects of desirability 
cannot fall within the elementary instrumental structure of action as merely further (non final) 
end-descriptions of the action.  Instead, I argued, the incommensurable respects of value or 
desirability must be interpreted as incommensurable requirements of practical rationality to 
which the means-end syntheses are subject.  Now the question is How is action motivation or 
practical reasoning determined by incommensurable requirements of practical rationality?  In 
other words, how should the multi-dimensionalist accounts conceive of the form of action 
motivation?  According to the variety of views that I shall examine later on in section 3.3.2, the 
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incommensurable requirements of practical rationality constitute incommensurable forms of 
practical reasoning.  I.e. practical reasoning is determined by practical requirements in 
incommensurable ways.  
If the incommensurable respects thus specify incommensurable forms of practical reasoning 
and the form of action motivation just is the form of practical reasoning, it follows that action 
motivation must itself take incommensurable forms.  For instance, to say that one reasons 
practically to the conclusion that one has reason to-do-A-to-do-B in so far as doing so is 
pleasurable is to say that if one reasons practically under the form of practical reasoning 
constituted by the aim or guise of pleasure, then one will conclude that one has a reason to-do-A-
to-do-B.  Similarly, to say that one is motivated to-do-A-to-do-B in so far as doing so is 
pleasurable is to say that one is motivated in accordance with pleasure and one is motivated to-
do-A-to-do-B.   
I call these multi-dimensional views formal and not material, even though both formal and 
(at least the Reasons-first) material accounts may trade on the idea of the conditionality of 
reasons on incommensurable aspects of value or incommensurable values.  The reason is that on 
material multi-dimensional theories, the matter of action motivation is the matter that the 
monolithic Reasoning-first views also suggest: the action qua the (potential) object of choice, 
and not the action as merely eligible for choice in the face of conflict between incommensurable 
forms of practical reasoning. The difference between the multi-dimensional and monolithic 
versions of the Reasoning-first variety is that on the former, the form of action motivation itself 
(the way in which it is determined by (incommensurable) practical requirements) is multiple.  In 
contrast, on the Reasons-first multi-dimensional views it is the matter of action motivation which 
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is determined by incommensurable aspects of practical worth-whileness.   To sum up, there are 
at least two families of multi-dimensionalist views about the way in which the guise of action 
motivation
172
 is subject to incommensurable practical requirements.  On material multi-
dimensionalism the thought of means together with ends descriptions is subject to 
incommensurable practical requirements materially: i.e. what is determined by these 
incommensurable requirements is the matter, the content of this thought.  On formal multi-
dimensionalism, the thought of means together with ends descriptions is subject to 
incommensurable requirements formally; i.e. what is determined by these requirements is the 
form of this thought, the way this thought is determined by these requirements. 
 
3.3 THE QUESTION OF CHOICE 
The main point of chapter two then was to bring forth a fatal disadvantage of monolithic 
theories: that they cannot allow for primary motivational conflict.  What I did not mention 
though is that these views have a terrific advantage: they can give a single story about the form 
of action motivation and the form of intentional action; i.e. the way in which practical norms 
determine action motivation and intentional action as a potential object of choice, and not merely 
as eligible for choice, in the face of conflict between incommensurable requirements of practical 
rationality.
173
  If intentional action qua chosen just is what action motivation issues in, and action 
motivation is determined as such by a single (commensurable) practical requirement, then it 
follows without further ado that choice will be determined as such in the same way. (Depending 
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on the theory we prefer, choice may be determined either by desire or by the content of practical 
judgment or by practical reasoning itself.) 
If we reject the monolithic theories of motivation in favor of multi-dimensional theories, we 
risk losing this terrific advantage.  If we side with the material multi-dimensionalist views, we 
risk losing this advantage, because, on these views, action motivation does not issue in 
intentional action qua potential object of choice.  This is so because, as I said in the previous 
sub-section, material multi-dimensionalists of the Reasons-first variety for instance suggest that 
practical judgments (with which action motivation ought to be in conformity) are judgments 
about incommensurable reason-giving aspects of the action.  If the form of action motivation is 
its conformity with one‘s judgment about one‘s incommensurable pro tanto reasons, and in cases 
of primary conflict one‘s conflicting motivations are in conformity with incommensurable pro 
tanto reasons, then choosing what to do in these conditions will have to be more than merely 
being motivated to do it.  If, for instance, the Reasons-first material multi-dimensional theories 
are right and primary motivational conflict is conflict between judgments about 
incommensurable pro tanto reasons, and normatively constrained choice is possible even in 
conditions of such conflict, choice must be something over and above the conformity of action 
motivation with conditional incommensurable practical judgments.  The same is true for the 
Motivation-first multi-dimensional accounts as well.  Therefore, after having settled the issue 
about the constitution of action motivation, the material multi-dimensional theories will have to 
answer the further question: What constitutes choice if not what constitutes action motivation?  
This question is of course urgent only if we assume that we ought to give a normative account of 
choice in these conditions; if, that is, we want to explain how we can rightly or wrongly decide 
between reasons that are incommensurable.  But the question now is: should we really want this?   
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One could for instance claim that choice is simply what a conditional, incommensurable 
practical judgment issues in when there is no competing action motivation and the existing 
action motivation issues in action.  What happens in conditions of choice is that one of the 
conflicting motivations merely wins out, and this we call ―choice.‖  This solution excludes the all 
too familiar possibility of normatively constrained choice in conditions of conflict, or between 
conflicting practical judgments.  Should we accept it?  Even if we grant that normatively 
constrained choice is not apparently possible in conditions of conflict, I believe that we should 
not accept a non-normative account of choice for the following reason.  There is an intuitive 
sense in which practical reasoning is reasoning about what to do, and not about what it would be 
good, desirable, pleasurable, prudent, etc. to do, as the Reasons-first views seem to suppose.
174
  
Paraphrasing Korsgaard‘s criticism of instrumentalism, we typically do not first come across, or 
choose a way of acting (e.g. as prudence requires, or as pleasure or etiquette requires, etc.) and 
then scramble around for some way to fulfill it.
175
  Alternatively, we do not scramble around for 
some way to fulfill what would be prudent, pleasant, well-mannered etc. to do, and then either 
randomly, or causally or out of choice come to do one of these things.  Instead, what we typically 
do, when we are in the business of reasoning about what to do, is reason both about what would 
be the pleasant thing to do, and about whether to do what‘s pleasant.  It is this conception of 
practical reasoning that can carry out the promise of not altering beyond recognition the sense in 
which practical reasoning is reasoning about what to do and not merely about what it would be 
pleasurable, prudent, etc. to do.  To salvage this conception the material multi-dimensional 
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views would have to provide an account of the way in which choice is determined by norms over 
and above the way action motivation is determined by norms. 
One could at this point suggest that if we side with the Reasoning-first variety of multi-
dimensionalism, i.e. the formal multi-dimensionalist views, we will not have this problem.   The 
reason, one might claim, is that , as I said, on these formal views the practical reasoning is an all-
out judgment about what one ought to do and not a conditional judgment about the respect of 
desirability of an action.   The matter of action motivation on a Reasoning-first view is, as I said, 
the intentional action as the (potential) object of choice and not the action as eligible for choice 
under an incommensurable (aspect of) value.
176
  Thus these formal accounts may seem to respect 
the intuition inspiring the monolithic views that practical reasoning is reasoning about what to do 
and not about what is desirable, valuable, etc. to do. 
But things are not this simple.  On the formal views, action motivation is takes 
incommensurable forms, and so, if the form of choice just is the form of action motivation, then 
choice will have to be multi-form as well.  This possibility seems to once more compromise the 
sense in which action motivation issues in intentional action qua (potential) object of choice.  
For on this formal version of multi-dimensionalism, in cases of primary conflict, different forms 
of action motivation will simply issue in different forms of choice and so in different forms of 
intentional action.   If choice takes different forms, the following question arises: how, in the 
face of conflict of forms of choice, is it possible to choose how to choose?  Are the standards of 
this higher order choice the standards of one of the forms of first order choice or not?  If yes, 
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then so much for the supposed incommensurability of the forms of choice.  And if no, then the 
multi-dimensional Reasoning-first view may give us a normative account of how intentional 
action is determined as the object of choice in general, but not in conditions of primary 
motivational conflict. 
In other words:  if practical reasoning takes more than one form, it will issue in different 
forms of choice and different forms of intentional action, depending on what we take to be the 
condition on which practical reasoning each time rests.  Practical reasoning will at best issue in 
intentional action qua the disjunction of the incommensurable objects of choice.  So for instance, 
if we take the condition of one form of practical reasoning to be pleasure, then practical 
reasoning under the guise of pleasure will issue in appetitively intentional actions; and if we take 
the condition to be prudence, then practical reasoning under the guise of prudence will issue in 
prudently intentional actions.  At this point we can rest our case with a disjunctive conception of 
intentional action on which choice is a disjunctive term signifying distinct and incommensurable 
forms of choice and intentional action.  Or we can attempt to answer the question of the unity of 
intentional action, and explain what in the incommensurable (individual) determinations of 
practical reasoning by practical requirements unites them under the category of intentional 
action.   
I believe that we should not rest with a disjunctive interpretation of the unity of intentional 
action, on which there are incommensurable forms of choice.  For if we did, we would be 
limiting practical reasoning to reasoning about what appetitive-intentional or what prudent-
intentional thing to do, overlooking the capacity of reasoning to guide us with respect to whether 
to do the appetitive or the prudent thing.   And so there would be an important sense in which 
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reasoning wouldn‘t be able to guide us with respect to what to do.  In other words, the capacity 
of practical reasoning to guide our actions would be limited to informing when we would be 
excused with respect to a given standard (say prudence, pleasure, etc.).  But when we reason 
practically we reason about what to do and not about how to escape criticism. 
In what follows I will examine material and formal multi-dimensional accounts in turn and 
show that their answers to the question of choice are inadequate.  At the end I will suggest that 
each (individual) determination of practical reasoning by incommensurable practical 
requirements potentially constitutes choice.  The reason is that choice is the form of a distinctive 
self-consciousness: the agent‘s consciousness of herself as determined in her reasoning by the 
right practical requirement for the circumstances, which when things go well constitutes 
knowledge of oneself as rightly determining what to do in the circumstances.  First let me take 
up material multi-dimensional views. 
3.3.1 Material Multi-dimensional Accounts of the Unity of Intentional action.  I said above that 
the material multi-dimensional views need to answer the question of what determines choice in 
conditions of conflict if it is not the form of action motivation; the way action motivation is 
determined by the requirements of practical rationality.  
This has often been interpreted as the requirement for an extra capacity of choice in the face 
of the incommensurability of reasons.
177
  The same interpretation could be applicable in the case 
of the incommensurability of the agent-distinctive dispositions.  From now on I shall drop 
reference to the latter type of material multi-dimensionalism, but the criticism should be taken to 
apply to it no less than the Reasons-first variety.   If the reasons that figure in the content of 
                                                          
177
 See for instance Holton 2006 p. 7; Watson, 2003, p. 181-3; Raz, 1999a, ch. 3; etc. 
 131 
one‘s practical judgments are merely incommensurable pro tanto reasons, practical judgment 
itself will not be fit to adjudicate between these incommensurable reasons.  This is to say that if 
practical judgments are judgments about the incommensurable respects of reason-hood of 
actions, the verdicts of practical reason will constitute mere suggestions about what is to be 
chosen.   If these respects are incommensurable, practical reason itself will not be fit to take us 
from these suggestions to choice, at least not in conditions of conflict.  This is the sense in which 
practical reason does not issue in intentional action qua the object of choice, in the case of 
material multi-dimensionalism.  In addition, then, to our deliberative or reasoning capacity, the 
material multi-dimensional views typically suppose that we need an executive capacity: one that 
will take us from incommensurable pro tanto practical reasons to intentional actions as the 
(potential) object of choice (reflected in all-out judgments, whatever their exact nature).  This 
extra executive capacity is what I shall from now on be referring to as the will.
178
  On the 
material multi-dimensional views, the question of choice is settled by reference to the exercise of 
a capacity other than action motivation (as on the corresponding monolithic theories): the 
capacity to execute the verdicts of one‘s practical judgments. 
The general shape of this solution is the following: practical judgments are about actions in 
so far as they have some incommensurable reason-giving aspect.  So practical judgments, in 
Raz‘s terminology, merely make options eligible; they merely specify what‘s up for choice.179 To 
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get to intentional action, at least in conditions of agency, we need an extra capacity, the will, 
whose function is to choose among the incommensurable alternatives or, more generally, to 
execute the verdicts of practical reason.  Paradigmatic practical rationality is then the composite 
exercise of the functions of two separate capacities: the first is the rational capacity to recognize 
reasons and the second is the practical capacity to act on reasons.
180
  Intentional action as the 
object of choice is essentially that which one‘s practical capacity (one‘s will) determines.   
This general account raises the following question: what is the connection between one‘s 
rational and one‘s practical capacity?  In other words, what is the connection between judging 
about one‘s practical reasons and willing?  Depending on their answer to this question I will 
distinguish between three broad categories of theories: internalism, externalism and 
reformism.
181
  Internalists suppose that the connection between the will and one‘s practical 
judgment is necessary; i.e. that the form of the will is determined by the principles which 
determine one‘s practical judgments.182  Externalists take the will to be in principle, at least, 
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entirely unconstrained by one‘s practical judgments.183  Reformists distinguish between two 
senses of the will; a thin and a thick sense.  On the thin sense the will is always constrained by 
reasons, and on the thick sense the will is not constrained by sufficient reasons.
184
  In the 
remainder of this section I will consider these alternatives in turn, and show that they all fail to 
give a satisfactory account of choice.  Let me first take up internalism.     
There are two main varieties of internalism.  On the first, our will is controlled by reasons in 
the same way that our practical judgments are controlled by reasons.  In other words, on this 
picture, the will is nothing other than our deliberative capacity in its unconditional exercise; the 
capacity which issues in unconditional judgments about one‘s reasons, and so judgments about 
intentional action as the object of choice, and not as falling under a respect of value or practical 
worth-whileness.
185
  On another variety, the will as such could directly cause anything at all, but 
the will as a bearer of agency is constrained by our practical judgments.
186
  On the former 
variety, our will is conceived of as a mere species of practical judgment, and on the latter, as the 
genus under which the agential species of the will falls; i.e. the species of the will which is 
restricted by practical judgments.   
The drawback of the first alternative is that it fails to portray the will as an essentially 
executive capacity as it purports to.  On this view, the will is nothing other than another practical 
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judgment along with the practical judgments about one‘s pro tanto reasons, which is controlled 
in the same way by our reasons or our sensitivity to reasons.  But even if we grant the possibility 
of the formation of unconditional practical judgments against the background of the 
incommensurability of reasons, there is no reason to suppose that even the unconditional 
judgment that one has reason to-do-A-to-do-B will ever actually issue in action.  For now we can 
imagine that one‘s conditional practical judgments may go against one‘s unconditional 
judgment.  In this case we would have to assume that there is a higher order practical judgment 
that would play the role of the will, and adjudicate between one‘s unconditional and one‘s 
conditional judgment.  But, in this case too we can imagine that another or the same conditional 
judgment could go against this higher order judgment that would play the role of the will, and 
then we would need a still higher order judgment to adjudicate between the two judgments, and 
so on ad infinitum.   
The reason we face the threat of infinite regress is the following: if the will is subject to the 
same normative constraints as our conditional, non-executive practical judgments, then its 
executive function will depend solely on its role as an adjudicator of conflict.  Any principled 
way of determining which judgment should be the adjudicator (such as the principle that this 
practical judgment should be about one‘s all things considered reasons for the action) will fail, in 
the face of the simple fact that any practical judgment which is not governed by this principle 
may nevertheless go against this executive judgment.  In this way, any conflicting judgment will 
cancel out the executive nature of the judgment-adjudicator, thus creating the need for a new way 
of specifying what counts as the exercise of the executive capacity, and hence for a new 
principled way of distinguishing between executive and non-executive judgments. 
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On the other hand, the version of internalism which presents the will as a species of a 
generic capacity for movement merely postpones the real question.  For the drawback of the 
view that practical judgment is what issues in intentional action as the object of choice was not 
that judgments as such cannot issue in intentional action.  The problem was that practical 
judgments cannot issue in choice if they concern incommensurable pro tanto reasons; i.e. if they 
register one‘s recognition of the incommensurable pro tanto reasons for an action.  To say that 
this problem is solved if we suppose the existence of a generic capacity to be moved, which may 
on occasions be constrained by one‘s conditional practical judgments about incommensurable 
reasons, is to assume that the problem was that practical judgments cannot as such move on their 
own.  But if the problem is the one I stressed both here and in the previous section (i.e. that 
conditional judgments may of course move to intentional action but may not move to intentional 
action qua the object of choice; at least not in conditions of primary conflict) then to propose that 
there is a generic capacity to be moved which may be constrained by those judgments is to 
merely postpone the question.  For now the question can be recast in these terms: if the generic 
capacity to be moved is constrained by one‘s judgments about one‘s incommensurable pro tanto 
reasons, then this capacity will not issue in intentional actions qua the object of choice either, but 
only qua falling under an incommensurable respect of reason-hood; i.e. qua prudent, pleasant, 
etc.  This possibility may, as I said in the introduction to the question of choice, be seem to be 
non-problematic when it comes to choice in conditions of singleness of motivation, but not in 
conditions of conflict between incommensurable conditional judgments.  But this impression is 
false.  For if the capacity to be moved to act is constrained by the same incommensurable 
reasons that one‘s practical judgments are about, choice even in conditions of non conflict will 
still at best be a matter of one practical requirement merely taking over, and at worst a random 
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determination by specific incommensurable requirements.  For instance, if prudence is taken to 
be an incommensurable respect of reason-hood, then in reasoning practically under its guise one 
will be able to reason about what prudent thing to do, but one will not be able to reason about 
whether to do the prudent thing or not. 
In each case, both varieties of internalism fail to explain how the will may be both an extra 
practical capacity (i.e. capable of being specified in a non-trivial way; i.e. not merely by pointing 
out that it is the capacity which issues in choice) and a distinctively practical capacity (i.e. 
issuing in intentional action qua the object of choice and not qua recommended by 
incommensurable respects of reason-hood), as long as they suppose that the exercise of the will 
issues in further practical judgments alongside one‘s other (conditional) practical judgments. 
Let me now turn to the externalist view.  On the externalist variety, the will is essentially a 
non-normative attitude.  As Jay Wallace concisely puts it, 
―Choice may often reflect or be based on normative commitments that the agent accepts, 
but it cannot be identified with such commitments without foreclosing genuine possibilities 
in the theory of action. There has to be something in the act of choice that distinctively 
goes beyond normative commitment if we are to leave room for akrasia and the other 
forms of irrationality to which action is characteristically subject.‖ (Wallace, 2006, p. 87) 
Leaving worries about akrasia and irrationality aside, the distinctive claim of externalism is that 
the will qua bearer of agency is not a normative attitude.
187
   As before, there are two main 
varieties of externalism.  On the first, which I will be calling volitionalism,
188
 the will is 
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identified with a distinctive kind of want or volition, which has two features: (a) it is not 
constrained by one‘s judgments about one‘s reasons or one‘s normative attitudes in general, and 
(b) it cannot be captured in the causal flow of one‘s causally efficacious psychological attitudes.  
On the second variety, which I shall be calling the Action model,
189
 the activity of the will is to 
be identified with a special sort of deliberative action, which itself is subject to distinctive 
practical norms.   
Let me take up volitionalism first.  When describing the commitments of volitionalism 
Wallace says that ―we do not think of choice as an essentially normative stance, and this is 
connected with our feeling that our active powers of self-determination in the practical domain 
present us with a set of alternatives for action that is wider than the set of actions we ourselves 
approve of.‖190  The motivation for this view of the will is the search for a moment which can 
break into the normative flow of judgments about reasons and the causal flow of desires; a 
moment which qua breaking in will manifest the freedom of the agent from the constraints 
posited by each type of flow, a moment of self-determination.  As Wallace puts it, ―The question 
of what action we are going to perform is not necessarily answered by our having determined to 
our own satisfaction what it would be best to do.‖191  Nor is it determined, on volitionalism, by 
the causal powers of the psychological states, to which we are subject.
192
  Instead, it is 
determined by ―us‖.  And ―we‖ are identified with the will understood as a normatively and 
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psychologically unconstrained volition, as a state of self-determination unpolluted by subjection 
to normative and psychological determinations.
193
   
The problem with this conception of the will is that it cannot perform the function it was 
originally meant to perform.  Remember that the introduction of the will as an extra capacity 
seemed necessary because it appeared to be what could turn a rational capacity into a practical 
rational capacity; i.e. a capacity to get us from our incommensurable conditional practical 
judgments to choice.  If we assume that this extra capacity is entirely unconstrained by our 
practical judgments,
194
 then we should not suppose that its addition is what turns our capacity to 
recognize reasons for and against particular actions into the capacity to choose.  For all we 
know, it is possible that our ―autonomous‖ will (in Wallace‘s sense of self-determining volition, 
of course) might never side with our practical judgments.  In what sense then would this addition 
be the capacity which turns our rational capacity into a practical rational capacity?   
One might object to my thought here by suggesting that this case is no different than the 
case of a person who suffers from severe paralysis and as a result can never actually execute her 
practical judgments.  Would we say that in this case as well the person does not have a rational 
practical capacity?  No.  The objection misses the point, for in the former case it is conceivable 
that an agent could have the capacity for self-determination without having the capacity for 
recognition of reasons at all.  If the definition of self-determination is purely negative (i.e. if self-
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determination is defined as freedom from normative constraints) then it is true that the condition 
will be satisfied when the agent does not even have the capacity to be subject to normative 
constraints, i.e. when the agent does not have a rational capacity at all.  If having a will is thus 
independent from having a rational capacity, it cannot be part of its function to get us from 
conditional judgments about practical reasons to choice. 
A similar problem threatens the second version of externalism.  On the Action model, the 
determinations of the will are themselves actions, which are subject to distinctive practical 
norms.
195
  The actions in question are the conclusion of reasoning about what decision to make, 
or in other words, how to determine one‘s will.  In Pink‘s words, ―…the Action model says that 
decisions to do A are justified by desirable ends which deciding to do A would further.‖196  The 
problem, as Pink himself acknowledges,
197
 is that if willing, or deciding to perform an action, is 
itself an action subject to different norms than the norms to which intentional action is subject, 
then there is no reason to expect that the will‘s function might be constrained by one‘s 
conditional practical judgments.  For it might very well be the case that the norms to which the 
will‘s actions are subject are completely unrelated to the norms that govern one‘s practical 
judgments about one‘s intentional actions.  And then there would be no reason to expect that 
these higher order norms should have to coincide with some of the norms governing the agent‘s 
practical judgments.   
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If we choose to restrict the norms guiding our deliberations concerning the actions of the 
will to the norms guiding our practical judgments, as Pink for instance does, we may manage to 
explain why the will‘s function is constrained by one‘s conditional practical judgments, but only 
at the cost of reverting to a disguised form of internalism, and to its problems.   If on the other 
hand, we do not restrict the norms guiding our deliberations concerning the actions of the will to 
the norms guiding practical judgments, but suppose instead that the actions of the will typically 
execute the verdicts of our practical judgments, we end up with a disguised version of Wallace‘s 
externalism and its problems.
198
  Externalism may manage to explain in what sense the work of 
the will is distinct from the work of one‘s practical judgments in a way that avoids the problems 
of internalism, but it cannot explain why it should nevertheless be that distinctive work‘s 
function to execute some of the verdicts of our practical judgments.  In other words, it does not 
manage to answer the particular question of choice that the material multi-dimensional views 
face; the problem of how we get from incommensurable conditional practical judgments to 
choice.  What are we to do? 
It may appear that the solution to these problems is to take a course that will steer clear of 
both the Charybdis of internalism and the Scylla of externalism, by accepting a reformist view.  
On this reformist view, as I said above, we may make a distinction between two senses of the 
will.  In the thin sense, the will is constrained by conditional reasons, and in the thick sense the 
will is unconstrained by sufficient reasons.   Raz himself says that ―In this [the thin] sense to say 
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that I did something because I wanted to do it… is to mark the action as intentional, that is, as an 
act I did for a reason.‖199  In the thick sense the will is what colors the way we do anything we do 
intentionally.  (For one and the same intentional action can be done reluctantly, grudgingly, 
enthusiastically, etc.)  The will in the thick sense is also what can determine which actions, 
emotions, thoughts, etc. we have, either when reason determines which one is the best all things 
considered to have, or when reason presents merely incommensurable alternatives between 
which it (reason) cannot choose.
200
  When reason determines what is the all things considered 
best thing to do the will in the thick sense may nevertheless determine one to perform the action 
there is lesser reason to perform.  When reason presents merely incommensurable alternatives, 
the will in the thick sense may determine us to perform whatever action (from those suggested 
by reason) we happen to want.  In both cases, there would be some reason we would be acting in 
conformity with, and so in acting for a reason we would be determined by the will in the thin 
sense. 
In either case, it is important to note that this view differs from the externalist views above 
in emphasizing that the activity of the will is an activity constrained by at least one of the 
reasons registered by our practical judgments.  It differs from the internalist views in allowing 
that this activity may at the same time be unconstrained by reasons, if by reasons we mean to 
refer to sufficient reasons.  For it is possible that one may choose, will, that is, against one‘s 
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good or best reasons, and against reasons that are neither better nor worse than the reasons one 
chooses or wills in accordance with.  Raz summarizes his view in the following way: 
The view that I have outlined can be summarized by saying that the will is the capacity for 
intentional action, which is instantiated in every intentional action. This gives rise to the 
thin sense of 'want': I do what I want to do whenever I act intentionally. The will is also the 
ability to be attached to various options, actions, or objects, which expresses itself in the 
attitude with which we do what we do, and which enables us to choose, even when, as is 
normal, reason does not dictate a unique choice. This second power of the will gives rise to 
the thick sense of 'want', meaning an attachment not required by reason (though we can be 
attached in that way to an option prescribed by reason, as well as to one proscribed by 
it).
201
 
 
Raz‘s solution is ingenious.  While it brings in the will as a distinct executive capacity to bridge 
the gap between incommensurable conditional practical reasons and choice, it explains the 
difference in the possible exercises of the will as a consequence of the nature of the rational 
capacity.  Where reasons speak in one voice and point to one action, the will‘s function is thin.  
Where reasons speak in more than one voice or point to more than one actions, the will‘s 
function is thick.  It is the ingenuity of the solution that is also its biggest fault.  It is true that on 
this picture the will is portrayed as a capacity whose function is determined non-negatively 
unlike the case of the voluntaristic version of the will above.  For, on Raz‘s picture, the will is 
not that which is not constrained by reasons (even in the case of good reasons).  On the contrary, 
the will is that which is necessarily constrained both by reasons and by other types of 
commitments.  This is how choice, or willing, against one‘s best reasons or choice, or willing, in 
the face of incommensurable reasons is to be explained.   
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In both cases the definition of the function of the executive capacity is not negative.  But it is 
not positive either, for it is ad hoc.  Let me explain why.  On Raz‘s picture, the function of the 
will is defined solely in terms of the function of the distinct capacity to reason. It is defined 
ultimately as that which fills in the gap there is between rationality and choice.  It may of course 
turn out that we have a capacity to act which fits this definition of the will as what makes up for 
the incapacity of reasons to reach all the way out to choice.  But material multi-dimensionalism 
professed to explain the nature of the connection between practical reasons and choice by 
identifying a distinctive capacity, not to merely posit the connection by positing that there is a 
distinctive capacity which carries it out.
202
   
Until a better theory of material multi-dimensionalism is forthcoming, a theory which 
actually explains and not merely posits the connection between practical reasons and choice in a 
satisfactory way, we have to suppose that material multi-dimensionalism is wrong.  The reason 
can of course not be multi-dimensionalism itself, for without it we could not explain the 
possibility of motivational opposition, which I think we should be able to.  The reason must then 
be the assumption about the form of action motivation that the material multi-dimensionalists 
share with the monolithic Reasons-first views: that one‘s action motivation must be in 
conformity with one‘s judgments about one‘s reasons.  (One‘s incommensurable reasons in the 
case of multi-dimensionalism, and one‘s conclusive reasons in the case of the monolithic views.)  
3.3.2 Formal Multi-dimensional Accounts of the Unity of Intentional Action.  In section two 
above I claimed that multi-dimensionalism can embrace the fundamental claim of the 
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Reasoning-first views, that the form of action motivation is the form of practical reasoning, i.e. 
the form of the activity which issues in practical judgments, and not the correspondence with the 
content of these judgments.  On this claim, to be motivated to act just is to reason about how to 
act; that is, to reason practically.  Formal multi-dimensionalism would then be the view that there 
are several forms of practical reasoning – ways in which practical reasoning is determined by 
practical requirements – that are not commensurable.   
In section three I pointed out that formal multi-dimensionalism may appear to avoid the 
problem of material multi-dimensionalism – the inability to explain how practical reasons 
connect with intentional action as the object of choice and not merely as eligible for choice in the 
face of conflict between incommensurable forms of practical reasoning.  I also pointed out in 
that same section that if there is more than one form of practical reasoning and practical 
reasoning is what issues in intentional action as the object of choice, then we will have to accept 
that there is more than one form of choice and hence intentional action.   So, following Sergio 
Tenenbaum, we may conclude that there are three forms of choice or intentional action broadly 
understood: fully deliberative, merely intentional and merely voluntary.  As Tenenbaum also 
realizes, and I argue in subsection 3.3, we cannot leave matters at that.  We have to explain why 
these different forms are nevertheless all subject to a certain sort of normative criticism.  For if 
we didn‘t, we would be assuming that if a particular action is fine by the standards of its 
distinctive form (e.g. the standards of appetite in the case of the merely intentional form), then it 
must be fine by any practical standard.   
Appetitive actions, for instance, are often not fine at all by the standards of the fully 
deliberative form of actions, and fully deliberative actions are not fine at all by the standards of 
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the appetitive form of action or choice.  In fact, as I‘ve stressed repeatedly in this chapter, if an 
action that is fine by the standards peculiar to its distinctive form could not be subject to further 
normative criticism, we would have no way of normatively resolving cases of primary 
motivational opposition.  But such cases, sometimes at least, do seem resolvable on a normative 
basis.  Think for instance of continent choice in the face of conflict between incommensurable 
forms of reasoning.  Any theory which assumes the existence of distinct forms of intentional 
action or choice should then have an answer to the question of why one of these 
incommensurable forms could be subject to criticism from the perspective of the other.  If, on the 
other hand, we refuse to suppose that the incommensurable forms of practical reasoning translate 
into the existence of multiple forms of intentional action or choice, it may seem that we need to 
provide an account of choice as the ideal form of unity of these distinct forms.  This is 
Korsgaard‘s suggestion, to which I will come back after I present Tenenbaum‘s view.  As I will 
suggest in the end, there is an alternative.  We do not have to suppose that there are 
incommensurable forms of practical reasoning in order to accommodate the fact that practical 
reasoning is determined by incommensurable practical requirements.  This is why we do not 
have to wonder how incommensurable forms of reasoning all may issue in choice.  But let me 
first go into Sergio Tenenbaum‘s view. 
On what Tenenbaum calls the Scholastic view, that in virtue of which all forms of practical 
reasoning count as such is that they all strive for the good.  On this conception, the actions which 
issue from the different forms of practical reasoning all count as chosen because they are all 
guided, albeit in different ways of course, by one‘s general conception of the good.  Let me 
briefly explain how.  An intentional action as the object of choice is the conclusion of the agent‘s 
practical reasoning, or what carries out the intention which is the conclusion of practical 
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reasoning.
203
 Practical reasoning
204
 typically
205
 starts from desires, which for Tenenbaum are 
nothing more than appearances of the good, and issues in unconditional, all-out judgments of the 
good, which are the expressions either of the intentional actions as chosen or of the intentions 
that are carried out by the intentional actions.
206
   
As Tenenbaum notes, these transitions do not all take a single form though.  Depending on 
these different forms, i.e. on the different ways in which one‘s conception of the good may relate 
to one‘s actions, Tenenbaum divides all intentional actions broadly defined, into three categories: 
the fully deliberated, the merely intentional (narrowly defined) and the merely voluntary.
207
   
On this view, practical reasoning which issues in fully deliberated actions is the transition 
from appearances of the good to all-out judgments of the good, through the agent‘s deliberation, 
which determines that within the perspective of the agent‘s general conception of the good, no 
better action is available at that time.  Practical reasoning which issues in merely intentional 
actions is the transition from an appearance of the good to an all-out judgment of the good, 
without any deliberation about whether it is the best available action on the basis of one‘s 
general conception of the good.  In other words it is an immediate transition from an appearance 
to a judgment, which is nevertheless warranted by one‘s conception of the good, in the sense that 
one‘s general conception of the good has determined that some transitions from appearances to 
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judgments should not be mediated by deliberation.
208
  Finally, practical reasoning which issues 
in merely voluntary actions is the transition to an all-out judgment of the good which is not 
mediated either by desires or deliberation.  This transition is nevertheless warranted by one‘s 
general conception of the good, in that it is part of this conception that one‘s bodily movements 
should sometimes run more freely than they would if constrained by desire or deliberation. 
These different forms of transition or practical reasoning to all-out judgments of the good 
nevertheless issue in intentional action qua chosen, because they all have the good as their 
formal end; because they all strive for the good in a specific way.  On this view, there is a 
generic determination of what it is to reason practically and more specific determinations of the 
various forms of reasoning practically.  On the generic determination, an agent counts as 
reasoning practically to the extent that she thereby strives for what really is good, what is part of 
her general conception of the good.
209
  On the more specific determinations, which I presented 
above, an agent counts as reasoning practically either to the extent that the activity of getting to 
the all-out judgment is guided by deliberation, or to the extent that this activity is warranted by 
her conception of the good. Thus a merely intentional action may be subject both to the standards 
of merely intentional reasoning and to the standards of generic practical reasoning.   
So, for instance, in moving immediately from the appearance that the cake is good to the all-
out judgment that it is good, in case one hasn‘t eaten anything for two days, the agent may be 
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succeeding in reasoning practically in the sense that in this case, judging immediately is 
warranted by one‘s conception of the good (starvation is a solid consideration for judging fast 
about food, for instance).  But if the cake happens to be bad, then the agent may be failing to 
reason practically, in the sense of reasoning practically which is determined by aiming at what is 
really good and not what appears good. It is thus that all forms of action might be subject to 
criticism from the perspective of the standards of one‘s general conception of the good.  
But things are not this simple.  To say that the good is the formal end of practical reasoning 
is to say that practical reasoning just is reasoning which determines what is good to do.  In 
Tenenbaum‘s words, ―only the actual exercise of practical reason could determine what the good 
is, in much the same way that only actual theoretical inquiry could determine the truth.‖210  But 
what is the ―actual exercise of practical reason?‖  
According to Tenenbaum, ―Practical reasoning in this [the scholastic] conception would be 
employed primarily in the reflective formation of a general conception of the good. Upon 
reflection, we deem appearances illusory or overridden, infer from certain practical judgments to 
others, and so forth, in such a way as to form a general conception of the good.‖211 [my 
emphasis]  It is clear from the above description of the different forms of practical reasoning that 
the practical reasoning in question is the specific, deliberative form of practical reasoning 
alone.
212
  If all forms of practical reasoning, i.e. reasoning which issues in choice, count as such 
because they all strive for the good, and this good is determined as such by the exercise of the 
deliberative form of practical reasoning alone, then it follows that all forms of practical 
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reasoning count as such because they strive for what the deliberative form of practical reasoning 
―says‖ they should strive for.   
It would seem then that the merely intentional and merely voluntary forms of practical 
reasoning count as forms of practical reasoning because they obey the rule of the deliberative 
form of reasoning.  In this case, when they do issue in all-out judgments of the good which are 
true, they will count as achieving their end, i.e. the good, because they obey the rule of 
deliberative reasoning, and not because their exercise determines the good.  So, even though the 
non-deliberative forms of practical reasoning may count as aiming at the good, they may not 
count as having the good as their formal end.  To the extent though that a form of practical 
reasoning is determined as such by its formal end, to this extent the non-deliberative forms of 
reasoning will not count as forms of practical reasoning at all.  No matter how much we stress 
the fact that they still aim at the good, their doing so must be a degenerate form of ‗aiming at the 
good‘.   
Therefore, if the formal end of practical reasoning is the good as such, and not the good 
under a further specification (for instance, the good as determined by the deliberative form of 
reasoning), the deliberative form of practical reasoning should be the only genuine form of 
practical reasoning.  The merely intentional and voluntary forms of practical reasoning should 
only count as degenerate, or as less than full-fledged instances of a single form and not as 
distinct forms of practical reasoning.  
Indeed Tenenbaum‘s vocabulary often gives this impression.  For instance, when he 
introduces the merely intentional form of practical reasoning he says that ―…given that we are 
limited agents for whom deliberation is often costly, not all actions can be determined by 
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deliberation…‖213  This makes it seem as if merely intentional practical reasoning is admitted as 
a form of practical reasoning merely because we don‘t have much choice.  Elsewhere for 
instance he says that ―According to the version of the scholastic view I defend, an unconditional 
evaluative judgment ought to be formed in accordance with a general conception of the good, a 
reflective view on the good formed in light of the various perspectives on the good manifested in 
the various desires of a particular agent. This is not to say that an agent will always form an 
unconditional evaluative judgment in accordance with her conception of the good but only that 
whenever this does not happen her actions fall short of the ideal of rational action.‖214 [my 
emphasis]  This is not to say of course that one will thereby be irrational, but it is to say that one 
will be less than fully rational, which implies that the non-deliberative forms of practical 
reasoning are less than full-fledged forms of practical reasoning.   And again elsewhere, ―… a 
judgment of the good ideally should not itself be the immediate consequence of a desire.  The 
move from an appearance to a judgment should be mediated by a more general conception of the 
good formed on the basis of an evaluation of the various relevant appearances of the good.‖215  
[my emphasis] 
To the extent that the non-deliberative forms of practical reasoning count as degenerate, they 
will not count as distinct forms of practical reasoning, but only as degenerate instances or 
manifestations or approximations of the single genuine form.  But at the same time, to the extent 
that they strive for what the genuine form of practical reasoning strives for they count as forms 
of practical reasoning.  Therefore, the Scholastic version of formal multi-dimensionalism thrives 
on an ambiguity between the existence of distinct forms of practical reasoning sharing one thing 
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in common and one form of practical reasoning which may be realized more perfectly or 
imperfectly depending on the circumstances.  A better account of formal multi-dimensionalism 
should manage to explain what the distinct forms of practical reasoning share in common 
without having to end up presenting the one form as merely a degenerate instance of the other.  
This is what Korsgaard attempts to do in her book Self-Constitution, by arguing against what 
she calls the model of the Miserable Sinner: the conception of the virtuous person as the one who 
―must constantly repress his unruly desires in order to conform to the demands of duty.‖216  In 
trying to argue against this model of virtue, Korsgaard in effect argues against a multi-
dimensional model of the forms of practical reasoning on which even though there is more than 
one form of practical reasoning, only one of them is genuine.  The others are merely degenerate 
instances of the one true form.  It is this understanding of the distinction of the forms of 
reasoning as the distinction between the perfect and the imperfect instantiations of a single form 
which dictates that the virtuous person (the ideally rational person in our case) is the one who 
should be suppressing the voice of the imperfect or degenerate forms of reasoning in order to 
conform with the demands of the perfect or genuine form of reasoning.  Against this model of 
the form of practical reasoning, and hence of virtue, Korsgaard proposes a model which 
promises to explain how the distinct forms of practical reasoning issue in choice, without 
presenting them as the degrees of realization of a single form; i.e. without presenting the one as a 
merely degenerate or imperfect instance of the other.  But, I shall argue, Korsgaard does not keep 
her promise. 
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On Korsgaard‘s proposed solution, the form of intentional action as chosen is not simply the 
form of practical reasoning which issues in it.  This, she takes it, is the assumption which gets 
Tenenbaum into trouble.  Once he has assumed this together with the incommensurability of the 
forms of practical reasoning, he has to suppose the incommensurability of the forms of choice.  
And then, to explain the unity of intentional action, in other words what these incommensurable 
forms of choice share in common such that choice between them must be subject to normative 
criticism, he has to explain these different forms as degenerate forms of the only genuine form of 
practical reasoning and action.  To deny this foundational assumption Korsgaard makes two 
ingenious moves.  First she supposes that the form of intentional action is the form of a unity.
217
  
Then she claims that the form of a unity is a matter of a certain arrangement of its parts; i.e. a 
matter of the constitution of its parts through distinct functions.
218
   
Broadly speaking, Korsgaard‘s argument (like Velleman‘s and Tenenbaum‘s) is a function 
argument.  On Velleman‘s conception, as I said in section 2.2.1, the function of an object A is 
constitutive of it, in the sense that its addition is what turns another object B, into object A.
219
  
The function of an object A is then always external to another object B, which forms its basis.  
On Tenenbaum‘s conception on the other hand, the function of a type of object A is constitutive 
of it in the sense that it is determined by the characteristic activity of the best instance of that 
type.
220
  Once determined by this activity, it constitutes the goal or the aim of the less perfect 
instances of this activity.  In this sense the function of an object A is external to the less perfect 
instances of its characteristic activity.  Korsgaard‘s view is that the function of an object A is 
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constitutive of it, in the sense that its function is the activity that the ideal arrangement of its 
parts, i.e. its collective form, makes it fit for.
221
  Claims about the function of an object are 
claims about the internal organization of an individual object.
222
   An individual is constituted as 
such when its parts are arranged in the manner that allows it to do perfectly what it does; to 
perform its function.  The function of an object is internal to its individuality, and not just to the 
perfect instance of its form.
223
   
In some sense then the function of any living thing is self-constitution.  The characteristic 
work of a living thing, the task that lies at hand for it, is to constitute itself as an individual of its 
kind.  And an individual is determined as an individual of its kind to the extent that its matter 
takes up a certain form.  This form is nothing but an ideal arrangement of its parts or matter.   
Similarly in the case of intentional action, an individual intentional action is the 
characteristic activity of an individual agent, and the characteristic work or function of an agent 
is to constitute itself as an individual agent.
224
  An individual agent is determined as an individual 
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to the extent that its matter takes up a certain form; to the extent that its parts are arranged in an 
ideal manner.  In other words, an individual agent is determined as such to the extent that each of 
the parts of the agent‘s soul performs its distinctive task or function.  It is to this extent that the 
agent acts intentionally.  Korsgaard then argues that the parts of the agent‘s soul are arranged 
properly for the agent to constitute itself as an individual when the following holds:  the rational 
part of the soul rules, the appetitive part proposes and obeys and the spirited part ensures that the 
verdicts of reason are carried out.
225
  In other words, the agent performs her characteristic 
activity, i.e. acts intentionally, when the matter of the soul is informed by the proper virtue of 
justice; when the organization of the parts of the soul is just.  And for the organization of the 
parts of the soul to be just, each part must perform its own function.  The relevant passage is 
worth quoting in full. 
So the function of appetite is to propose and obey, of reason to rule, and of spirit to ensure that 
reason‘s decisions get carried out. The parts of the soul are not—at least not when the soul is in 
order—contenders for power, but rather each has its own work to do, and together they make 
collective action—that is to say, action—possible. And this explains Socrates‘ puzzling definition 
of justice. Justice, he says, is ‗‗doing one‘s own work and not meddling with what isn‘t one‘s own‘‘ 
(R 433a–b). When Socrates first introduces this principle into the discussion (R 369e–370d), he‘s 
talking about the specialization of labor, and that‘s what the principle sounds like it‘s about. But if 
we think of the constitution as laying out the procedures for deliberative action, and the roles and 
offices that constitute those procedures, we can see what Socrates‘ point is. For usurping the office 
of another in the constitutional procedures for collective action is precisely what we mean by 
injustice, or at least it is one thing we mean. … It is meddling with somebody else‟s work. 
(Korsgaard, 2009, p. 147-8) 
I argued above that Tenenbaum fails to explain how the incommensurable forms of practical 
reasoning issue in unified intentional action.  Korsgaard‘s answer not only allows that the 
different forms of practical reasoning have distinct functions while allowing for unified action, 
but demands that the forms of reasoning should have distinct functions if they are to issue in 
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unified action.  This is because on her picture unification is self-constitution and self-constitution 
is by definition an ideal arrangement of parts; i.e. a matter of the constitution of parts through 
distinct functions.   
The parts of the soul, Korsgaard says in the passage above ―are not – at least not when 
the soul is in order – contenders for power, but rather each has its own work to do, and together 
they make collective action – that is to say, action – possible.‖226  On this interpretation, the three 
parts of the soul correspond to three distinct stages of every individual deliberative action.  In the 
case of a paradigmatically deliberative action the function of each of the parts is, as I said earlier, 
the following: appetite makes a proposal, reason decides whether to act on it or not, and spirit 
carries out reason‘s decision.227  This interpretation of the specialization of the functions of the 
parts of the soul in the unification of the agent is born out of Korsgaard‘s interpretation of self-
consciousness as the terrain of the partition of the soul.  In fact, Korsgaard claims that 
―Socrates‘s emphasis on conflict is slightly misleading, for even if there is no conflict, two parts 
of the soul can be discerned.‖228   
On her conception, contrary to what happens with animals, when we, human beings, desire 
or fear certain things, we are aware not merely of the fact that we feel certain things but also of 
the fact that we are inclined to act in certain ways on the basis of these desires and fears. But 
―…once we are aware that we are inclined to act in a certain way on the ground of a certain 
incentive, we find ourselves faced with a decision, namely, whether we should to that.  We can 
say to ourselves: ―I am inclined to do act-A for the sake of end E.  But should I?‖‖  Being 
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conscious of the fact that we are inclined to act a certain way on the ground of a certain 
incentive
229
 opens a space between the incentive and the response, what Korsgaard calls a 
―reflective distance,‖230 in which reason is born.  In Korsgaard‘s words, ―Our rational principles 
then replace our instincts – they will tell us what is an appropriate response to what, what makes 
what worth doing, what the situation calls for.  And so it is in the space of reflective distance, in 
the internal world created by self-consciousness that reason is born.‖231  It is the consciousness 
of the fact that we are inclined to act a certain way that raises the question of whether we ―ought 
to‖ act that certain way; the question of reason.232  On this interpretation this is what it is for 
reason to rule.  It is for it to endorse or reject the proposals of appetite: the incentives we are 
aware of as inclining us to act a certain way.   
To say that reason is operative when we are not determined by alien forces working on us, 
but when we can step back from these forces and reflect on what to do, is to side with 
commonsense.  What is not commonsense though is to say that this is where reason is born.  In 
particular, what goes beyond common sense is that reason does not have its own incentives, but 
merely provides the principle for accepting or rejecting the incentive that comes from elsewhere; 
e.g. from appetite.  Korsgaard herself seems to go against her own words when she repeatedly 
stresses that on Kant‘s picture, which she explicitly endorses, reason provides its own 
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incentive.
233
 But if reason is first born in the reflective distance that self-consciousness opens 
between the incentive and our response then this incentive cannot be provided by reason.  
Instead it always has to be provided by something else; appetite, in Korsgaard‘s view.   
On this interpretation, to say that it is the function of reason to rule is to say that it is the 
function of reason to rule appetite; i.e. to choose whether to accept or reject the deliverances of 
appetite.  Similarly, to say that the form of intentional action is the form of unity would be to say 
that the parts of the soul correspond to the three stages of a fully deliberative intentional action, 
because for reason to be fully operative, for reason to be able to rule, appetite must offer the 
matter which reason will endorse or reject, and appetite must obey reason‘s verdict.234  So 
appetite‘s function must be to propose and obey.  And, on this interpretation, because appetite 
often happens to be disobedient, a third part is formed, the spirited part, whose function is to 
ensure that reason‘s verdicts are carried out. 
I said above that Korsgaard herself seems to go against her own words when she claims that 
reason can in fact provide its own incentive.  If it can though, there is no reason to suppose that 
at the first stage of every deliberative action we find appetite making a proposal.  Reason should 
be able to make its own proposal independently of appetite.  If reason were able to make its own 
proposal, the unification of the parts of the soul in action would not have to be a matter of the 
three parts corresponding to three stages of every deliberative action.  It could be the case that a 
fully deliberative action might turn out to be the ―result‖ of the function of reason and reason 
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alone: reason being and reason endorsing the incentive.  It could, that is, be that reason operates 
on appetite‘s proposals, only when something has gone wrong, and reason has not provided its 
own incentive or on some occasions only.  But then the picture of unification that Korsgaard 
proposes would fall on its knees; or rather onto Tenenbaum‘s knees.  For now we would in effect 
be reverting to a conception of the more or less perfect manifestations of one and the same 
function, rather than distinct functions constituting a unity.   
To preserve her picture of unity as a unity of distinct functions or parts, Korsgaard could 
suggest that reason provides its own incentive only in the sense that, when it rejects or endorses 
appetite‘s proposals, it does so out of an incentive of its own: respect for moral law for instance.  
On this alternative, the incentive of reason functions as such only when appetite has made its 
proposal, only when appetite has provided an incentive for action.  
But in this case we can always raise the following objection. As I said above, Korsgaard 
argues against the Tenenbaum style of thought, on which even though there is more than one 
form of practical reasoning, only one of them is genuine.  The true view for Korsgaard is one on 
which the form of intentional action is constituted collectively by the ideal arrangement of the 
parts of the soul; i.e. by the ideal exercise of each of the functions of the distinct forms of 
reasoning.  Now the question is: what happens when this ideal arrangement is not fully effected 
or preserved? What happens for instance when reason rules that appetite‘s proposals should 
always or most of the time be embraced?  The difficulty of this question is not, as Korsgaard 
supposes, that ―an unjust person cannot act at all, because an unjust person is not unified by 
constitutional rule.‖235 Because in a moderately unjust soul each part still performs its distinctive 
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function, albeit not very well: appetite proposes, reason embraces (where it should reject of 
course) and spirit carries out.  The particular malfunction in this case is that reason should reject 
appetite‘s proposal.  This should be no problem for Korsgaard at all for as she herself says, 
―action…is something that comes in degrees: an action can unify and constitute its agent to a 
greater or lesser degree.‖236 
The problem with Korsgaard‘s solution is that if the unjust soul must be to some extent 
unified in order to act, then what is unjust in the above case of malfunction must be its very 
unity.  For if appetite is recognizable as proposing, reason as ruling and spirit as carrying out, the 
unjust soul must to some extent, as I said, count as unified.  Even when reason almost always 
rules that appetite‘s verdicts should be embraced, reason is still recognizable as giving the law.  
The difference between this and the ideal case is, Korsgaard points out, that in this case reason 
gives the wrong law.  ―A city may be governed, and yet be governed by the wrong law.  And so 
may a soul,‖ says Korsgaard.237  When talking about action performed under this wrong law or 
bad principle later on she says: ―it is action because it is chosen in accordance with the exercise 
of a principle by which the agent rules himself and under whose rule he is – in a sense – 
constitutionally unified.  It is bad, because it is not reason‟s own principle, it does not rule for 
the good of the soul as a whole, and therefore the unity it produces – at least in the cases of 
timocracy, oligarchy, and democracy – is contingent and unstable. Reason‘s own principle, in 
contrast to all of these, is the principle that truly unifies the soul…‖238 [my emphasis].  Here 
Korsgaard seems to claim that in both the ideal and the defective case the agent gives herself a 
law and that what distinguishes the two cases is that in the one, but not the other, the law is good 
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because it is reason‘s own law.  This seems to fly in the face of Korsgaard‘s earlier declarations 
that the agent is unified because the agent‘s constitution says that reason should rule, and not 
because it is reason that rules.  To say that the difference between the ideal and the defective case 
is that in the former the law is good, i.e. is reason‘s rule, and in the second it is not just is to say 
that the ideal and the defective unities constitute different forms of unity; such that only one of 
them is genuine (reason‘s unity) and the rest (appetite‘s unity for instance) count as distinct, but 
less genuine or rational forms of unity and so of intentional action.  But this conception faces the 
same problem as Tenenbaum‘s view did.  For on Korsgaard‘s conception too it would seem that 
the distinct forms of choice or intentional action count as distinct forms to the extent that they 
approximate the only genuine form.  To the extent that each constitutes a degenerate 
manifestation of this one genuine form, it constitutes less of a form of unity.  
If the form of choice or intentional action as the object of choice is determined as the perfect 
collective exercise of the functions of the distinct forms of practical reasoning, then the function 
of each form of choice will be determined in relation to the collective of the functions of the 
forms of reasoning.  If this is so, even if we grant reason its own incentive, it will arise as 
reason‘s incentive only as a reaction to an appetitive incentive.  And so reason will be other-
determining, but not self-determining.  In other words, it will always, in all possible cases, rule 
over something else ultimately; i.e. appetite.  Depending on how it rules over appetite (i.e. 
whether reason gives appetite reason‘s own law, or reason gives appetite a law reason derives 
from appetite), it will either give a good or a bad law, and so it will constitute a good or a bad 
form of unity, and hence a good or bad form of intentional action.  So ultimately the ideal state 
of the soul is a distinctive form of unity which is constituted as such, not by the constitution of 
the soul, but by the fact that the law of the soul is given to appetite by reason and not by appetite.  
 161 
Korsgaard‘s account then is also a disguised version of rationalism, on which even though there 
are distinct and incommensurable practical requirements, only one of them is constitutes true 
unity, because it is reason‘s own. 
For reason to be self-determining in a way that would make for genuine self-determination 
and not mere rationalism (which supports the unquestioned rule of reason), reason should be able 
to be more than its own form; it should also be able to be its own matter.  This would only be 
possible if the unity of intentional action was not determined by the collective exercise of the 
functions of the distinct and incommensurable forms of reasoning.  In the next section I will 
briefly show how. 
 
3.4  CONCLUSION 
In the somewhat lengthy passage I quoted above, Korsgaard says that ―The parts of the soul are 
not – at least when the soul is in order – contenders for power, but rather each has its own work 
to do, and together they make collective action – that is to say, action – possible.‖239  But, I 
argued that if the unity of intentional action is understood as a matter of collective action – i.e. 
action whose every stage is under the jurisdiction of one of the parts of the soul – then we will 
have a hard time arguing, on the basis of considerations of unity alone, that the defective unities 
(where for instance reason embraces all of appetite‘s proposals) do not constitute distinct, albeit 
less genuine forms of unities. To avert this conclusion, I suggested, we have to understand the 
function of reason as specifiable independently of the prior proposals of appetite.  To do this we 
have to reject Korsgaard‘s view that reason is born together with the question of Whether to 
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endorse appetite‟s proposals.  We have to understand reason as providing its own incentive 
independently of appetite‘s incentives.  In other words, reason has to be conceived as capable of 
issuing in intentional action “on its own.”  But then the unity of intentional action will not be a 
matter of the parts of the soul issuing in action collectively.  The form of unity of the parts of the 
soul will not be provided by the image of justice: the image of each ―part of the soul‖ or ―form of 
reasoning‖ doing its own work in order to constitute action together with other parts or forms.  
Intentional action will not be the result of the just configuration or organization of a certain 
collective (of parts, forms of reasoning, etc.).
240
   
One could suggest that this rejection of Korsgaard‘s account of unity may once more lead to 
something like Tenenbaum‘s view, on which intentional action is what the paradigmatic form of 
practical reasoning issues in, and the ―other‖ forms of practical reasoning are in reality 
degenerate manifestations of this paradigmatic form.  For, if reason can issue in intentional 
action all ―on its own,‖ it would seem that the ―other‖ forms of reasoning, in which reason 
―needs‖ appetite or spirit to issue in intentional action, would in reality be less genuine 
manifestations of the only genuine rational form.   
But there is an alternative.  There is a way to argue that even though practical reasoning is 
subject to incommensurable practical requirements, its different guises can issue in intentional 
action qua the object of choice ―on their own‖ (i.e. not collectively as Korsgaard assumes) 
without falling back onto Tenenbaum‘s view (i.e. without discriminating between more and less 
genuine forms of rationality).  To sum up: on Korsgaard‘s view, there are different forms of 
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practical reasoning which share in a further ideal form of rationality which they constitute 
collectively as a unity by performing their proper functions rightly.   On Tenenbaum‘s 
conception, there are different forms of practical reasoning which share in an ideal form of 
rationality by virtue of the fact that they approach, more or less perfectly, the only genuine form 
of practical reasoning – the form of fully deliberative reasoning. 
The first step to the alternative argument is to insist that the parts of the soul can all provide 
both the incentive and the principle, to speak in the Kantian idiom.  To avert the first form of 
misunderstanding, the one that leads to Korsgaard‘s view, we have to understand reason as being 
its own matter; in Korsgaard‘s idiom, as also ruling over itself.  To avert the second form of 
misunderstanding, the one that leads to Tenenbaum‘s view, we have to understand appetite as 
being its own form; in Tenenbaum‘s idiom, as also determining, and not merely (accidentally) 
striving for what is good.  To get there we have to appreciate that the incommensurable practical 
requirements determine incommensurable guises of practical reasoning (determinations of 
individual means-end syntheses by the practical requirements) and not incommensurable forms 
of reasoning (ways in which practical reasoning is determined by practical requirements).  The 
fact that practical reasoning is determined by incommensurable practical requirements does not 
have to mean that each such requirement determines practical reasoning in a distinctive and 
incommensurable way; i.e. it does not have to mean that each practical requirement determines 
an incommensurable form of practical reasoning, as Tenenbaum and Korsgaard assume.  
Practical reasoning may still be determined by incommensurable requirements in one and the 
same way.  This is the way of a distinctive self-consciousness, which may, depending on the 
circumstances, constitute practical knowledge: knowledge of oneself as rightly determining what 
to do in the circumstances.  This is why practical reasoning determined by incommensurable 
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requirements of practical rationality may nevertheless issue in intentional action qua the object of 
choice and not merely qua eligible for choice.  Let me take things more slowly here. 
In the first chapter of this dissertation I argued that we have good reason to accept the 
Thompsonian account of the elementary structure of intentional action.  On this account, the 
structure of intentional action is the synthesis of instrumental or means-end descriptions (means-
end synthesis) which is manifested in rationalizations of the form ―I‘m doing A because I‘m 
doing B, I‘m doing B because I‘m doing C, etc.‖  If the form of action motivation is the form of 
practical reasoning; and action motivation is subject to non-instrumental incommensurable 
practical requirements, then we should say that the guises of practical reasoning – i.e. the 
(individual) determinations of means-end synthesis that are inscribed in an action by practical 
requirements – are themselves incommensurable.   
With this generic definition of practical reasoning in mind I can cast Tenenbaum‘s and 
Korsgaard‘s views in the following light.  For Tenenbaum the incommensurable guises of 
practical reasoning are more or less perfect approximations to the exercise of the paradigmatic 
capacity of determining which such guises are the right ones in general; determining that is one‘s 
general conception of the good.  For Korsgaard, on the other hand, the incommensurable guises 
of practical reasoning constitute in the ideal case (which is the case of the ideal arrangement of 
the parts of the soul) different stages of the ideal activity of reasoning about what is the right 
means-end synthesis in the circumstances.  
In my view, the incommensurable guises of practical reasoning really are incommensurable 
guises of practical reasoning, which, depending on the circumstances, are all equally practical 
and rational.  Tenenbaum and Korsgaard hesitate to admit this simple truth because both 
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mistakenly assume that the unapologetic incommensurability (i.e. no less, or more, or equal 
practicality and rationality) of the (individual) determinations of practical reasoning by practical 
requirements has to issue in strongly
241
 incommensurable forms of choice.  Tenenbaum‘s 
solution was to partly embrace this incommensurability of forms of choice,
242
 and Korsgaard‘s 
solution was to partly reject it.
243
  I believe that we can entirely reject the possibility that there 
are multiple forms of choice, even in the face of the (individual) determination of practical 
reasoning by incommensurable requirements of practical rationality.  
Korsgaard and Tenenbaum assume that clear-cut incommensurability between the guises of 
practical reasoning (its (individual) determinations by incommensurable practical requirements) 
must constitute clear-cut incommensurability between forms of practical reasoning which cannot 
but issue in clear-cut incommensurability between forms of choice.  This is why they both 
assume a watered down incommensurability of the guises of practical reasoning.  But there is an 
alternative.  The incommensurable guises of practical reasoning (individual (individual) 
determinations of practical reasoning by incommensurable practical requirements) need not 
constitute incommensurable forms of practical reasoning (typical ways in which practical 
reasoning is determined by incommensurable practical requirements).  The incommensurability 
of the guises of practical reasoning is compossible with the existence of a single way in which 
practical reasoning is determined by practical requirements.  Let me explain how. 
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The (individual) determination of an agent‘s practical reasoning by incommensurable 
requirements should not be taken merely as the activity of reasoning under incommensurable 
standards of what the right means-end synthesis is in the circumstances.  We should understand 
the (individual) determination of the agent‘s reasoning by incommensurable standards of 
rationality as the agent‘s consciousness of her reasoning as determined by the right practical 
requirement for the right means-end synthesis in the circumstances; and so, as consciousness of 
herself as rightly determining what to do in the circumstances, such that it may constitute 
knowledge of herself as rightly determining what to do in the circumstances, depending on the 
circumstances.  If the determination of practical reasoning is thus self-conscious, we can take the 
form of practical reasoning (the way it is determined by incommensurable practical 
requirements) to be this distinctive sort self-consciousness on the part of the agent.  So for 
instance (intemperate) appetite not only presents an action as pleasant, but it also presents 
pleasure as the proper requirement by which one‘s reasoning ought to be determined in the 
circumstances; and similarly for the other requirements of practical rationality.  If we thus 
understand the (individual) determination of practical reasoning by incommensurable practical 
requirements, and see our way to accepting that there is only a single form of practical reasoning, 
we can appreciate that choice just is the actualization of this distinctive form when things go 
well; i.e. practical knowledge.  Practical reasoning may issue in intentional action, even when the 
agent is wrong in her self-consciousness, because intentionality is constituted by the potential of 
self-consciousness to constitute practical knowledge.  When the agent is right in her self-
consciousness the agent‘s intentional action constitutes choice; i.e. practical knowledge.  Choice 
constitutes the simple actualization of the capacity to reason practically or self-consciously, the 
potential for which constitutes the intentionality of action.  We do not have to assume that there 
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are more or less ideal or rational forms of this capacity, as Korsgaard and Tenenbaum seemed 
forced to, to explain the difference between intentionality and choice.   This is how we manage 
to both preserve the genuine incommensurability of the (individual) determinations of practical 
reasoning by the requirements of practical rationality and answer the question of choice.   
But one may object that the only thing I have thus far managed to settle is that all intentional 
actions must be self-conscious in a distinctive way; not that this distinctive self-consciousness if 
the form of the intentionality of action.  For, we cannot just assume that intentional action as the 
object of choice is what multi-dimensional practical reasoning issues in.  For this is what we are 
trying to show.  In other words, even if we manage to establish that the incommensurable guises 
of practical reasoning are self-conscious (individual) determinations of what to do under the 
guise of the (purportedly) right practical requirement for the circumstances, and that all choice 
is the self-conscious (individual) determination of reasoning under the right practical 
requirement for the circumstances, what I have not established is that this self-consciousness is 
not multiform as well.  In other words, on this objection, I have not established that the criteria 
for determining whether an agent is right in the consciousness of herself (as determined in her 
reasoning by the right practical requirement for the circumstances) are not themselves internal to 
the standards of the practical requirement which determines the reasoning; and so I have not 
established that the criteria of practical knowledge are not themselves incommensurable.  But, 
once the possibility of this incommensurability is on the table, we will once more (as in the case 
of the material multi-dimensional views) need to introduce an extra capacity for judging what is 
the right form of self-consciousness about what one ought to do in the circumstances.    
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The only reason we are tempted into this further postulation of incommensurability is that 
we overlook another simple truth: that the self-consciousness involved in the (individual) 
determination of reasoning by requirements of practical rationality is not itself something that 
can admit of further incommensurable forms, because when things go well this self-
consciousness simply amounts to practical knowledge; knowledge of oneself as rightly 
determining what to do.
244
  There is no need for a further criterion for deciding whether this or 
that particular self-consciousness as reasoning under the right requirement constitutes 
knowledge, other than how way things in the world go.  Self-consciousness of rightness in the 
sense discussed here does not automatically amount to practical knowledge of rightness.  One 
may be conscious of oneself as reasoning in the right manner in the circumstances without 
indeed doing so.  To say that an action counts as intentional to the extent that the agent of the 
action is conscious of herself as reasoning under the right requirement for the circumstances is 
not to say that the agent is indeed right in her self-consciousness.  It is to say though that she is 
potentially right and so that her self-consciousness potentially constitutes practical knowledge of 
herself as correctly determining what to do in the circumstances.  It is this potential of self-
consciousness to constitute practical knowledge that makes all actions intentional, even though 
they may issue from incommensurable (individual) determinations of practical reasoning by 
practical requirements.  Whether the particular guise of self-consciousness (consciousness of 
oneself as rightly reasoning under the guise of a specific practical requirement) in each situation 
indeed constitutes practical knowledge or not will depend on the particular circumstances.  It is 
true that there is no way to tell in advance what instance of self-consciousness will indeed be 
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  When speaking here of practical knowledge I don’t mean to refer to Anscombe’s specification of practical 
knowledge in the first part of Intention, as knowledge without observation of what one is doing when one is acting 
intentionally. (Anscombe, 1957)  What the connection of Anscombe’s sense of knowledge with my sense of 
practical knowledge as knowledge of oneself as rightly determining what to do, is a topic of further research. 
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right in particular circumstances.  But as I will briefly suggest in the conclusion of this 
dissertation, there is no good reason why we should be expect to able to tell in advance anyway.  
And so no further criterion of the rightness of one‘s practical self-consciousness is needed other 
how things in the world go. 
In the introduction to this chapter I said that if practical reasoning is determined by 
incommensurable requirements, the sense in which practical reasoning is reasoning about what 
to do is put in jeopardy.   To show this I urged that typically when we reason about what to do, 
we reason both about what the prudent or the pleasant thing is, and about whether to do the 
prudent or the pleasant thing or not.  And I suggested that a good theory of practical reasoning 
should take practical reasoning to address both questions. But if the requirements of rationality 
by which practical reasoning is determined are incommensurable, then, it may seem that unless 
we postulate the existence of a higher order or ideal form of practical reasoning, practical 
reasoning will be about what is the prudent thing to do, or what pleasant thing to do, but not 
about whether to do the pleasant thing or not, for instance.   
If I‘m right in suggesting that the (individual) determination of practical reasoning by a 
principle of rationality involves the agent‘s consciousness of herself as determined in her 
reasoning by the right practical requirement, then in reasoning about what the pleasant thing to 
do is, one will thereby be reasoning about whether to do the pleasant thing (and the same goes 
for prudence, etiquette, or whatever other guise of practical reasoning we propose).  For, an 
agent‘s reasoning that doing-A-to-do-B is the pleasant thing to do must involve the self-
consciousness on her part that the principle she is reasoning under (i.e. pleasure) is the right 
principle to reason under in the circumstances.  Of course, the reasoning may be unsound and the 
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self-consciousness false.  What matters is that in reasoning about what to do, one would on my 
view be reasoning both about what the particular e.g. ―prudent‖ thing to do in the circumstances 
is, and about whether reasoning under the guise of prudence is called for by the circumstances or 
not.  
In her book on self-constitution Korsgaard makes the dramatic claim that ―our liberation 
from the government of instinct is also our expulsion from the Garden, our banishment from a 
world that is teleologically ordered by our instincts and presented as such by our incentives, a 
world in which we nearly always already know what to do … For now we must use intelligence 
and reason both to reconstruct a picture of the world that enables us to find our way around in it, 
and to decide where to go and what to do in that world. That is to say, we must resort to science 
to reconstruct a usable conception of the world, and to ethics to determine how to live our 
lives.‖245   
If what I said here is right, then we never actually left the Garden.  For we almost always 
know what to do.  It‘s just that the Garden was never perfect.  For as Korsgaard herself 
emphasizes in her book, we almost always act.
246
  To assume that we are not in the Garden is to 
assume that things never go well, and that self-consciousness in acting never actually amounts to 
practical knowledge.  This is simply absurd.  Intelligence and Reason are not the equivalents of 
map and compass for someone who is ‗homeless‘, in the way that science and ethics may be.  To 
act and to act well we do not need a map and a compass, or science and ethics.  We need the 
right upbringing and the right circumstances.  Both of which can be proven inadequate at times 
of great challenge where nothing we could do could speak to our sense of how we should be 
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acting.  Intelligence and reason are not tools for ―us,‖ sinners against the ―government of 
instinct,‖ but the differentiae of ―our‖ life-form, from which alone we may become alienated. 
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4.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the introduction of this dissertation I tried to motivate the normativist commitment by arguing 
that only a normativist conception of motivation can allow for the distinctive criticism that 
akrasia incurs. And I suggested that if the conflicting motivations are conceived of as subject to 
two incommensurable requirements of practical normativity, then the object of each motivation 
will be criticizable from the standards which constitute the other motivation as such.  The akratic 
motivation would count as being subject to standards internal to the perspective of action 
motivation.  If what I argued for in this dissertation is right, akrasia is an instance of primary 
motivational conflict.  It is an instance of reasoning practically that one and the same action 
ought to both be pursued and avoided, where each instance is an exercise of reasoning under an 
incommensurable requirement of practical rationality.  So, when I am akratically smoking this 
one cigarette, my action is the outcome of a primary motivational conflict between reasoning 
practically both that smoking this one cigarette is to be done and that it is to be avoided.  Each 
motivation, i.e. each piece of reasoning is determined by incommensurable practical 
requirements; let‘s say appetite and temperance in this case.  If the motivations conflict, each 
piece of reasoning will incur criticism from the perspective of the requirement determining the 
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conflicting piece of reasoning.  In intemperately smoking this one cigarette, I am subject not only 
to the standards of the requirement of temperance (the requirement to reason practically to what 
will be prudent) but also the standards of the requirement of appetite (the requirement to reason 
practically to what will be enjoyable). And these standards are internal to action motivation as 
such; in fact they constitute action motivation, as I tried to show in this dissertation, because 
action motivation is determined as such by incommensurable requirements of practical 
rationality. 
But, one will object, this explanation of akrasia renders it indistinguishable within the genus 
of primary motivational conflict.  For if the distinctive feature of akrasia is merely that from the 
point of view of one motivation the conflicting motivation is not determined under the right 
guise of reasoning for the circumstances, then akrasia will be indistinguishable from all other 
cases of primary motivational conflict.  It will for instance be indistinguishable from continent 
motivation where one manages to act temperately.  For in this case too, the criticism one will 
incur will arise from the requirement which determines the reasoning which in the circumstances 
issues in a contrary verdict about what to do.  In both cases, that is, the motivation one acts from 
will merely be subject to the determining standards of the motivation one does not act from.  
This potential assimilation seems counter-intuitive because it appears that in acting akratically I 
am aware of acting wrongly in a way that I am not aware of when acting continently.  This is the 
objection that akrasia is asymmetric, whereas on my account it appears to be symmetric. 
But I suggested at the end of the third chapter of this dissertation that the form of practical 
reasoning – the way it is determined by incommensurable practical requirements – is the 
distinctive form of self-consciousness: the self-consciousness on the part of the agent as 
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determined in her reasoning by the right requirement of practical rationality for the 
circumstances; such that it may constitute practical knowledge depending on the circumstances.  
So, I can say now that the case of akrasia is indeed distinct from other cases of primary 
motivational opposition, because by definition in this case, the self-consciousness of the 
reasoning one acts against does constitute practical knowledge in the circumstances.  So, I can 
claim, the asymmetry between the akratic and the continent motivation in the case we are 
discussing is distinguished in accordance with whether the self-consciousness one eventually 
acts against constitutes practical knowledge or not.
247
  So, in the case of intemperately smoking 
this one cigarette, my akratic motivation is defective not just from the perspective of the contrary 
motivation and hence of an incommensurable practical requirement, but from the perspective of 
the right motivation and hence from the perspective of practical knowledge.  Whereas in the case 
of continently abstaining from smoking this one cigarette, my continent motivation is defective 
from the perspective not just of the contrary motivation but from the perspective of the mistaken 
in the circumstances self-consciousness.  It is in this way, I believe, that akrasia is asymmetric.   
Now one may insist that the point of the objection was not to just note the distinctiveness of 
the akratic type of primary motivational conflict, but to challenge directly my conclusion that 
there are distinct and incommensurable requirements of practical rationality, or guises of action 
motivation and practical reasoning, which are constituted as such by distinct and 
incommensurable normative standards, such that when one acts from either of the conflicting 
motivations one is thereby subject to the standards of the contrary motivation.  For if in acting 
continently one is not aware of acting wrongly in the way that one is aware of acting wrongly 
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when acting akratically, then this might seem to show that in acting continently one is not 
flouting any distinct and incommensurable rational norms; i.e. one is not acting wrongly even 
from the misguided application of the standards of the incommensurable guise of practical 
reasoning as I would like to say.  This purported difference in self-consciousness might, in our 
case, be taken to show that appetite is not constituted by its own practical requirement, by 
reference to which one can be criticized as acting wrongly.  But the proposed phenomenological 
evidence does not point this way at all.  That I‘m conscious of acting wrongly in a different way 
when I‘m acting akratically than when I am acting continently, follows from the fact that the 
self-consciousness of the rightness that each guise of reasoning or motivation involves is indeed 
distinct.  If the standards of acting rightly are different in each case (i.e. issue from a different 
requirement of practical rationality), then when I‘m acting wrongly in each case, it follows that I 
will be conscious of a different sort of wrongness on my part.  In the case of wrongness by the 
standards of prudence for instance I could be conscious of fighting my own development and 
well-being in time, etc., whereas in the case of wrong doing by the standards of appetite I could 
be conscious of failing to live an open-minded life such that it is guided not only by map and 
compass but also by delight and enjoyment.   
And yet, the objector will press, when acting incontinently I‘m conscious of the wrongness 
of the act not just from a certain perspective, but as such.  And this just isn‘t what I‘m conscious 
of when acting continently for instance.  So, the objector might continue, it is only in the akratic 
case that I‘m conscious of real wrongness.  In the continent case I‘m at best conscious of some 
incongruity or disagreement and this may be normative but not deeply so.  But this is to 
illegitimately divide kinds of wrongness into genuine and less genuine out of mere prejudice.  
The prejudice is I think the result of the notion that if erring on the side of caution is preferable 
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to erring on the side of pleasure, as Aristotle recommends, then the latter erring is more genuine 
than the former, and so the standards of prudence are superior to the standards of appetite by 
default.  The only reason that Aristotle recommends that erring on the side of caution is 
preferable is statistical.  Since most people err on the side of prudence, and since the matters of 
human conduct are uncertain and unpredictable,
248
 then it is better to err on this side.  The 
thought is not that since it matters most to err on the side of prudence, then we should be 
avoiding it as much as possible.  The thought is that the side of caution is the side of prudence 
because most people fail by its standards more often than by other standards. 
Should I not have a story about what explains the sense that the wrong-doing in the akratic 
case is, so to speak, graver than in the case of merely continent wrong-doing?  The fact that self-
consciousness may take incommensurable guises does not mean that in each such guise it cannot 
come in degrees.  So for instance in cases of what we call clear-eyed akrasia, the agent‘s 
consciousness of herself as rightly determined in her reasoning under the requirement of 
prudence in the circumstances is stronger than in common occurrences of akrasia.  Conversely, 
in a lot of cases of continent conflict, the agent‘s consciousness of herself as rightly determined 
in reasoning appetitively (say in thinking that one piece of super fatty chocolate cake will not 
harm the tenth attempt at a diet of someone who can‘t keep their mouth shut) may be relatively 
weak.  There is nothing in what I‘ve said so far that precludes this possibility. 
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  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.  I quote David Wiggins’ translation of an excerpt from chapter ten from 
Book Five of the Nicomachean Ethics: “About some things it is not possible to make a general statement which 
shall be correct.  In those cases then in which it is necessary to speak generally but not possible to do so correctly, 
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the Lesbian moulding: the rule adapts to the shape of the stone and is not rigid.  So too a decree adapts itself to 
the particular facts.” (Wiggins, 1997). I will come back to this notion of uncertainty in the human affairs shortly. 
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I said above that Aristotle‘s urge that we should be erring on the side of prudence is motivated 
by his estimation that most people err on the side of prudence and his belief that the matters of 
human conduct are uncertain and unpredictable.  To end this dissertation I want to come to this 
last part of Aristotle‘s injunction, and explain why, if what I‘ve said so far is right, we too should 
draw nearer to this commonsensical Aristotelian claim.   
In the final chapter of this dissertation I discussed Korsgaard‘s view as an attempt to ground 
the distinctness of the guises of practical reasoning in something other than their approximation 
to a more genuine or rational form of reasoning, as Tenenbaum‘s view seemed committed to.  
And I argued that ultimately Korsgaard‘s conception is also committed to the idea that there are 
distinct forms of unity of intentional action, which are distinguished as such in accordance with 
whether they approximate the most genuine or rational form of unity: the unity which is the 
outcome of the perfect collective exercise of the function of each of the soul‘s parts, and is 
determined by the ―right‖ law of reason and not the ―wrong‖ law of appetite.  In Korsgaard‘s 
view then, we can determine ahead of time which forms of practical reasoning are right in the 
circumstances, independently of the circumstances; i.e. the ones united by the ―right‖ law of 
reason and not the ―wrong‖ law of appetite.   Tragedy on this view arises when we unite 
ourselves genuinely, i.e. when each part of the soul performs its own function excellently and in 
accordance with the right law, but the circumstances in the world are such that even our best 
grapes go sour.   
Against this conception of our practical situation in the world I suggested that there is only 
one form of practical reasoning and this is the self-consciousness of the agent as determined in 
her reasoning by the right requirement of practical rationality for the circumstances.  And I 
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claimed that what makes all action determined by incommensurable practical requirements 
intentional is that this self-consciousness is a potential form of practical knowledge; when things 
go well this self-consciousness constitutes practical knowledge. 
One consequence of this view is that we cannot determine in advance of reasoning and 
acting which practical requirement is the most genuine, and so what our most common or 
mundane guises of reasoning ought to attempt to approximate.  For it is the mark of all 
requirements of practical rationality that they are all equally genuine, since each and every one of 
them may potentially issue in practical knowledge, when things go well.  We cannot fully 
determine in advance which practical requirement will work best for what circumstances, i.e. 
which requirement of rationality will determine the guise of practical reasoning which will 
constitute practical knowledge in particular circumstances, because we cannot determine in 
advance whether things will go well or not.   
But if we cannot determine in advance under what circumstances a specific guise of 
practical self-consciousness (self-consciousness of the agent that the specific requirement she is 
reasoning under is the right requirement for the circumstances) will constitute practical 
knowledge, then we cannot come up with a coherent and functional map of our practical 
situation in the world and a full-fledged plan of what self to be and what life to live, as 
Korsgaard seems to suppose.  As David Wiggins puts it, ―…often in a given case, we can find a 
way to collate and arbitrate between the demands that impinge there of impartiality, 
benevolence, mercy, due process, and so on.  There may, however, be no general method for 
doing this.  And let us say that A is incommensurable with B in the new sense of 
―incommensurable‖ – and under the new understanding of what sorts of things A and B are – if 
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there is no general way in which A and B trade off in the whole range of situations of choice and 
comparison in which they figure.‖249  There arises out of this line of thought a new way of 
understanding incommensurability, on which two guises of practical reasoning in my 
terminology, or ―general concerns which are rooted in the multiplicity of psychic structures‖ in 
Wiggins‘ terminology,250 are incommensurable in the sense that there is no general method of 
determining which of them will constitute practical knowledge in particular circumstances.   
But if it is not possible to construct in advance a detailed map and compass for our practical 
journey in the world, the following non-philosophical, practical question arises:  How then, 
facing the claims that these incommensurable general concerns or practical requirements make 
on us, do we make our choices?   Or rather, how do we make our choices in the light of our 
consciousness of the incommensurability of our most general concerns in this last sense of 
incommensurability? In other words, how do we go about in the world of practice if not with 
map (telling us where the good is located) and compass (telling us where we are located in 
relation to the good) in hand?  As Wiggins characteristically puts it ―The answer is that we have 
to make our choice in the light of our overall practical conception of how to be or how to live a 
life (both here and in general).  We deploy these conceptions even as the variety of the 
contingencies that we actually confront constantly shapes or reshapes the conceptions themselves 
(a two-way flow).  It will be no wonder if choice (as now described) is the exercise of an 
irreducibly practical knowledge, a knowledge that can never be exhaustively transposed into any 
finite set of objectives that admit of finite expression.‖251   
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We choose in the light of our practical conception of how to be or live, which is neither 
determined prior to the circumstances nor unchanging.  Instead it is a conception which is 
constantly reshaped by the contingent situations and our response to them, and not in accordance 
with a definite law which is antecedently determined as good, based on what form of practical 
reasoning provides it, as per Korsgaard‘s view.  In the light of this dynamic and historically 
determined conception of how to be and live we commonly reach accommodations between the 
autonomous, separate and irreducible practical requirements we are under.  But as Wiggins notes 
―…there cannot be any guarantee that no matter what the circumstances may be, we shall always 
be able to find this accommodation…Where our concerns for A, B (which are incommensurable 
simply in the third sense) cannot in a given circumstance X be accommodated at all to our sense 
of how one should live and what one should do, where nothing seems to us, even for the context, 
bearable or livable, there A and B are also in a  fourth and ―tragic‖ sense incommensurable in X 
– or incommensurable for us in X.‖252   
In my terminology, the incommensurability of the requirements which determine practical 
reasoning (in the sense that there is no general method of determining in advance under what 
conditions the self-consciousness of the agent as being determined in her reasoning by the right 
requirement for the circumstances will constitute practical knowledge) leaves it open that none 
of them may actually constitute practical knowledge in some circumstances.  For it is always 
open that particular circumstances in the world are such that the incommensurable practical 
requirements to which our thinking is subject cannot actually trade off each other in such a way 
as to yield a correct determination of oneself as knowing what one ought to do.  For it is open, in 
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other words, that there are cases in which the alternatives with which we are faced cannot be 
accommodated at all to our sense of how we should live.
253
   
The avoidance of this sort of tragedy, where nothing we do can amount to a rational 
response to circumstances in the world, is I believe the deeper reason which motivates theorists 
to seek either a theory of commensurable requirements of practical rationality in the way 
presented in the second chapter of this dissertation, or a theory of incommensurable but a priori 
more genuine or more rational forms of rational motivation in the ways examined in the final 
chapter.  That my view does not avoid the possibility of this sort of tragedy is not a fault of the 
view, but a reflection of our practical condition in the world.  In fact, I believe that views which 
cannot allow for this sort of tragedy are the views which are built on a fantasy about our practical 
condition. 
It transpired over the course of the argument of this dissertation that the different families of 
normativist multi-dimensional views typically resort to the following types of 
incommensurability: (a) The Motivation-first versions of multi-dimensionalism had to resort to a 
version of incommensurability on which the intervening dispositions to which a given 
disposition has to approximate to count as a case of action motivation could not be measured 
exactly against each other by a measure M  of property φ; where property φ was taken to be the 
approximation to a specific agent-general disposition.  (b) The Reasons-first multi-
dimensionalist theories had to resort to a type of incommensurability on which the respects of 
reason-hood that figure in the content of the judgment one has to be motivated in accordance 
with in order to count as motivated to act are incommensurable in the sense that they constitute 
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respects of practical worth-whileness that cannot be compared in respect of reason-hood.  c)  The 
Reasoning-first versions of multi-dimensionalism had to posit a conception of 
incommensurability on which the reasoning one has to be engaged in to count as being motivated 
to act must itself take incommensurable forms; i.e. that the way in which practical reasoning is 
determined by the incommensurable practical requirements must itself be incommensurable; and 
so the only way to judge whether it will be appropriate or not in the circumstances would be to 
judge whether it is a priori genuine or not.   
But these conceptions of incommensurability are ultimately unappealing.  For on all of 
them, it is still possible to construct a general method for figuring out how the incommensurable 
concerns A and B trade off in the whole range of situations of choice that an agent may face in 
her life.  For in the first case, it might be true that there is no measure against which to exactly 
measure the realization of property φ in A and B, but this does not mean that A and B are 
nevertheless not comparable.  If they are comparable, it should be perfectly plausible to come up 
with a general method of comparing different alternatives in terms of reason-hood.  Similarly in 
the second case it might be true that A and B may be incomparable with respect to reason-hood, 
but this does not mean that there should be no way to choose between them; such as would 
enable an adequate researcher to predict or explain in advance all reasonable behavior.  As 
Joseph Raz himself puts it when he attempts to defend the sense of incommensurability as 
incomparability in terms of reason-hood, ―Saying that two options are incommensurate does not 
preclude choice. Rational action is action for (what the agent takes to be) an undefeated reason. 
It is not necessarily action for a reason which defeats all others. We are, it is essential to 
remember, inquiring into the structure of practical reasoning, i.e. of the ways people conceive of 
themselves and their options and judge them. Psychological or other theories may explain, even 
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predict, people's choices on some of the occasions in which they find their options to be 
incommensurate. This is compatible with wide-spread incommensurability. While the agent's 
reasoning figures in many explanations of behavior there are other factors which also play a 
part.‖254 [my emphasis] 
If this is granted, then it should be perfectly plausible to come up with a general method of 
predicting not only what we have reason to do but also what we will in fact do.  Finally, in the 
third case, it might be true that A and B may be incommensurable in the sense that they 
themselves determine separate and irreducible standards of what it is to incur a rational loss or 
gain. But even so, this does not mean that it cannot be determined in advance how A and B will 
trade off each other (i.e. with what losses on the part of the agent) in the whole range of choices 
an agent faces.  In other words, an agent can determine in advance what types of rational losses 
and gains to acquire.  In this case it should be perfectly plausible to construct a general method 
for engaging practically with the world. 
The distinctive sense of incommensurability of A and B is the sense I suggested above, in 
which, as Wiggins puts it, ―there is no general way in which A and B trade off in the whole 
range of situations of choice and comparison in which they figure.‖255  The courage that our 
practical situation in the world demands is not the courage of the one who knows in advance that 
some choices will necessarily involve a distinctive type of rational loss or pain, as in the last 
sense of incommensurability above.  The courage that our practical situation in the world 
demands is the courage of the agents who know that they have to make ―the best sense they can 
of their own positive concerns and commitments in the space not excluded by accepted 
                                                          
254
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 Wiggins, 1997, p. 59. 
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prohibitions and of their striving to do this even in a world for whose countless and not 
exhaustively classifiable contingencies no Decalogue or code of practice or statement of 
objectives could ever prepare them.‖256   
If this is our practical condition, then, to end with a final quote by David Wiggins, ―It 
follows that the standard of reasonable conduct that the philosophy of the practical derives from 
lived experience must attend to each value in its separateness and irreducibility to others.  It must 
specify more and more closely what claims (including moral claims) each value makes on 
thought, feeling, and appetition.   The philosopher of practice must render it as unmysterious as 
he can how the knowledge of such a standard is not exhausted by the verbalized generalizations 
or precepts of either agent or theorist.  It is the existence of such knowledge that makes it 
possible, as Aristotle puts it, for the decision to lie in perception, that is, for the decision to 
depend on the exercise of judgment in confrontation with some actually given particular 
situation, even as the situation itself (with its larger context) is as specifically conceived by the 
agent as is necessary for him to conceive it in order to realize or instantiate there his evolving 
conception of the life that it is for him to lead in the there and then.‖257 But this is the task of 
another work. 
 
 
 
                                                          
256
 Ibid., p. 61. 
257
 Ibid., p. 65. 
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